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GUIDING CAPITAL SENTENCING
DISCRETION BEYOND THE "BOILER
PLATE": MENTAL DISORDER AS A
MITIGATING FACTOR
JAMES S. LIEBMAN* AND MICHAEL J. SHEPARD**
In five decisions handed down on July 2, 1976, the United
States Supreme Court held that the death penalty may be
imposed for the crime of murder, so long as there are clear
standards to guide the sentencing authority and the sanction
is not imposed mandatorily. The authors examine the eighth
amendment doctrinal framework used by the Court in the July
2 Cases, with particular reference to the requirement that
individualized mitigating information be considered in the
sentencing decision. Illustrating that requirement, they
contend that mental disorder should be considered as a
possibly mitigating factor and then suggest a standard by
which the sentencing authority might evaluate evidence of
mental disorders, particularly retardation and sociopathy.
INTRODUCTION
The recent history of capital sentencing in the United States has
centered around the inherent conflict between punishment admin-
istered mandatorily according to established standards and punish-
ment administered in a discretionary manner with regard for the spe-
cific defendant.1 In 1971, Professor Kalven asked a series of rhetorical
questions that highlighted this normative tension between death
imposed according to the rule of law and death dispensed with
discretionary authority.2 Agreeing with Justice Harlan's argument in
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Carl McGowan (D.C. Cir.). B.A. 1974, Yale University; J.D.
1977, Stanford University. The authors' names are arranged in alphabetical order.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Walter Cummings (7th Cir.). A.B. 1974, Princeton University;
J.D. 1977, Stanford University.
1. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 245-48 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing
American trend away from mandatory death sentence and contradictory trend away from
discretionary procedures that inflict unequal penalties on equally guilty parties).
2. Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War-, 85
HARv. L. REv. 3, 25 (1971), quoted in text accompanying note 337 supra.
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McGautha v. California3 that the factors that should guide a legislator
or jury in deciding whether to impose death are too complex to be
reduced to a regularized formula,4 he asked whether the impossibility
of administering the death penalty in accordance with legal rules does
not disclose a fatal flaw in the nature of that penalty.5 Because he did
not share Justice Harlan's faith in the jury's discretion, Kalven was
faced with an overwhelming dilemma-how to administer a punish-
ment that should not be dispensed without mercy and yet should not
be dispensed arbitrarily. He concluded that such a punishment must
be per se unconstitutional.6
Kalven's views have not been accepted by a majority of the
Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the force of his dilemma may explain
the multiplicity of opinions when the Court next reviewed standard-
less jury discretion in Furman v. Georgia.7 The five Justices
concurring in the Court's disposition of the case could agree only that,
whether or not the death penalty is ever constitutional, the eighth
amendment certainly prohibits its arbitrary administration.8 Thus, for
3. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
4. Ralven, supra note 2, at 25; see 402 U.S. at 204-08 (developing understandable standards
appears to be beyond present human ability). In McGautha, the Court rejected due process
challenges to the California and Ohio death penalty statutes. Id. at 186, 196. Although both
statutes left the sentencing decision to the untrammeled discretion of the jury, the Court upheld
them because it found that jury discretion is necessary to permit mercy to play a role in the
decision and because it felt that standards adequate to govern every case are impossible to
formulate. See id. at 203-08.
5. Ralven, supra note 2, at 25.
6. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 448-49 (1966) (no human being should
be given discretion to decide whether to use the death penalty); text accompanying note 337
infra; cf McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 249-50 (1971) (Brennan, J., with Douglas &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (if the rule of law and power of the states to impose the death penalty
irreconcilably conflict, the death penalty cannot supercede the rule of law).
7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The Court's decision was announced in a brief per
curiam order holding that these death sentences, imposed under the Georgia and Texas death
penalty statutes, violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 239-40. This order was
followed by five concurring and four dissenting opinions; no two Justices joined in any of the
concurring opinions.
8. See id. at 248-49, 248 n.11, 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discretionary statutes
unconstitutionally permit discrimination to play unfettered role in sentencing decision); id. at
294, 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (statute fails to guard against capricious selection of who shall
be executed; death penalty per se unconstitutional); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(statute unconstitutionally permits random and capricious imposition of death sentence); id, at
313 (White, J., concurring) (statute fails to provide meaningful basis for imposing death
penalty); id. at 364, 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring) (death penalty imposed discriminatorily on
certain classes; concludes it is per se unconstitutional); see Note, Discretion and the
Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1692-99 (1974)
(analysis of Furman opinions).
The Chief Justice, Justice Blackman, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist each filed
dissenting opinons. See 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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those jurisdictions that have resisted the historically disfavored
solutions of either abolishing capital punishment or providing for
mandatory death sentences, 9 Furman left the task of establishing
standards for imposing the death penalty, a task called impossible a
year earlier in McGautha.10
On July 2, 1976, the Court handed down five decisions, Gregg v.
Georgia," Proffitt v. Florida,'2 Jurek v. Texas," Woodson v. North
Carolina,14 and Roberts v. Louisiana,5 that together broke with
McGautha'6 and held that the death penalty is constitutional only
when the sentencing authority is provided adequate individualized
information and is guided by clear and objective standards. 7 The
9. See notes 36-39, 42 infra and accompanying text.
10. See 402 U.S. at 204 (identification before the fact of all characteristics that call for death
penalty is task "beyond present human ability").
11. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
13. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
14. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
15. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). These five cases will be collectively referred to as the July 2 Cases.
16. The Court avoided an explicit overruling of McGautha, which was based on the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, by premising its decisions on the eighth
amendment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.47 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ). See generally McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971) (attack on jury's
standardless discretion based on due process clause of fourteenth amendment); Kalven, supra
note 2, at 22 (attack in McGautha focused not on constitutionality of death penalty itself, but on
standards by which California imposed it). Nevertheless, Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens
conceded that a substantial tension exists between McGautha and Furman when read in light of
the July 2 Cases. 428 U.S. at 195 n.47. But see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,319-21
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (insistence on standards to guide sentencing squarely contrary
to McGautha).
The question whether sentencing procedures must satisfy the eighth amendment's protection
from cruel and unusual punishment, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, or
both remains unresolved. Compare Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (sentencing process must comport with due process as trial must; due process violated
when sentence based in part on confidential information not disclosed to defendant), with i&L at
363-64 (White, J., concurring) (conclusion of Court concerning procedure for selecting persons
for death penalty should be based solely on eighth amendment; no reason to address due
process).
17. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-36 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.,) (Louisiana mandatory death penalty statute violates eighth and fourteenth
amendments because it both fails to focus on particular circumstances and character of offender
and lacks standards to guide jury); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301-05 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (North Carolina mandatory death penalty statute
unconstitutional due to its inconsistency with prevailing social values imd its failure to provide
objective standards or particularized consideration of individual defendant); Jurekv. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (Texas statute constitutional
because it authorizes jury consideration of individual mitigating circumstances and provides
adequate guidance); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252, 259-60 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (Florida statute constitutional because trial judge must focus on
individual circumstances of both defendant and crime, and appellate process ensures against
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judgment of the Court in each of the July 2 Cases was announced in a
plurality opinion endorsed by Justice Stewart, Justice Powell, and
Justice Stevens. The plurality' 8 confronted the issues avoided in
Furman and held that the death penalty for the crime of murder is not
per se unconstitutional1 9 so long as it is not imposed mandatorily. 21 It
consequently accepted and began to grapple with the unenviable
chore of defining guidelines that, in Justice Harlan's words, are neither
"meaningless 'boiler-plate' [nior a statement of the obvious that no
jury would need."
'21
Much of the task lies ahead. The plurality conceded that the
guidelines laid out in the July 2 Cases establish only that it is pos-
sible to construct a capital sentencing system that resolves the
constitutional concerns of Furman and that each capital sentencing
system henceforth must be analyzed on an individual basis to
determine its constitutionality. 22 Its own analysis of the five statutes
presented did not venture very far beyond holding that in three cases
the sentencing schemes permitted an adequate degree of guided
individualization, 23 but that in two others the mandatory death
penalty schemes did not.24 This tentative evaluation of the statutes
left many crucial questions unexplored. As a preliminary matter, the
Court has not yet firmly resolved whether the substantive eighth
amendment doctrine laid out by the plurality in Gregg to justify the
death penalty in the abstract also controls the constitutional analysis
of particular statutory schemes or even particular sentences of
arbitrary imposition of death sentence); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1976) (opinion
of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (constitutional death penalty statute, such as Georgia's, must
direct and limit discretion and must take into account the circumstances of the crime and the
character of the defendant).
18. The phrase "the plurality" hereinafter refers to the five opinions rendered by Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in the July 2 Cases. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 158; Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 244; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 264; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. at 282; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 327.
19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 168-87 (rejecting argument that capital punishment
unconstitutional per se under eighth and fourteenth amendments); accord, Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. at 331; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 285; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 268;
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 247.
20. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 252, 259-60; Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 189-90.
21. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).
22. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195 (1976).
23. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 252, 259-60; Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 189-90.
24. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333-36; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 302-
05.
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individual defendants." The resolution of this issue will permit the
Court to confront the much more difficult questions of what standards
to use in determining the individualizing information that a sentencing
authority must consider, what degree of guidance must delimit the
sentencer's discretion, and what legal body is the final arbiter of
proper sentencing procedures.2 6
This article will argue that consistency with the eighth amendment
requires that every aspect of a particular sentencing procedure be
scrutinized in terms of the plurality's substantive eighth amendment
doctrine. In the first part it reviews the July 2 Cases and extracts from
them the doctrine used in analyzing the abstract constitutionality of
capital punishment and the constitutionality of particular death
sentencing statutes. It attempts to build from this foundation a
framework that resolves the issues untouched by the July 2 Cases
25. At many points, however, the plurality implicitly sanctioned this extension of its abstract
doctrinal analysis. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 294-96; Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. at 184, 186; notes 39, 42, 58 & 64 infra and accompanying text. But cf The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 72-76 (1976). This article notes that the Court's failure in
the July 2 Cases to relate the reasons underlying retention of the death penalty to the specific
statutory system under consideration is particularly troubling in light of the critical eighth
amendment requirement of principled sentencing. Id at 74-75. It suggests that if the personal
characteristics considered by a sentencing authority inadequately relate to purposes of the death
penalty, the Court may be forced to reconsider the per se constitutionality question. Id. at 76.
Professor Charles Black has leveled similar criticism at the July 2 Cases. See Black, Due Process
for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 13-16 (1976) (specific
facts of cases reveal that Court has not solved arbitrariness condemned in Furman; cases fail to
correspond eighth amendment considerations to specific procedures employed).
26. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 64. The issue is pressing. See
Lockett v. Ohio, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 261
(1977) (No. 76-6997); Bell v. Ohio, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 2971 (1977) (No. 76-6513). At issue in both cases is the constitutionality of the Ohio
capital punishment statute, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-04 (Page, 1975). Both petitioners
contend that the narrowness of the statutory provisions on mitigating circumstances leads to a
virtually mandatory death sentence. Brief for Petitioner at 50, Lockett v. Ohio (No. 76-6997);
Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, Bell v. Ohio (No. 76-6513). The Court must decide whether the
individualization goal set forth in the July 2 Cases requires reversal because of the sentencing
courts' failure to consider such characteristics as immaturity, low intelligence, absence of a prior
criminal record, prospects for rehabilitation, and such circumstances as minor participation in
the crime and lack of intent to commit murder.
After some hesitation, the Court avoided deciding the same issue with respect to Arizona's
death penalty in State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
2988, application for suspension of cert. and for stay of execution denied, 98 S. Ct. 8 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice), response to reh. petition reqjuested, 98 S. Ct. 49, petition for reh. denied, 98 S. Ct.
537 (1977). Richmond failed to allege that he was prevented from presenting any of the
mitigating factors foreclosed in Lockett and Bell. 98 S. Ct. at 9. Nor, apparently, was the failure
to consider petitioner's sociopathological condition considered worthy of Supreme Court review.
Id. For another challenge to Arizona's capital punishment statute, see State v. Jordan, 114 Ariz.
452,561 P.2d 1224 (1976), stay of execution pending Supreme Court disposition granted, 97 S. Ct.
2970 (1977) (No. 76-6965).
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themselves. In the second part, this framework is applied to a specific
issue-whether mental disorder should be considered a mitigating
factor in the process of seeking, imposing, or reviewing a sentence of
death. The article will demonstrate the viability of mental disability as
a mitigating factor and will sketch out a standard that a sentencing
authority might use in testing the mitigatory potential of a defendant's
evidence of mental disorder. This standard is reduced to a four-factor
mitigatory scheme and, in the last part, applied to two specific classes
of disordered persons: retardates and sociopaths.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: THE JULY 2 CASES AND BEYOND
THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK OF THE JULY 2 CASES:
THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
The Supreme Court's first foray into the thicket of capital
sentencing after Furman produced twenty-four opinions spread over
the five July 2 Cases.27 Although the opinions defy attempts to derive
a single coherent guide for sentencing authorities seeking to impose
capital punishment, 28 a relatively clear rationale underlies the Court's
preliminary conclusion that capital sentencing does not necessarily
violate the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. In evaluating the abstract constitutionality of the death
27. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 325-63 (1976) (six separate opinions); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,'280-324 (1976) (six separate opinions); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 262-79 (1976) (four separate opinions); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 242-61
(1976) (three separate opinions); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153-241 (1976) (five separate
opinions).
The Court divided into three groups in the five cases. Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
formed the plurality that upheld the death penalty in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek and avoided the
statutes in Woodson and Roberts. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 325-36; Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 280-305; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 262-77; Proffittv. Florida, 428 U.S. at
242-60; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 153-207. Justices Brennan and Marshall adhered to their
position in Furman that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se and would have found all
five statutes unconstitutional. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 336-37; Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305-06; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 227-41; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at
227-41; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 227-41. Justice Blackmun, writing for himself, and
Justices White, Rehncuist, and Chief Justice Burger writing separate concurrences and
dissents, would have found all five statutes constitutional. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at
337-63; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 306-24; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 277-79;
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 260-61; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 207-27.
28. See United States v. Kaiser, 545 F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 1977) (expressing relief at being
spared chore of producing definitive exegesis of "complex if not confounding" July 2 Cases;
statute held unconstitutional on basis of Furman).
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penalty in Gregg, the plurality applied a two-part test 29 derived from
the substantive limits found in previous eighth amendment cases3 °
and based on the proposition the "amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."'" The first part of the test focuses on contemporary
values or "public attitudes" concerning the sanction under considera-
tion;32 the second concentrates on the "dignity of man."33
PUBLIC ATTITUDES
In Gregg the plurality defined the public attitudes element of the
test as an inquiry, based on objective indicia, into public perceptions
of the appropriateness of the death penalty.34 Consistent with its goal
of objectivity, the plurality confined its search for public attitudes to
historical and contemporary source material reflecting the institu-
tional deliberations on criminal justice by a democratic society.35
29. See 428 U.S. at 173. This analysis of whether capital punishment is inherently cruel and
unusual is adopted by reference in the other four opinions. See note 19 supra.
30. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (contemporary values dictate
that any punishment for narcotic addiction inherently cruel and unusual); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion) (eighth amendment requires that punishment conform
to evolving standards of decency and accord with the dignity of man; denationalization of
deserter unconstitutional); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (eighth
amendment concerned not only with physical pain but also with proportionality of penalty to
crime).
31. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion)).
32. Id.
33. Id.; see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 64-65.
34. 428 U.S. at 173.
35. Because the plurality relied on indicia with a nexus to institutional deliberations and cited
,raw public opinion polls only sparingly, the importance of polls to the death penalty's
constitutionality is subject to considerable doubt. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at
298 & n.34 (public opinion polls used by plurality only to confirm that mandatory death penalty
passed by post-Furnan legislatures not evidence of renewed acceptance of that procedure);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 181 n.25 (evidence of public opinion polls used to supplement
statewide referenda). Nonetheless, it is worthy of note that a public opinion poll compiled after
the July 2 Cases found that the public is willing to impose the death penalty because it is
perceived as morally just and as serving a useful purpose. Thomas, Eighth Amendment
Challenges to the Death Penalty: The Relevance of Public Opinion, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1005, 1023
(1977). Bearing out the dangers of relying on public opinion data that has not been subjected to
institutional constraints, however, this researcher also found that much of the public's support
for capital punishment is grounded in a belief in the utility of death as a deterrent-a belief the
plurality found inconclusively supported by the relevant empirical data. See id at 1028-30; note
56 infra and accompanying text.
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Legislative enactments,3 6 statewide referenda,17 and jury verdicts38
were among the indicia relied on to demonstrate that a substantial
number of United States citizens accept the death penalty as an
appropriate punishment in some circumstances. The plurality also
considered historical evidence of the evolution of public attitudes
toward the death penalty and concluded that the long history and the
current acceptance of death as a punishment for murder indicate that
public attitudes support the death penalty on the abstract level.3"
The inquiry into public attitudes was not restricted, however, to the
abstract analysis in Gregg. In Roberts and Woodson, public attitudes
played an important role in the plurality's evaluation of the particular
statutes, 40 both of which made the death penalty mandatory for
36. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-81. The plurality found the overwhelming legislative
response to Furman a strong indication of society's approval of the death penalty for murder.
Congress and at least thirty-five state legislatures enacted new statutes in an attempt to
circumvent the defects that invalidated the statutes considered in Furman. See id. at 179-80,
179 n.23, 180 n.24 (listing statutes).
37. See id. at 181 (only statewide referendum on issue since Furman adopted constitutional
amendment to overrule California Supreme Court holding that capital punishment per so
unconstitutional under state constitution).
38. See id. at 181-82 (jurya reliable, objective index of contemporary values). Although juries
impose the death penalty infrequently-a reluctance undoubtedly reflecting public perception
of the enormity of the sanction-they continue to invoke it in a considerable number of extreme
cases. Id. at 182 & n.26.
39. See id. at 176-78, 182 (reviewing common law, intent of Framers, and Supreme Court case
law). In a subsequent case, the Court again looked to public attitudes derived from history,
precedent, legislative acts, and the response of juries in evaluating the constitutionality of death
as a punishment for rape. In concluding that the statute was unconstitutional, Justice White
relied in part on his finding that in recent years discretionary death sentencing for rape has
become increasingly less acceptable. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2866-69 (1977)
(Georgia only jurisdiction to permit death for rape of adult women and 9 out of 10 juries in
Georgia refuse to impose it).
In Coker, the Court had to evaluate conflicting evidence in the indicators of public attitude it
examined: the death penalty statute had been passed by the state legislature and juries had
imposed capital punishment under it in a few cases. See id. (Georgia statute as revised after
Furman included rape among capital offenses; at least six juries had imposed death sentence for
rape). It resolved the dilemma by balancing the objective data of limited local acceptance against
an overwhelming national trend against imposing death for rape. Id. at 2867. Cf. Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 249 n.25 (clarity of juries' historical rejection of mandatory death
sentences outweighs ambiguous, contrary expressions of legislative attitudes). The use of a
balancing test to determine whether a statute conforms with public attitudes and the hegemony
of national attitudes over local ones in making the balance will be significant factors in the
Court's future evaluations of the constitutionality of statutes and of their application to
particular classes of defendants.
40. It is unclear why the plurality failed to refer to public attitudes in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek
when making the second level of analysis into the constitutionality of particular statutes. The
Court may have relied on the evidence before it in the abstract analysis of public attitudes as an
endorsement not only of the death sentence per se, but also of the death sentence as applied in
those three cases. This possibility is evidenced by a reference in Woodson to polls indi-
cating that many who support retention of the death penalty prefer that it be administered
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certain crimes. 41 Its conclusion that the statutes were unconstitutional
was based in part on a strong historical trend away from mandatory
death penalty statutes. 42 The plurality dismissed the recent rash of
mandatory statutes as a misguided attempt to comply with Furman
and not as evidence of any resurgence in public acceptance of
mandatory death sentencing. 43 This use of public attitudes as a
touchstone for testing statutory sentencing procedures in individual
cases demonstrates that this aspect of the doctrinal framework of the
July 2 Cases is extremely important. Because public attitudes must be
with regard for the circumstances of each case and the character of the defendant. 428 U.S. at
298 n.34 (quoting Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1245, 1267 (1974)).
41. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.30(1) (West 1974) (conviction for murder committed with
specific intent during armed robbery automatically merits death sentence); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-17 (Supp. 1975) (murder committed during robbery punished with death).
42. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 336 (mandatory death penalty statute rejected 130
years ago; reintroduction intolerable); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 288-301 (history
of mandatory statutes reveals that practice has been rejected). Between 1838 and 1963, all state
legislatures rejected mandatory statutes as unduly harsh and rigid, largely in response to jury
refusals to deliver guilty verdicts for the crime of murder. Id. at 291-92; see id. at 295-96 (pattern
of jury death sentencing suggests that contemporary society rejects death as an appropriate
sanction for a substantial number of convicted murderers).
Since Roberts and Woodson, both the United States Supreme Court and state supreme courts
have declared unconstitutional statutes that impose death automatically for first degree murder,
capital murder, or murder with aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., Roberts (Harry) v.
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977) (per curiam) (possibility of raising defenses during trial for
murder of police officer does not compensate for inability to raise mitigating factors at
sentencing); Green v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976) (remanding case involving mandatory
death sentencing statute, in light of Roberts and Woodson); State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 988
(Del. 1976) (automatic capital punishment for first degree murder cruel and unusual under
Woodson and Roberts); State v. Duren, 547 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Mo. 1977) (capital murder
carrying mandatory death sentence unconstitutional); People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 33,
371 N.E.2d 456, 464, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735, 743-44 (1977) (possibility of raising defenses during
trial for murder of police officer does not compensate for inability to raise mitigating factors at
sentencing; mandatory death penalty unconstitutional); see note 43 infra.
43. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 298 & n.34. In response to Furman, many state
legislatures feared that the greater the degree of jury discretion present in the death sentencing
process the greater the likelihood that a capital punishment provision would be deemed
unconstitutional. Therefore, numerous state legislatures passed acts providing for mandatory
capital punishment. Many of these have already been held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Rockwell
v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 446-48, 556 P.2d 1101, 1116-18, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 665-67
(1976) (Clark, J., concurring) (historical account of how California enacted unconstitutional
mandatory death penalty in response to confusing Furman ruling); State v. Spence, 367 A.2d
983, 985-86 (Del. 1976) (legislature and state court misread Furman as requiring the abrogation
of all sentencing discretion, resulting in enactment of statute unconstitutional under July 2
decisions); Commonwealth v. Moody, 22 CRni. L. REP. (BNA) 2249, 2250 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30,
1977) (legislature's effort to cure constitutional defects of pre-Furman statute by narrowly
limiting mitigating factors resulted in violation of July 2 Cases principles). For an account of one
frenzied state legislature's reaction to the Furman decision, see Lehman, Some Legislative
History and Comments on Ohio's New Criminal Code, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 8, 15-23 (1974) (new
capital punishment statute drafted without benefit of scholarly legal analysis of Furman ruling).
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considered in evaluating whether death penalty statutes are constitu-
tional, on their face or as applied, not only the sanction of death
in the abstract but also the system adopted to administer the sanction
in each instance must conform to the standards of decency of the
institutional majority."
HUMAN DIGNITY
Unlike public attitudes, the element of the eighth amendment test
requiring that punishment accord with the "dignity of man" 45 cannot
be applied by reference to objective reflections of the value modern
society places on human life. Rather, a judge must look to standards
established by the courts themselves to determine whether this part
of the test is satisfied.46 The human dignity requirement represents
one attempt to cure the arbitrariness and capriciousness condemned
in Furman as intolerable when the sanction is death.4 ' The plurality in
44. Although the plurality did not state that a bifurcated proceeding that involves the jury in
the sentencing decision is essential to a constitutional statute, it did indicate that one of the
jury's most important functions is to ensure that contemporary community values are meshed
into the penal system. See.Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 295; Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. at 190-92. Moreover, the three constitutional statutes all included split trial proceedings
involving the jury at both levels. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 267 (separate sentencing
proceeding before same jury); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 158-60 (same); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. at 248-49 (separate sentencing proceeding but jury decision only advisory). Indeed, in
Gregg the plurality noted that a bifurcated proceeding is the best way to combine jury
involvement with adequate guidance. 428 U.S. at 190-91. Thus, the public attitudes part of the
eighth amendment test may require that the decision to impose death on a particular defendant
for a particular crime be made by a sentencing authority in close touch with contemporary
community values. But see note 99 infra.
Subsequent cases have also considered a bifurcated proceeding an important factor in
evaluating the constitutionality of the statute. See, e.g., People v. Velez, 88 Misc. 2d 378, 405,
388 N.Y.S.2d 519, 537 (1976) (July 2 Cases construed as requiring bifurcated trial, with jury
acting as conscience of community; state death penalty struck down for not allowing court or jury
opportunity to consider any mitigating or aggravating circumstances); Commonwealth v. Moody,
22 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2249, 2249 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1977) (provision for bifurcated
proceeding approved; nevertheless, statute unconstitutional because it limits mitigating
circumstances jury may consider); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1345 (Utah 1977) (statute that
provides for bifurcated trial and permits consideration of unlimited mitigating circumstances
constitutional).
45. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion).
46. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2868 (1977) (evidence of public attitudes does not
wholly decide case; eighth amendment also requires that Court bring its own judgment to bear
on statute imposing death penalty for rape); cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (eighth amendment imposes duty on courts to review constitutionality of
punishment and to overturn the act of the elected legislature if necessary).
47. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 288, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). For a discussion of other, primarily
procedural, attempts to achieve Furman's goal of a sentencing system free from caprice, see note
71 infra.
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the July 2 Cases focused on the problems raised in Furman and gave
substantive and procedural content to the human dignity require-
ment to ensure that the death penalty serves a valid purpose in
accord with penological justifications, is not disproportionate to the
crime committed, and is administered in an orderly manner that
admits of distinguishing the cases in which it should be imposed from
those in which it should not.48 The plurality's own citation of
authorities indicates that the human dignity analysis may draw on a
wide variety of legal, historical, sociological, and philosophical
sources.
49
Substantive Requirements. Substantively, human dignity
requires that a punishment not be excessive; that is, it may not impose
unnecessary infliction of pain nor may it be grossly out of proportion
to the crime. 50 Thus, to avoid gratuitous infliction of pain, a
punishment must first have some recognized penological justifica-
tion;51 for the death penalty specifically, the plurality identified two
principal purposes: retribution and deterrence.52 Second, even if a
48. See id. at 173, 187, 188; cf. England, Capital Punishment in the Light of Constitutional
Evolution: An Analysis of Distinctions Between Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 596,
608-09 (1977) (far from being retreat from Furman, the July 2 Cases follow that case in
consistent pattern of constitutional history).
49. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 271 n.6 (quoting Model Penal Code); Gregg.v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 184 n.30 (British legal views); id. at 184-85 & nn. 31-32 (sociological
studies); id. at 184 (views on social morality).
50. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion). Justice White and Justice
Blackmun added their endorsement of this aspect of the human dignity test to that of the July 2
Cases plurality by joining with the plurality in Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2865-66 & n.4
(1977) (statute imposing death for rape must accord with both public attitudes and human
dignity).
51. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
52. Id. The plurality also noted another frequently discussed penological justification:
protecting society by the incapacitation of known criminals. Id. at 183 n.28. However, it did not
rely on this justification, perhaps because incarceration is almost equally effective in preventing
future crimes by the criminal involved. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 72
(life imprisonment without possibility of parole would serve protection purpose equally well).
The fourth commonly discussed penological justification for a particular punishment,
rehabilitation, can of course be of no relevance to the death penalty. Because capital punishment
serves at best only three of the four justifications, it might be argued that the evidence required
to show that these three purposes are actually accomplished should be greater than might be
necessary when the punishment might also rehabilitate. Cf. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
360 (1977) (extinction of any possibility of rehabilitation makes death penalty qualitatively
different from all other sentences); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (death is extreme sanction, suitable only to most extreme of crimes); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (death penalty unique in its
irrevocability and in the irrelevance of rehabilitation as penological justification); id. at 289
(Brennan, J., concurring) (unusual severity of death most clearly demonstrated by its finality and
enormity).
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death sentence serves legitimate goals of punishment it may still be
found unconstitutional if disproportionate to the crime for which it is
imposed."
The plurality defined retribution as a society's expression of moral
outrage at offensive conduct and stated that a legal channel for
retribution is necessary to prevent vengeance outside the legal
process. 4 Thus, certain crimes are so reprehensible that only the
death penalty is adequate to reflect the revulsion felt by society
toward the perpetrator.55 In contrast to the subjective nature of
retribution as a penological justification, the utility of capital
punishment as a deterrent for those contemplating similar crimes
ought to be an objectively demonstrable fact. Nevertheless, the
plurality did not find conclusive evidence either that the death penalty
does or does not deter.16 Faced with evidence it thought conflicting,
the plurality opined that the death penalty probably would not deter
the murderer who acts in a moment of passion, but could significantly
deter those whose murders are coolly calculated. 7 Beyond that, its
abstract decision that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional
deferred to state legislatures the factual determination whether death
53. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2866 n.4 (1977). In Coker, the Court found that the
statute may have served penological goals, but held it unconstitutional after finding both that
death is disproportionate to the crime of rape and that public attitudes generally align against
death sentences for rape.
The scope of the disproportionality factor is unclear. So far the Court has treated this aspect
of the human dignity requirement as primarily relevant to the offense-oriented inquiry into
whether capital or some other punishment may be imposed for a specific crime. See, e.g., Coker
v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2866 (1977) (punishment of death disproportionate to crime of rape);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (denationalization disproportionate
to crime of desertion for one day); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) (hard labor
and chains for twelve years disproportionate to crime of record falsification). But ef Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 n.40 (1976) (plurality opinion) (reserving question whether
punishment of death disproportionate for murderer allegedly acting under duress and not fully
participating in crime). The role this factor will play in the evaluation of whether death may be
imposed on a specific individual for an admittedly heinous crime such as murder remains in
doubt. In keeping with this article's focus on distinctions among offenders rather than offenses,
the proportionality question will receive little attention.
54. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183.
55. Id. at 184.
56. Id. at 185. Opponents of capital punishment argue that deterrent effects can never be
accurately measured. See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE (1974) (a "scientific" conclusion impossible); note 265 infra; cf Thomas, supra note
35, at 1009, 1030 (most research indicates that deterrence not served by capital punishment;
thus, public attitudes based on deterrence questionable).
57. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 185-86.
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will deter. 58 Relying on its judgment that death may adequately serve
two penological justifications, the plurality concluded that the
substantive prohibition of gratuitous infliction of pain will not nec-
essarily bar all capital punishment.5 9
Although the plurality analyzed in some detail the abstract
retributive and deterrent functions of the death penalty,6" it did not
expressly relate this analysis to the three statutes found constitu-
tional. 61 This omission does not mean, however, that a specific statute
need not serve those penological justifications either on its face or as
applied. First, the Court was not required to decide whether
individual circumstances in these cases substantially affected the
deterrent or retributive impact of each application of the death
penalty. Rather, the challenges to the particular statutes apparently
were limited to claims that the unguided power of the prosecutor to
58. Id. at 184-86 (proof of deterrent effect inconclusive; therefore Court defers to legislative
determination). The plurality's deference to this legislative choice of a rational means to achieve
a valid social end is somewhat reminiscent of the low level of review employed by the Supreme
Court in economic due process decisions. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) (Court will no longer strike down state laws regulating business because they might be
unwise or improvident, or inharmonious with a school of thought; statute regulating eye care a
rational means to cure evil at hand). As in the due process area, the Court was apparently
concerned in the July 2 Cases with promoting a flexible approach that would both enable states
to respond to local needs and relieve courts of the arguably nonjusticiable task of deciding
whether and to what degree death deters. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186; cf. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (debatable issues regarding business,
economic, and social affairs left to legislative decision). See also The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,
supra note 25, at 72 n.70 (listing articles endorsing "compelling state interest" review, but
rejecting argument).
Nevertheless, the plurality's deference to a legislative finding that death is an effective
deterrent was apparently not intended to signal the end of judicial involvement in the deterrence
issue. First, the decision to leave the issue to legislators seems premised on its complexity and
inconclusiveness. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187 (conclusion that death may deter based
on "absence of more convincing evidence"). Because the plurality did not rule out the possibility
that conclusive evidence may be developed in the future, it did not foreclose the question from
some day becoming wholly justiciable. Moreover, the Justices made clear that once a legislature
purports to have found that death does deter, the courts must still decide whether the imposition
of death in the particular case furthers the deterrence end found legitimate. See id. (praising
Georgia legislators' efforts to pinpoint crimes and criminals affected by capital punishment's
deterrence); cf Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 520-21 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (lack of substantial relationship between legitimate goals of zoning and particular
rule prohibiting two first cousins from living together violated due process; municipal regulation
falls under intermediate standard of review); see note 68 infra.
59. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187. The plurality also cautioned that courts should not
invalidate a category of punishment merely because another less severe penalty could serve the
same penological justifications; rather, courts should only determine whether the penalty is so
lacking in penological justification that it constitutes gratuitious infliction of pain. Id. at 182-83.
60. Id. at 182-87; see notes 54-59 supra and accompanying text.
61. The July 2 Cases have been criticized for their failure to relate the purposes of retribution
and deterrence to the statutes themselves. See The Supreme Court 1975 Term, supra note 25, at
72-73.
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plea bargain and the governor to commute death sentences permitted
unconstitutionally arbitrary grants of mercy to certain individuals,
62
and that the emumerated aggravating or mitigating circumstances
were so vague as to be meaningless. 63 Second, the plurality did note
without any elaboration that many of the statutes passed after
Furman reflected a responsible effort to impose death for those
crimes and on those criminals for which it is a most effective
deterrent.64 Finally, the sentencing authority in each case had stated
the findings used to reach the verdict; these findings did reflect
penological justifications to some degree.65 In the absence of a direct
claim of injury by the defendant, the Court might well have relied on
these factors in assuming that the specific statutes as applied
adequately served some penological justification."
62. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 274 (defendant asserted arbitrariness still pervaded state
system through plea bargaining, jury consideration of lesser included offenses, and Governor's
commutation power); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 254 (same); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
199 (defendant focused on discretion of prosecutor, jury, and Governor in considering any
murder case).
63. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 274-76 (defendant claimed that statute permitting jury to
impose death penalty on finding that defendant a continuing threat to society unconstitutionally
vague); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 254-58 (defendant claimed that mitigating and
aggravating factors enumerated in statute vague and overbroad); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
200-04 (defendant claimed statute so broad and vague as to fail in reducing risk of arbitrary
infliction of death sentences).
64. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186.
65. In Gregg the death penalty could not be imposed unless the jury found one of ten
statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances. The jury found that the offense was
committed while the defendant was engaged in armed robbery and was committed for the
purpose of receiving money. 428 U.S. at 161. In Proffitt, after the jury recommended the death
sentence, the judge, as required by the statute, supported his decision in writing by enumerating
four aggravating factors, including a finding that the murder was particularly atrocious and cruel.
428 U.S. at 246-47. In Jurek the jury supported the death sentence with a finding, required
under the statute, that the murder was deliberate and that the defendant probably would be a
continuing threat to society. 428 U.S. at 267-68. See note 66 infra.
66. All three cases involved premeditated murders committed during a defendant's
perpetration of a separate, serious felony. In Gregg the defendant was convicted of murdering
two men who had picked him up while hitchhiking with a companion. The shooting incident
occurred during a roadside stop; the defendant waited for the two men to return to the car, then
shot and robbed them and drove away in their car. 428 U.S. at 158-60. After admitting to police
that he killed the two men "in cold blooded murder just to rob them," id. at 214 (Vhite, J.,
concurring), he was indicted and convicted for armed robbery and two counts of murder. Id. at
160. In Proffitt the evidence indicated that the defendant fatally stabbed a sleeping man with a
butcher knife and repeatedly struck the victim's wife during a burglary. He was convicted of first
degree murder, which the judge characterized as premeditated as well as committed during the
course of a felony. 428 U.S. at 245-46. In Jurek defendant was charged with kidnapping a ten-
year-old girl, strangling her with his bare hands, and then throwing her in a river to drown. 428
U.S. at 264-67.
Although it can be argued that these cases satisfy the penological justification requirement,
commentators who have closely examined the statutes and the circumstances of each case
disagree. See Black, supra note 25, at 14 (scathing criticism of adequacy of guidance in statutes
770
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The plurality could not have intended to ignore the retribution issue
simply because a legislature determines that a particular crime
sufficiently provokes society's moral outrage and so includes it in the
statutes as a conclusive aggravating circumstance. Such an approach
would seem at odds, if not fatally inconsistent, with the plurality's
rejection of mandatory death penalty statutes for specific crimes.
6 7
Similarly, failure to analyze the specific procedures and the specific
verdicts in terms of their deterrent impact would deny a defendant the
right to demonstrate that his execution would amount to gratuitous
infliction of pain. 68 Thus, although, the plurality in the July 2 Cases
was not compelled to carry the substantive inquiry into penological
justifications beyond the abstract level of analysis, the doctrine in
those opinions dictates that the Court must do so in the proper case.
69
Procedural Requirements. Most of the plurality's analysis of
the individual statutes challenged in the July 2 Cases focused on the
arbitrariness condemned in Furman. 1 0 To answer the issues directly
upheld in July 2 Cases); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 73-74 (factors actually
included in each statute demonstrate that none of these states were guided by deterrent or
retributive goals).
67. This offense-specific assumption of the retributive value of the death penalty is implicit in
imposing that penalty whenever an aggravating circumstance, such as murder committed during
a robbery as in Proffitt and Gregg, is present; as such, it seems very similar to the mandatory
death statutes rejected in Roberts and Woodson. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 336;
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305. At least one court has already recognized this
danger. See Purdy v.:State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977). In Purdy a man was convicted of sexual
battery of a child under eleven years of age. The trial court justified imposition of the death
penalty on the ground that the aggravating circumstance of heinousness was present. Although
impressed by the enormous impact of the crime on the child, the Florida Supreme Court
overturned the death sentence because nothing in the trial court's finding distinguished the
crime from any other violation of the same statute. Therefore, affirming the death penalty in the
case would mean that anyone convicted of that crime could be sentenced to death, a result the
Florida Supreme Court felt was unconstitutional under Woodson and Roberts. Id. at 4, 6.
68. At least one commentator has argued that the plurality's apparent deference to the
legislative decision on deterrence indicates only that the defendant has the burden of showing
lack of deterrence. See Stotzky, Capital Punishment, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 841, 850-51 (1977).
69. Two cases now before the Supreme Court present legal questions and factual circum-
stances inviting consideration of the penological rationale for imposition of the death penalty on
the particular defendants. Characteristics of the offenders and the offenses in both cases raise
doubts whether an execution of the defendant in either case will serve deterrence or retributive
goals. See Lockett v. Ohio, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 52-53, 67, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1066-67, 1074 (1976)
(21-year-old drug-addicted woman with arguably low I.Q. participated in robbery of pawnshop
during which shop owner murdered; during homicide defendant remained outside), cert. granted,
98 S. Ct. 261 (1977) (No. 76-6997); Bell v. Ohio, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 278, 282, 358 N.E.2d 556,
564 (1976) (drug-using juvenile participated in armed robbery and kidnapping that resulted in
homicide; defendant allegedly did not physically commit murder), cerL granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971
(1977) (No. 76-6513).
70. Although the substantive content of the human dignity test of the eighth amendment draws
upon Furman, see notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text, Furman itself did not reach
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raised in that case, the plurality enumerated procedural requirements
necessary to satisfy the human dignity element of the eighth
amendment test.71 First, the plurality held that the fundamental
respect for humanity identified in Gregg as the source of substantive
requirements72  also indispensably requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual defendant and the circum-
stances of his offense. 73 It applied this preliminary holding by
determining whether each statute had a mechanism whereby a
defendant could bring individualized information to the attention of
the sentencing authority. The statutes found constitutional all
permitted consideration of any mitigating circumstances the defen-
dant might seek to establish,7 4 while those held unconstitutional failed
to provide for consideration of the character and record of the
individual defendant.75
substantive isiues because of the glaring procedural defects found in the statutes. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (eighth amendment cannot
tolerate imposition of death in wanton and freakish manner).
71. The July 2 Cases did not exhaust the nonarbitrariness implications of Furman. Both
Supreme Court and state decisions reflect a higher degree of concern for procedural fairness when
the outcome of a trial can result in the taking of an individual's life. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349,362 (1977) (increased notice and discovery rights of capital defendants with respect
to presentence reports); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-87, 287 n.34 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (recognizing special state practices surrounding death penalty, including two-stage
trials, automatic appeals, and 12-person juries); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (while fifth and sixth amendments should not necessarily apply to all overseas trials of
military dependents, trials for capital offenses require special constitutional considerations).
This gradual but certain progression toward the recognition of "eighth amendment due
process" has its parallel in the first amendment area. See Note, Search and Seizure of the Media: A
Statutory Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957, 985-86, 985
nn.164-65, 988 & n.84 (1976) (special concerns of first amendment mandate a higher level of due
process).
72. See 528 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
73. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958)).
74. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 271 (eighth amendment requirement of individualized
sentencing satisfied by construction of statutory question to allow defendant to bring any
mitigating circumstances in his case to attention of jury); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 250-52,
250 n.8 (absence of limiting language in section of statute enumerating mitigating factors indicates
that court must focus on individual circumstances of crime and character of defendant); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 189, 196-97 (statute that authorizes jury consideration of any appropriate
mitigating or aggravating circumstances satisfies requirement that crime and character of
defendant be considered).
75. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333-34 (mandatory death statute impermissibly
affords no meaningful opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304 (mandatory death statute treats all persons convicted of offense as
undifferentiated mass). See also Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per
curiam) (mandatory death sentence for murder of police officer invalid; insufficient allowance for
consideration of mitigating circumstances). Since the July 2 Cases, at least one state court has
held that a statutory enumeration of mitigatory circumstances that limits those that may be
considered is unconstitutional because the defendant must be permitted to introduce anything
relevant to mitigation. See Commonwealth v. Moody, 22 C115i. L. REP. (BNA) 2249, 2249-50 (Pa.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1977).
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Second, the plurality held that the procedural aspect of human
dignity requires objective standards to guide and render reviewable
the process for imposing the death penalty.76 Adequate and careful
guidance of the jury as it deliberates pervades every other aspect of
our legal system and was deemed especially necessary when the jury
decides whether a convicted defendant shall live or die.77 Further-
more, by requiring that the sentencing authority specify the factors on
which it relied in reaching a decision, the plurality claimed meaningful
appellate review would be made possible."'
After stating the two elements of the guided individualization
requirement, the plurality first noted that they are best satisfied by a
statute that calls for a bifurcated proceeding during which the
sentencing authority is provided with all relevant information and with
standards to guide its use of that information.79 It then examined each
statute individually to determine whether the guided individualization
requirement was satisfied. In Roberts and Woodson, the plurality
invalidated the mandatory death statutes in part because they vested
standardless sentencing power in the jury80 and in part because they
failed to allow the jury to consider particularized information
concerning the character and record of the defendant relevant to the
sentencing decision.8 The plurality emphasized the separate im-
portance of each element of guided individualization, implying that
even if a statute allows a defendant to introduce evidence in
mitigation of the death penalty, the sentence might still be
unconstitutional if the sentencing authority is not also provided
76. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 302.
77. See Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) (plurality opinion) (that juries be carefully
guided is a hallmark of American legal system).
78. Id at 195.
79. Id.; see note 44 supra; note 98 infra.
80. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 334; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 302.
The plurality noted that the mandatory statutes were drafted in an attempt to withdraw all jury
discretion in response to Furman. Experience indicates, however, that the same unbridled
discretion inheres in a mandatory statute because of the jury's ability to convict for a degree of
crime that does not mandate death. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 334-36; Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 302-03.
81. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 303-04.
The plurality left open the possibility that an extremely narrow statute that defines a capital crime
in terms of the character and record of the individual offender might constitutionally impose a
mandatory death sentence on a prisoner serving a life sentence who murders again. Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 334 n.9. This would indicate that the strong penological justification in
such a case might offset the limitation on the jury's ability to evaluate mitigating factors. See id
But cf Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636-37,637 n.5 (1977) (per curiam) (although
murder of police officer may be aggravating circumstance per se, to bar all mitigating circum-
stances still unconstitutional; question of prisoner serving life sentence left open).
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standards adequate to guide and regularize the decisionmaking
process.
8 2
One of the most puzzling aspects of the July 2 Cases is the
plurality's failure to bifurcate consistently its own treatment of guided
individualization. Although the separate importance of guidance and
individualized treatment was emphasized in Roberts and Woodson,83
the plurality did not as clearly distinguish these two facets of the
guided individualization requirement when applying it to the facts of
Proffitt, Gregg, and especially Jurek. In Proffitt and Gregg, the plurality
enunciated the requirement but then found it readily satisfied by
statutes that present mitigating and aggravating factors to the
sentencing authority, direct the sentencing authority to balance those
factors in a specified manner, and provide for appellate review .8
82. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333-34 (lack of guidance and lack of individual focus
listed as separate deficiencies); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 302-03 (same). The
separate nature of the two aspects of guided individualization is borne out by the Supreme Court's
actions after Furman. Among the hundreds of cases in which the Court vacated death sentences
and remanded by order, several were cases in which defendants had been capitally sentenced
following murder convictions under statutes that included bifurcated procedures and allowed for
the consideration of mitigating circumstances. Under the explanation of Furman in the July 2
Cases, the only possible constitutional defect of the death sentencing systems disapproved in
these cases was their failure to provide the jury as sentencing authority with standards to guide
their decisions. See State v. Delgado, 161 Conn. 536, 290 A.2d 338 (1971), vacated & remanded,
408 U.S. 940 (1972) (disapproving CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-10 (1958)); Tea v. State, 453 S.W.2d
179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), vacated & remanded, 408 U.S. 937 (1972) (disapproving TEX. CODE
CRmi. PRO. art. 37.07 (Vernon 1972)).
83. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
84. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 251-53 (Florida Statute protects against arbitrariness by
requiringjury and judge to make findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
to impose death only if mitigating facts insufficient to outweigh those sufficiently aggravating;
automatic supreme court review provided to ensure consistent results); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. at 196-98 (Georgia statute protects against arbitrariness byrequiringjury to find atleastone
of 10 specified aggravating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and permitting consideration
of any other aggravating or mitigating circumstances; automatic appeal to supreme court ensures
consistency in sentencing). The Florida statute provides that the jury's decision is reached by
majority vote and is advisory only; the judge makes the final determination. FL& STAT. ANN.
§§ 921.141(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1977). In Georgia, the jury makes the ultimate decision after a
presentence hearing. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(c) (Supp. 1977). Neither statute imposes any
limitation on the mitigating circumstances that may be relevant. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at
250 n.8; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 197.
It is unclear whether Florida practice after the July 2 Cases adheres to the Supreme Court's
construction of the death penalty statute. Six days after the plurality opined that the Florida
statute's listing of mitigating factors did not foreclose other factors from consideration, the
Florida Supreme Court stated otherwise. See Cooperv. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1139 (Fla. 1976)
(per curiam) (sole issue in capital hearing is to examine statutorily itemized aggravating and
mitigating circumstances; evidence on other matters has no place). Moreover, since Cooper
Florida courts have ignored the statute's nonexclusive language and have tended merely to
itemize the statutory factors present in each case, or at best to characterize other mitigating
circumstances as fitting into one of those categories. See Gibson v. State, 351 So. 2d 948,951 n.6
(Fla. 1977) (per curiam) (opinion lists mitigating categories and follows each with findings of fact in
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Although these statutes do not explicitly provide detailed standards
to guide the jury in its consideration of the relevant factors, the
plurality was satisfied that clear and objective standards adequate to
guide the jury's discretion inhere in the provisions that direct the
jury's attention to specific circumstances of the crime.85 On the other
hand, in Jurek the plurality seemed to view guidance merely as an
incidental by-product of the jury's consideration of any mitigating
information presented by the defense.16 The opinion radically
compressed the two requirements identified in Woodson and Roberts,
suggesting that the information itself fulfills the guidance requirement
and that the guiding information need consist of nothing more
structured than presentation by the defense of whatever mitigating
information it chooses to put before the jury or judge. 7
mitigation; no allegation that any specific nonstatutory factor foreclosed from court con-
sideration); Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1270-71 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam) (trial judge listed
each statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstance and followed each with relevant findings;
no allegation of.foreclosure of any specific factor).
85. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 251-52; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 197-98.
86. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 276 (by permitting defense to bring any mitigating
circumstances before jury, Texas ensures adequate guidance). This aspect ofthe July 2 Cases has
borne the brunt of the criticism focused on the decisions. See Black, supra note 25, at 13-15 (none
of three statutes eliminates arbitrary lenience orharshness; decision inJurek most egregious); The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 71-72 (Jurek especially difficult to reconcile with
eighth amendment requirement of principled application of death penalty; Gregg and Proffitt also
troubling). Professor Black argued that the malleability of the Texas statute was especially visible
in a subsequent case; the defendant in that case was sentenced to die under the Texas statute
affirmed in Jurek although the evidence showed that the defendant himself had not committed
the murder. See Black, supra note 25, at 14-15 (discussing State v. Smith, 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976), cerL denied, 97 S. Ct. 1341 (1977)). The imposition of the death penalty was
apparently based on his failure to show remorse and on a previous conviction for possession of
marijuana. See State v. Smith, 540 S.W.2d at 296 (these factors "of extreme importance" to
sentencing). Professor Black concluded that the July 2 Cases had failed to establish that it is
possible to construct a system that can answer the dilemma raised in Furman and McGautha.
Black, supra note 25, at 16; see notes 1-10 supra and accompanying text.
87. The statute upheld in Jurek does not explicitly provide for consideration of mitigating
factors. Instead it requires the jury to decide whether the defendant acted unreasonably in
response to alleged provocation or whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will commit
violent criminal acts in the future. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2)-(3) (Vernon Supp.
1976-1977). In upholding the Texas statute, the plurality relied heavily on two Texas appellate
decisions, which held that in answering those questions the court should ask the jury to consider
whatever mitigating evidence the defense decides to introduce. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 272-73
(discussing Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. 1975); Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693,
696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)); see Whitmore v. State, No. 52,325 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13,
1976) (unpublished opinion) (post-July2 Case; evidence admitted and instruction given regarding
temporary insanity due to intoxication as mitigating circumstanice). Admitting that the Texas
statute called on the jury to make a difficult prediction of future behavior, the plurality
nonetheless found in Jurek that the statute sufficiently guided the jury's decision precisely
because that decision must necessarily be based on consideration of all mitigating information.
428 U.S. at 275-76.
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Despite the plurality's questionable acceptance of the guidance
provided under the Texas statute, the importance of the guidance
requirement as a separate component essential to a constitutional
statute cannot be denied. The plurality in Gregg clearly stated that
merely providing the jury with relevant information cannot guarantee
that it will u~e the information properly in deciding to impose a certain
punishment.8 Accordingly, Jurek probably should be confined to its
most limited holding: In the absence of a request for instructions or for
other guidance, a statute may survive eighth amendment scrutiny
despite its provision of relatively vague general standards to guide the
jury's consideration of mitigating information.8 9 Thus, although the
July 2 Cases firmly focused on the nature of adequate guidance
essential to a constitutional death penalty, that requirement ap-
parently need not be expressly articulated in the statute itself for it
to pass prima facie constitutional muster. Instead, the July 2 Cases
seem to require that the defendant himself initiate the guidance
process by a request for instructions.9
The doctrinal framework laid out in Gregg and fleshed out in the
other July 2 Cases constitutes the starting point for any legislative,
executive, or judicial decisionmaking body facing the death penalty
issue. In light of the importance of that framework and the difficulty of
divining it from the twenty-four opinions scattered through the July 2
Cases, it is useful to summarize with a graphic representation.91
88. See 428 U.S. at 192-93 (jury routinely guided by instructions on law to apply to evidence
adduced at trial and this rule no less true at capital sentencing); id at 195 n.46 (sentencing system
providing jury with vague standards could violate Furman's proscription of arbitrariness).
89. Although the defendant did argue on appeal that the statute provided insufficient guidance
for the jury, he did not request any particular instruction at trial concerning any mitigating factor,
as he might have done. See Whitmore v. State, No. 52,325 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1976)
(unpublished opinion). While there may be many reasons for the omission, it is interesting to note
that since the decision in the July2 Cases, the defendant inJurek has filed a habeas corpus action,
claiming that his two lawyers, one of whom was disbarred soon after trial and one of whom was not
yet a member of the bar, committed so many errors in directing his defense that he was denied
constitutionally adequate representation. Among the errors cited was the failure to request
instructions atthe sentencing phase. See Jurekv. Estelle, Civ. No. V-77-1 (filed S.D. Texas 1978).
90. This requirement may be implicit in the plurality's repeated reference in Jurek to the jury's
normal role in the American criminal justice system. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 275-76. In the
typical jury trial situation, the law has established what information the jury may hear, but
opposing counsel are often required to request instructions to guide its analysis of that
information. Cf id at 276 (Texas death sentencing system assigns jury its normal decisionmaking
role).
91. The confusing language used by the plurality in the July 2 Cases has caused other
commentators to derive a somewhat different framework from the cases. See, e.g., England, supra
note 48, at 602-04 (analysis fails to establish relationship between "human dignity" and
"excessiveness", between "human dignity" and "proportionality", or between "human dignity"
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DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
and "guided individualization"); Tao, The Constitutional Status of Capital PunishmenL" An
Analysis of Gregg, Jurek, Roberts and Woodson, 54 J. URB. L. 345, 346-52 (1977) (same); The
Supreme Cour 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 64-65 (analysis confuses overall eighth amendment
"evolving standards of decency" with objective "public attitudes" requirement and fails to relate
"guided individualization" to "human dignity"). Moreover, confusion concerning the exact
doctrinal model envisioned by the Court may also inhere in the interrelationship of the several
tests used by the plurality as well as in the overlapping indicia relevant to each. For example, the
product of legislative deliberations on the death penalty may reflect not only the public attitude
that death is morally acceptable if imposed in particular contexts, but also may evidence society's
need for retribution from those who commit a certain act. Nevertheless, the inquiry into public
attitudes and the inquiry into penological justifications involve the courts in fundamentally
different modes of analysis. The former is an objective look by the court at the decision of another
body without regard to the basis of that decision while the latter is a question for the Supreme
Court itself to resolve. See note 131 infra and accompanying text.
92. Human dignity (nonarbitrariness) also is the source of other procedural requirements for a
constitutional capital sentencing system not dealt with in the July 2 Cases. See note 71 supra.
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BEYOND THE JULY 2 CASES: ESTABLISHING STANDARDS
The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that standardless death
sentencing is unconstitutional, and yet in the July 2 Cases it failed to
provide much direction concerning what the source of standards
should be. 93 Although those cases clearly establish the importance of
permitting a defendant to introduce whatever mitigating evidence he
has, 94 they do little to clarify the implementation of the mitigating
factor requirement. Consequently, lawmakers and jurists face a series
of confounding questions: what standards should guide a legislature in
drafting a death penalty statute; what standards should guide a judge
in deciding whether a particular piece of allegedly mitigating evidence
is relevant to the sentencing decision; if it is relevant, what standards
should a judge use in framing instructions to the jury to guide their
use of that evidence? Consistent with the previous discussion of the
implications of the eighth amendment doctrinal framework laid out in
the July 2 Cases, this section suggests that the answers to these
questions lie in that doctrinal framework; the tests articulated by the
plurality in the July 2 Cases were intended to apply not only to the
death penalty in the abstract but also to the statutes drafted to
implement the penalty and to individual applications of the penalty. 9
If the doctrinal framework is not applied in this manner, death
sentences are unlikely to be consistent with the penological purposes
underlying capital punishment or with public attitudes towards
imposing the death penalty on a given defendant for a particular
crime. Accordingly, mitigating factors should be defined and jury
instructions should be formulated in each case by reference to the
eighth amendment test used to sustain the death penalty in the
abstract. Unless that doctrinal framework pervades every aspect of
the sentencing process, any resulting death sentence is constitu-
tionally invalid, and upon appellate review of that sentence the
question of the death penalty and its per se constitutionality must
93. E.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory
death statutes merely papered over the problem of unchecked jury discretion); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments cannot tolerate wanton, freakish imposition of death penalty); see Gregg . Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976) (plurality opinion) (jury discretion must be suitably limited in death
penalty cases); notes 84-91 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 74-75 supra; note 119 infra and accompanying text.
95. This extension of the July 2 Cases doctrinal framework seems to be implicit in the cases
themselves. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184, 186 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that
valid post-Furman statutes reflect community belief that certain crimes should be punished by
death and that many are responsible efforts to define crimes and criminals in a way that most
effectively deters other crime); note 25 supra.
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arise again.96
The analysis of the problems surrounding administration of the
mitigating factor requirement can be elucidated best through the
following hypothetical situation, which is typical of what judges are
likely to face in adjudicating future death penalty cases. 97 The jury has
not been persuaded by the defendant's insanity defense during the
first phase of a bifurcated trial98 and has found him guilty of first
degree murder. In the sentencing phase, the defendant attempts to
offer additional evidence of mental disorder that he claims should be
considered as a mitigating factor. He also requests that the judge
instruct the jury99 to consider all mitigating evidence heard at both
96. See The Supreme Cour; 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 75-76 (if standards for principled
application impossible to formulate, constitutionality issue may be revived); cf. Black, supra note
25, at 16 (statutes held constitutional in July 2 Cases demonstrate impossibility of producing
procedure fit for choosing who shall die).
97. Although elucidation of the eighth amendment requirements for a constitutional death
penalty is relevant at every stage of decisionmaking from the passage of the statute to the
executive pardon, it is most critical at the judicial sentencing hearing because at that stage the
decision is made to impose death upon a specific individual for a specific act. Moreover, the
plurality in the July 2 Cases emphasized the important responsibility of appellate tribunals in
policing the sentencing authority's compliance with the eighth amendment. SeeProffittv. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 254-58 (1976) (plurality opinion) (claim of vagueness rejected because Supreme
Courtof Florida will give content to categories and means to balance them); Greggv. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 200-04 (1976) (plurality opinion) (claim of vagueness and overbreadth rejected because
no reason to assume Supreme Court of Georgia will permit open-ended construction).
98. Although the plurality did not equate use of a bifurcated proceeding with constitutionality,
it did strongly recommend that approach as the "best" means of meeting the Furman
requirements. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-91, 197 (1976) (plurality opinion); see note 44
supra.
99. All three statutes found constitutional in the July2 Cases provided for some input byjuries
into the sentencing decision. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 267 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(jury's answer to question concerning defendant's proclivity for future violence determines the
sentence); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976) (plurality opinion) (jury suggests an
advisory sentence that carries considerable weight if it recommends against the death penalty);
Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,164-66 (1976) (plurality opinion) (jury must find atleastone of 10
enumerated aggravating circumstances before a death sentence will be accepted; its recom-
mendation binds the court). The plurality noted that jury sentencing is desirable in capital cases
to maintain a link between community values and the criminal system. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
at 190. On the other hand, the plurality noted thatthe Court has never held that jury sentencingis
essential and cited special problems that complicate the task of affording jurors the guidance the
plurality considered necessary to overcome inconsistency in death sentencing. Id.; see note 44
supra.
Because the Court approved the jury as merely an advisory body in Proffitt, two state courts
have held that a defendant in a capital case does not have a right to ajury trial at the penalty stage.
See State v. Jordan, 114 A-iz. 452, 457, 561 P.2d 1224, 1229 (1976) (that judge imposes
sentence instead of jury without consequence), stay of execution pending Supreme Court
disposition granted, 97 S. Ct. 2970 (1977) (No. 76-6955); State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 229,
364 N.E.2d 224, 227-28 (1977) (per curiam) (rejecting argument that Ohio capital punishment
statute is unconstitutional by denial of right tojury of peers). Justice Rehnquist, in his capacity as
Circuit Justice, has indicated that the absence of jury input at the sentencing stage is constitu-
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phases of the trial. The state death penalty statute, however, contains
no enumerated mitigating circumstances reflecting mental disorder,100
nor any provision for jury instructions beyond requiring the judge to
describe the mitigating and aggravating circumstances that are
enumerated and to ask the jury to balance those found relevant.
Moreover, the prosecutor objects to the admission of the evidence
claiming both that it is not relevant to any of the mitigating factors
enumerated in the state death sentencing statute and that it is not
relevant to any principle of mitigation. He further argues that even if
the evidence is admitted, the instructions provided in the statute bind
the judge and no additional instructions should be given; or, if an
instruction must be given, it should focus the jury's attention on the
mental disorder only as an aggravating factor.10' The judge must
decide whether a nonstatutory mitigating factor must be admitted,
whether the mental disorder on which the defendant wishes to
tional under ProffitL Richmond v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 8, 9 (1977) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (de-
nying application for suspension of cert. and stay of execution). The entire Court will have an
opportunity to clarify its position regarding jury sentencing. See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Lockett
v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977) (No. 76-6997) (listing as issue whether death penalty statute violates
sixth amendment by denying capitally accused right of judgment by peers regarding mitigating
factors).
100. Neither Texas nor Georgia enumerates specific mitigating factors in its statute. See Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-72 (1976) (plurality opinion) (statutory question concerning
defendant's future behavior construed to require consideration of mitigating factors); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164 (1976) (plurality opinion) (scope of mitigating factors and
nonstatutory aggravating factors not delineated in statute). By contrast, the Florida statute does
list mitigating factors, including circumstances related to the defendant's mental and emotional
condition, his age, and his capacity to understand and control his behavior. See FLA. STAT, ANN.
§§ 921.121(2)(b), (0, (g) (West Supp. 1976-1977). Nevertheless, this list does not exhaust all
possible mitigating circumstances.
101. Of the three statutes held constitutional in the July 2 Cases, each provides only that the
jury must be instructed to balance the mitigating and aggravating circumstances that it finds, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(2)(b),(c) (West Supp. 1976-1977), or to consider any mitigating
circumstances that it finds, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2503(b), 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1977), or to
answer a dispositive question in light of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances presented,
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). Although the Florida
statute limits aggravating circumstances to those enumerated in the statute, in Georgia and Texas
the prosecution can make whatever arguments on aggravation that the judge deems relevant to the
sentencing decision. Compare Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249-50, 250 n.8 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (Florida statute limits aggravating but not mitigating circumstances to those
enumerated; aggravating circumstances listed relate to seriousness of crime and degree of
premeditation) with Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272-73 (1976) (plurality opinion) (in
determining whether defendant a continuing threat to society, jury may consider defendant's age,
degree of mental or emotional pressure, remorse, or prior criminal behavior) and Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 164 (1976) (plurality opinion) (although jury must find one of 10 statutory
aggravating circumstances to impose death penalty, any other nonstatutory aggravating circum-
stance may be raised).
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introduce evidence qualifies as a mitigating factor, whether she is
obligated to instruct the jury, and, if so, what the instruction should
be.
102
Admissibility of Mitigatory Evidence. In deciding whether
allegedly mitigatory evidence must be admitted, the trial judge must
determine whether the scope of mitigating circumstances the court
may admit can be statutorily or judicially restricted to established
categories. 103 Because the statutes in the July 2 Cases did not impose
any statutory restriction on mitigating evidence and because no
evidence allegedly relevant to sentencing was excluded, 10 4 the
plurality did not reach this question. Nevertheless, these cases and
their progeny strongly suggest that the Constitution itself prohibits
102. The difficulty of these questions is exacerbated by the uniqueness of the capital
sentencing hearing. Precedent from the guilt or innocence stage of the trial or from sentencing
hearings not involving the death penalty is unlikely to be useful to a capital sentencing judge. See
Crump, Capital Murder in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 531, 561 (1977). But see note 123 infra.
103. See Crump, supra note 102, at 561 (predicting that evidence admissibility issues will
present most difficult questions for courts applying the July 2 Cases at sentencing hearings).
Four Ohio cases, including two pending before the Supreme Court, illustrate one state's answerto
the question raised in text. In the earliest, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the state's death
penalty statute is constitutional even though it expressly limits mitigatory consideration to three
listed exculpatory circumstances, and its listed circumstance related to mental disorder is too
n-irrow to encompass a defendant with "dull normal" intelligence and sociopathic traits. State v.
Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d73, 83-87, 94-96, 357 N.E.2d 1035,1045-46, 1049-51 (1976) (construing
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02-.04 (Page Supp. 1976)). The court in fact exacerbated the
narrowness of the mental disorder circumstance by limiting its availability to defendants who can
prove they suffer from a recognized psychosis or a significantly impaired intelligence. Id. at 94-96,
357 N.E.2d at 1049-51.
Drawing extensively on Bayless, the Ohio high court subsequently held that a 17 year-old
offender was not sufficiently impaired mentally to qualify under the statute's mentality-based
mitigating circumstance despite his tender age and behavioral retardation. State v. Bell, 48 Ohio
St. 2d 270, 282-83, 358 N.E.2d 556, 563-65, cert granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977) (No. 76-6513).
The court felt that the statute's allowance for evidence of the "history, character and condition of
the offender" so long as it relates to one of the three enumerated circumstances was broad enough
to encompass all important mitigating factors. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 281, 358 N.E.2d at 564
(construing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2924.04(B) (Page Supp. 1976)).
In perhaps the most troubling case, the court dismissed a drop in I.Q. scores from 75 (dull-
normal) to 61 in 1966 and to 54 (moderate retardation) in 1968 and found no evidence of mental
defect sufficient to qualify under the relevant statutory circumstance. The court's conclusion
relied on a state psychiatrist's testimony linking the dropping scores to the defendant's
uncooperativeness. State v. Royster, 48 Ohio St. 2d 381, 388-90, 358 N.E.2d 616, 622 (1976).
Most recently, the Ohio Supreme Court persisted in the view that a woman' of dull-normal
intelligence, in this case accompanied by behavioral characteristics of retardation, may not avail
herself of the statute's exculpatory circumstance relating to mental disorder and defect. State v.
Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 66-67, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1074 (1976), cerL granted, 98 S. Ct. 261
(1977) (No. 76-6997).
104. See notes 74, 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
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any restrictions on jury consideration of relevant mitigatory evi-
dence.10 5 Accordingly, a statute that attempts to enumerate exclusive
mitigatory factors and thus that bars consideration of any other
possibly relevant factors must be unconstitutional because it fails to
treat persons convicted of a designated crime as "uniquely individual
human beings."'10 Any statute that authorizes the execution of one
convicted murderer without considering his peculiar frailties is no less
unconstitutional than a statute that authorizes execution of all
convicted murders without recognizing theirs. 107
Because it is most unlikely that any statute could list all possible
mitigating factors and because no degree of statutory particulariza-
tion will suffice for constitutionality if the statute fails to anticipate a
specific defendant or his crime, statutory enumeration alone can
never meet the individualization requirement of the human dignity
prong of the eighth amendment. 0 8 There must be some provision for
consideration of mitigating factors beyond those identified in the
statute, as in all three statutes validated by the Court. Thus, the
standard of admissibility cannot be more narrowly drawn than the
standard of relevance under the eighth amendment. When the statute
105. See, e.g., Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1976) (per curiam) (essential
that all information relevant to capital sentencing be considered); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
271 (1976) (plurality opinion) (jury must consider all relevant factors before eighth amendment
permits capital punishment); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,250 n.8 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(noting absence of limiting language introducing list of mitigating factors); Commonwealth v.
Moody, 22 CRm. L. REP. (BNA) 2249, 2250 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1977) (July 2 Cases mandate
that constitutional statute must delineate specific aggravating circumstances and impose no
limitation on mitigating evidence relevant to defendant's character and record); of. Messer v.
State, 330 So. 2d 137, 142 (Fla. 1976) (Florida statute requires thatjudge exercise broad latitude
in admitting evidence during sentencing; death sentence reversed for refusal to admit psychiatric
testimony). The force of these precedents and the strength of the plurality's commitment to
individualization overcomes any implications in the dictum of Gregg that state legislatares are the
definers of mitigating factors. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(sufficient guidance derived from jury's hearing mitigating factors enumerated in statute by
legislature).
106. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Common-
wealth v. Moody, 22 CRmi. L. REP. (BNA) 2249,2249-50 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1977) (statute that
limits mitigating circumstances to those enumerated unconstitutional); Black, Death Penalty
Now, 51 TuL L. REV. 429, 438 (1977) (July 2 Cases considered access to full range of mitigating
circumstances essential to valid statute).
107. Cf. Jurekv. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-72 (1976) (plurality opinion) (statute that restricts
jury consideration to aggravating factors suffers from same defect as mandatory statute).
108. In Gregg the plurality noted that the Model Penal Code's list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances created general categories. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-94, 193 n.43
(1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting MODELPENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
It cited McGautha for the proposition that wise capital sentencing is not susceptible to application
by a mechanical formula. Id. at 194 n.45 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 285-86
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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does not list the item sought to be admitted, the trial judge must look
to the Constitution itself to flesh out the standard for determining
mitigating factors. 19
Identification of Mitigating Factors. Because the hypothetical
statute does not list mental disorder as a mitigating factor, the judge
first must examine the July 2 Cases for some hint of how to identify
mitigating factors. The opinions provide two guides: first, they list
specific mitigating factors mentioned both in the statutes found
constitutional and in other sources; 10 second, Woodson provides a
brief generic definition of "compassionate or mitigating factors" as
facets of the character and record of the individual or of the
circumstances of the crime that stem from "the diverse frailties of
humankind.""'
The specific factors named in the July 2 Cases are the easiest
source for determining whether a specific situation constitutes a
mitigating circumstance relevant to the capital sentencing decision: if
the situation fits into an enumerated category, it probably must be
admitted. Thus, in the hypothetical case, much of the defendant's
evidence of mental disorder may fall within the mitigating factors
enumerated in the July 2 Cases and accordingly should be
admitted.11 2 On the other hand, a facile recitation of a specific
109. See Crump, supra note 102, at 563-64 (information admissible at sentencing a constitu-
tional question and much that would be excluded under ordinary rules of evidence must be
admitted).
110. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 272-73 (in deciding whether defendant likely to
commit another crime, jury may consider age, prior conduct, and duress or mental or emotional
pressure at time of crime); Proffittv. Florida, 428 U.S. at 248 n.6 (listof factors in Florida statute);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 193 n.44 (list of factors in Model Penal Code).
Moreover, when the Supreme Court recognizes a factor as mitigatory, it establishes an arguably
sufficient basis for the subsequent introduction of all evidence relating to that factor. See Exparte
Hammond, 540 S.W.2d 328, 331 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (relying on hypothetical mitigating
situation discussed in Jurek, involving battered wife who hires assassin to murder husband after
years of beatings, to support conclusion in case with remarkably similar facts that defendant could
not be sentenced to death; judgment denying bail reversed). Hence, in addition to its mention of
the factors recognized in Texas and Florida and by the Model Penal Code, the plurality's
discussion of two hypothetical mitigating circumstances seems significant. See Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. at 272 n.7 (discussing situation mentioned in Hammond); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
197 (defendant who cooperates with police).
111. 428 U.S. at 304.
112. The Model Penal Code as quoted in Gregg lists such circumstances as a murder
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, or a murder in which the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of
mental disease or defect or intoxication. 428 U.S. at 193 n.44 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 210.6(4)(b), 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
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category named in the cases to justify classification of a similar
circumstance as mitigating masks the lack of any normative basis for
the analogy and only temporarily avoids the need to articulate a
functional definition.
Moreover, the factors listed in the July 2 Cases are not exhaustive.
For example, although broad enough to encompass most evidence of
mental instability, the stated categories do not include a criminal who
exhibits a documented mental condition, not uncommon among
murderers, that leads him to murder because he realizes the heinous
and immoral nature of the act will induce society to impose its most
severe punishment.113 Despite clear premeditation, such a defendant
may argue that mitigation is appropriate because society should not
participate in suicide11 4 or because his execution will not deter similar
crimes but may, in fact, incite them." 5 Thus, despite the failure of this
evidence to fit neatly into nonexclusive categories listed in the July 2
Cases," 6 it should not be excluded. Nor can this lack of comprehen-
siveness be solved by liberally interpreting the stated categories. That
approach eliminates any semblance of guidance and leaves adminis-
tration of the death penalty open to the standardless caprice
condemned by Furman. " 7
Instead, the judge should turn her attention to the general
definition of mitigating circumstances in Woodson and should give it
113. See Ehrmann, For Whom the Chair Waits, FED. PROBATION, March, 1962, at 14, 19-20
(Mar. 1962) (discussing Massachusetts case in which defendant, who had made several suicide
attempts, pleaded with jury for death in electric chair, thanked judge after hearing death
sentence, and refused to request commutation; defendant hanged himself in cell two days before
Governor recommended commutation); Stotzky, supra note 68, at 842 n.1 (discussing execution
of Gary Gilmore and its impact on persons with death wish); West, Psychiatric Reflections on the
Death Penalty, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 689, 695-97 (1975) (discussing various cases and
authorities); note 261 infra.
114. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1977, at 21, col. 1 (existence of capital punishment encourages
commission of homicides by suicidal individuals).
115. See Stotzky, supra note 68 at 842 n.1 (case of Gary Gilmore may serve as incentive for
persons contemplating suicide to commit violent crimes).
116. The plurality characterized the citation of factors as a general exposition to clarify the
possibility of constructing a capital sentencing system that meets the Furman standards. Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion).
117. Liberal construction of the statutory language is likely to occur frequently. For example,
the comments to the Model Penal Code indicate that the "extreme mental or emotional
disturbance" factor may mitigate only in a situation in which some brief, but explosive, mental or
emotional state contributed to the crime, qualifying its deliberateness. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 201.6(4), Comments at 70 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); id. § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft
1962), discussed in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 218-20 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, in Florida, where the death sentencing statute was modeled on the Model Penal
Code, this factor was found to exist in a case in which a long-standing mental disorder short of
insanity contributed to a pattern of crime. See Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29, 33-34 (Fla. 1977)
(per curiam) (father with brain abnormality raped and brutalized children over several years;
death sentence reversed and remanded for life sentence because of overwhelming mitigating
factor).
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content derived from the factors that must be satisfied before death
may ever be imposed constitutionally, that is, from the substantive
aspects of the doctrinal framework implicit in the eighth amendment.
An examination of the doctrinal superstructure as a whole and of
public attitudes and penological justifications in particular'1 8 is a
logically necessary step for the trial court to take in attempting to
identify what information is mitigating. When the presentation of any
complex and interrelated doctrine does not exhaustively discuss the
full implications of one of its subparts, interpreting courts, as a matter
of course, may give additional substance to the ambiguous subpart-
in this instance the definition of mitigating factors in the individualiza-
tion requirement-by seeking guidance from or at least consistency
with the rest of the text. Moreover, beyond the dictates of interpretive
symmetry, the eighth amendment itself requires consideration of
mitigating factors that derive from the other, substantive components
of its doctrinal superstructure. The procedural requirement that a
court must consider individualized mitigating factors is inseparable
from the substantive requirements of the "evolving standards of
decency" doctrine. The July 2 Cases held that capital punishment
may be imposed constitutionally only because it comports with public
attitudes and because it might serve penological justifications. Be-
cause an execution that offends public attitudes or.that does not serve
any valid purpose is unconstitutional, compliance with the eighth
amendment requires that a capital sentencing system permit the
introduction of any evidence tending to prove that punishing the
defendant with death would offend public attitudes or would fail to
serve the recognized penological justifications of retribution and
deterrence. 1 9 Even if the individualization subpart of the test is
viewed as a procedural requirement independent of the substantive
requirements of the eighth amendment, 2 ' each state is required by
118. The third substantive element of the test focuses on the proportionality of the
punishment to the crime. For the reasons discussed in note 53 supra, this element will not be
explored further here.
119. Accord, The Supreme Court; 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 75 n.78 (death penalty in
general cannot be justified by retribution if morally indistinguishable defendants are executed;
neither can it be justified by deterrence if particular case does not focus on deterrence served by
that execution); cf Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (enormity of death penalty
requires vigilance to ensure preservation of constitutional rights in every case; confidential
presentence report must be disclosed); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (individualized capital sentehcing is progressive and humanizing develop-
ment arising out of human dignity underlying eighth amendment and enables sentencing
authority to arrive at "just and appropriate sentence").
120. This view was adopted in The Supreme Cour 1975 Term, supra note 25, at 64-65. Such
an approach is the result of a failure to note the confluence of Furman's prohibition of
arbitrariness with the human dignity branch of evolving standards of decency. See notes 48-49
supra and accompanying text.
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the plurality to adopt the individualization procedure as part of its
death sentencing system. Moreover, as the preceding discussion
demonstrates, the system the state adopts-and thus the state's
choice of what information to include in its individualization
process-is constitutional only if it adheres to the entire "evolving
standards of decency" doctrine.
121
Right to an Instruction. Once the defendant establishes that
proffered evidence is relevant to the issue of mitigation as defined in
the July 2 Cases, the eighth amendment individualization requirement
mandates its admittance. Merely exposing the jury to relevant
individualized information does not ensure, however, that the
sentence imposed will comport with the eighth amendment. 22 The
standards used by the judge to determine whether evidence is
relevant to mitigation and by the legislature in drafting the statute
must also be communicated to the jury. The guidance side of "guided
individualization" thus raises the usual right of a defendant to
demand a trial instruction on his theory of the case' 23 to the level of a
121. See note 25 supra; text accompanying notes 44, 103-09 supra.
122. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195-95 (1976) (plurality opinion) (because jury
inexperienced in sentencing, constitutional requirement best met by statute providing
bifurcated proceeding at which jury presented relevant information and standards to guide its
use of that information).
123. That a defendant is entitled to a requested instruction on any defense for which there is
a foundation in law or fact is well established. C. WRIGHT & C. McCoRMIcK, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL §§ 485, 495 (1969); see, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 413 F.2d
1376, 1378 (7th Cir. 1969) (defendant entitled to instruction on any theory reasonably
supported in law although evidence weak, inconsistent or of doubtful credibility); Strauss v.
United States, 376 F.2d 416, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1967) (judgment reversed because of judge's
refusal to instruct on substantive defense to tax evasion); People v. Slocum, 52 Cal. App. 3d 867,
889, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1975) (judge must instruct on any material evidence regardless of
veracity). Instructions are required not only to ensure that the jury consider the theory for which
the defendant introduced the evidence, but also as a prophylactic measure to avert the potential
for prejudice or improper use inherent in certain types of evidence. See C. WR,GHT & C.
MCCORMICK § 492 (limiting use of character evidence); id. § 496 (limiting use of impeaching
evidence). Thus, the defendant customarily has a right to a limiting instruction-a right he may
exercise to demand an instruction that prohibits the jury from drawing improper inferences from
the mitigating evidence.
Moreover, the trial court's discretion to decide when evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to
require a prophylactic instruction is severely curtailed when prejudicial evidence will play such a
crucial role in the case that the normal option of exclusion is not available. See United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (identification evidence is generally highly
probative; instruction required to prevent it from prejudicing jury); cf Bruno v. United States,
308 U.S. 287 (1939) (federal defendant has right to instruction that his failure to testify not
indicative of guilt); FED. R. EvID. 403, Advisory Comm. Note (instruction important alternative
to exclusion of evidence). This basis for the limiting-instruction rule bolsters the hypothetical
defendant's right to an instruction that the jury ignore any prejudicial aspects of his evidence of
mental disorder. See note 275 infra.
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constitutional imperative for mitigatory instructions in the sentencing
phase.1 24 That imperative draws additional strength from the
analogous but broader constitutional rule that a trial court must,
charge the jury on any substantive constitutional defense raised by a
criminal defendant's evidence. 125 To satisfy all of these rules, the
Most of the body of law establishing the right to an instruction evolved in the guilt or
innocence stage of the trial. See FED. R. CRIht P. 30 (right to file instruction requests at close of
evidence). The July 2 Cases make clear, however, that this right is equally viable in the
sentencing portion of the trial. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(practice of providing jury with guidance by instruction entrenched in legal system; no reason to
alter in sentencing context). One type of sentencing hearing that has been the subject of some
judicial and scholarly discussion is the treatment of persons who have become insane while
awaiting execution. See Solesbee v. Balkan, 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (constitutional to execute insane
person). Some states have statutes prohibiting executions of the insane and establishing special
sentencing hearings to determine sanity. See generally Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State and
the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 386 (1962). At least one such statute that
utilizes a jury as sentencing authority gives the defendant the right to instructions. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1165 (West 1958).
124. A death penalty system cannot fulfill Furman's basic requirement unless it replaces
arbitrary jury discretion with objective standards to guide and regularize the process. Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,303 (1976) (plurality opinion). The opinions in the July 2 Cases
varied in the degree of emphasis they placed on this guidance requirement. See notes 80-91
supra and accompanying text. Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 302-03
(separate importance of guidance emphasized) with Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 274-76
(arbitrariness eliminated by presenting all relevant information to jury). Nevertheless, having
established that a defendant must have the right to bring to the jury's attention whatever factors
might bear on mitigating his punishment, the Court cannot be lax in formulating its instruction
requirement. Once that evidence is before the jury, the eighth amendment mandates guidance in
how to evaluate its relevance to the sentencing decision.
125. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (due process right to instruction
that reasonable doubt on part of jury prohibits conviction); John Bad Elk v. United States, 177
U.S. 529, 530 (1900) (right to instruction that illegality of arrest a constitutional defense to
charge of resisting arrest, if resistance reasonable); United States v. Waskow, 519 F.2d 1345,
1347 (8th Cir. 1972) (dicta suggesting right to instruction on due process defense that extremely
offensive police activity led defendant to commit crime); Commonwealth v. Armao, 446 Pa. 325,
286 A.2d 626 (1972) (right to instruction that truth a constitutional defense to libel). In other
areas of the law in which jury confusion could deprive an individual of a constitutional right, the
absence of an instruction constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S.
564, 569, 571 (1970) (conviction for disturbing peace during demonstration protesting Vietnam
War reversed because jury instructions never clarified what legal weight to give to evidence;
possible that conviction based on espousal of unpopular ideas); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 448-49 (1969) (conviction for advocating violence during Ku Klux Klan rally reversed
because neither syndicalism statute nor instructions to jury refined statutory definitions to
assure that defendants not convicted of mere advocacy); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155
(1959) (conviction for selling obscene literature reversed because no instruction that
defendant's lack of knowledge constitutionally prevents conviction); People v. Vann, 12 Cal. 3d
220, 227-28, 524 P.2d 824, 829, 114 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (1974) (inadvertant and unchallenged
omission of crucial instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt amounts to reversible error).
Similarly, the refusal to give an instruction that prevents imposition of the death penalty in a
manner that violates the Constitution must also require reversal.
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mitigation instruction must be framed to guide the jury toward a
sentence that is morally acceptable to society and that serves
recognized penological justifications. Any reference to instructions in
the sentencing statute cannot limit the defendant's right; nor can the
alleged relevance of the evidence to an enumerated aggravating
factor 26 alter the constitutional requirement of an instruction for its
mitigatory potential.
127
In the July 2 Cases, the Court chose not to heed Justice Harlan's
warning that guidelines for death sentencing can be no more than
"meaningless 'boiler-plate.' 128 Nor did it succumb to Professor
Kalven's dilemma and abolish the death penalty.' 29 Instead, it
concluded that through guided individualization legislatures can write
and courts and juries can apply capital statutes that conform to the
eighth amendment.'30 In overseeing this experiment in guided,
126. At least one court has interpreted the July 2 Cases as holding that, although mitigating
factors may not be restricted to a specific list, aggravating factors that will justify imposition of
the death penalty must be clearly defined. See Commonwealth v. Moody, 22 CRIM,1 L. REP.
(BNA) 2249, 2250 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1977) (noting that all three statutes held constitutional
limited imposition of death penalty to murder accompanied by specified aggravating
circumstances; Pennsylvania statute constitutional in that regard). Thus it might be argued that
the prosecutor may successfully seek an instruction on the aggravating potential of evidence
offered in mitigation only if it is relevant to an enumerated factor. Moreover, if the prosecution
introduces evidence in support of some enumerated aggravating factor, the defendant may
request an instruction on the mitigating potential of the same evidence. If the evidence is
arguably relevant to the legal standard for mitigation inherent in the eighth amendment, the
mitigating instruction must also be given. Indeed, the strong possibility of prejudice when the
defendant's mental disorder is established and the judge accedes to the prosecutor's request for
an instruction on the defendant's continuing danger to the community can be overcome only by
an instruction informing the jury of its mitigatory potential. The defendant's request for an
instruction may be refused only if it has no support in the evidence, or is incorrect as a matter of
law. See F. WHARTON, IV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 538 (12th ed. C. Torcia 1976); note 275 infra.
127. The establishment of mitigatory standards to guide the sentencing authorities'
decisionmaking not only eliminates unconstitutionally arbitrary discretion but also facilitates
appellate review of every aspect of the process.
All three of the sentencing systems held constitutional in the July 2 Cases were praised by the
plurality for increasing the ability of appellate courts to review decisions made at the sentencing
hearing. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269-70, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Texas
expedited review process protects against wanton or freakish sentences); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 250-51 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Florida requirements of automatic review and
written findings guarantee meaningful appellate review and ensure similar sentences in similar
circumstances); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-06 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory
supreme court review ensures that sentence of death comports with eighth amendment and
eliminates random or arbitrary imposition). The mandatory statutes failed to satisfy the
requirements of Furman in part by their failure to make the process of death sentencing
rationally reviewable. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion); note 192 infra,
128. See text accompanying notes 3-4, 21 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
130. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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individualized sentencing, the Court placed primary reliance on the
requirement that the death sentencing authority consider all
circumstances in mitigation of the ultimate sanction. The foregoing
analysis demonstrates, however, that the Court must go further. It can
ensure that its experiment will succeed against the odds set by Justice
Harlan and Professor Kalven only by insisting that the mitigation
requirement be applied in conformity with the eighth amendment
doctrine under which it upheld the death penalty in the abstract. Most
importantly, the Court must insist on the consideration of all
mitigating factors, as defined by statute, recognized indicators of
public attitudes, and penological justifications. In addition, instruc-
tions must be afforded on all relevant theories of mitigation whenever
the jury serves as sentencing authority. Finally, because it has
interpreted the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment to require that the death sentencing authority consider
mitigating factors and to establish a process for identifying and
applying them, the Court itself must accept final responsibility for
reviewing all of these steps to ensure constitutional application of the
death sanction."'1
131. By emphasizing the importance of standards and of appellate review, the Court seems to
have accepted a major role in policing the administration of death sentencing systems under the
dictates of the July 2 Cases. See note 127 supra. In carrying out its review function in decisions
on the abstract constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court has varied the scope of judicial
scrutiny depending upon the part of the doctrinal framework being applied. Inherent in public at-
titudes scrutiny is a degree of judicial deference to the decisions of democratically elected
legislatures insofar as those decisions are one important indicator of public attitudes. See Coker
v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2868 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Stotzky, supra note 68, at 849; Tao, supra note 91, at 350-51. Nonetheless, by accepting
the responsibility for balancing competing indicia of public attitudes, the plurality held out the
possibility of finding legislative views outweighed by other considerations. See Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298-99 & n.35 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory statutes
adopted in misguided effort to comply with Furman not entitled to much weight as indicator of
renewed social acceptance of mandatory sentences; jury resistance to mandatory sentences
relied on as indicator of adverse public attitudes); note 39 supra. The plurality also indicated a
willingness to defer to legislative findings concerning the effectiveness of capital punishment as
a deterrent. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. Despite this reluctance to grapple with
the deterrence question, the Justices have recognized that the human dignity element of the test
generally involves issues that only the Court itself can resolve. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. at
2868 (public attitudes only half of eighth amendment question; to resolve other half, Court must
use its own judgment); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 644 n.1 (1977) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (holding of plurality in July 2 Cases demonstrates plurality itself to be final arbiter
of human dignity prong).
The Court has not yet revealed whether it will use the same multifaceted scope of review in
measuring the conformity of specific statutes and sentences against each aspect of the July 2
Cases doctrinal framework. Cf Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 368-70 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (contrary to plurality's expectation in Proffitt, Florida Supreme Court review of
individual sentence insufficient because it should have found two mitigating circumstances
existed which outweighed aggravating circumstances; failure to reduce death penalty to life
imprisonment indicates unconstitutionality of Florida statute despite Proffitt); id at 361 n.12
(plurality opinion) (questions raised by Justice Marshall premature; case remanded on other
grounds with expectation that Florida Supreme Court will adhere to Proffitt).
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II. DEVELOPING A SPECIFIC MITIGATORY THEORY:
MENTAL DISORDER SHORT OF INSANITY
MENTAL DISORDER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DOCTRINAL
FRAMEWORK
The identification of mitigating factors will play an important role in
future death penalty litigation and legislation. Although the full range
of mitigating factors that might someday be recognized is in doubt,
certain broad classes of potentially mitigatory circumstances are
readily apparent. The discussion now turns to one such class-mental
disorder 132 -to illustrate the application of the individualization and
guidance requirements discussed in the preceding sections.
The selection of mental disorder as a potentially mitigating factor in
the preceding hypothetical situation was not arbitrary but was a
product of the authors' guided discretion. Although mental disorder is
recognized as a mitigating factor in some state death sentencing
statutes,133 many legislators, judges, and jurors may not immediately
intuit its potential. Moreover, the high incidence of various mental
disorders among capital offenders assures that the mitigatory prob-
lems associated with these afflictions must soon be resolved.
1 34
This part of the article undertakes two tasks. First, it demonstrates
that treatment of mental disorder as a mitigating circumstance is
consistent with the doctrinal framework of the July 2 Cases. To this
end, public attitudes toward the death penalty and retributive and
deterrent penological justifications for capital punishment are
examined, and tentative definitions of mental states that may qualify
as mitigating circumstances within those parameters are outlined.
Second, it derives from these definitions a four-factor scheme for
analyzing the mitigatory potential of mental disorder and emphasizes
the scheme's application to the specific requirements of jury
instructions in death sentencing proceedings.
132. Throughout this section the phrases "mental disorder" and "mental abnormality" are
employed generically to denote all abnormal mental conditions, whether organic, environmen-
tally induced, or illness-related.
133. See notes 158-59 infra and accompanying text.
134. See D. ABRAHAMSEN, THE MURDERING MIND (1973); D. LUNDE, MURDER AND MADNESS





Early History of the Law of Mitigation. In the July 2 Cases,
"history and traditional usage" provided significant source material
for the interpretation of the eighth amendment.135 The inattention of
early commentators to the role of mental abnormality as a mitigating
factor in capital cases 3 6  and the limited data available for
reconstructing that role, 1' however, restrict any historical analysis.
Nonetheless, clear evidence indicates that, since the medieval period,
Anglo-American law has accepted special treatment, and often has
permitted mitigation, when a criminal is afflicted with a mental
abnormality.
As early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries, English law treated
mad "felons" with a leniency not accorded ordinary offenders. 3 8
When trial by petit jury became the usual method of determining
guilt, mad offenders were subject to conviction, but could be declared
mad to facilitate a grant of pardon or a reduction of punishment. 13 9
Bracton's thirteenth century commentary justified this mitigation of
punished by his madness. 40 By the reign of Edward I, mitigation of
135. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 288, 239-93 (history and traditional usage
important measures of social values regarding mandatory death sentences); see Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173, 176-89 (history and precedent major considerations in determining
whether capital punishment is per se unconstitutional). For a general delineation of the sources
of public attitudes recognized in°'the July 2 Cases, see notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text.
136. See 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANrrY IN ENGLAND 17-18, 26 (1968).
137. See E. POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 529 (1966) (court
records provide inadequate information). The primitive state of the psychological profession
before the twentieth century precludes inquiry into the early categorization of mentally
disordered offenders beyond the general groupings of madmen and lunatics.
138. Madmen who committed serious offenses were spared from trial by ordeal because they
were believed to be morally blameless. 1 N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 18. Instead, the
madman's family was required to restrain him and to pay compensation to the victim. Id. at 26.
139. Id at 26-27. Because juries and judges believed they lacked sufficient authority to
interfere with the normal course of the law, only the King could mitigate the prescribed
punishment by excusing the deranged "felon" from mandatory penalties. Id at 24, 26; cf 3 W.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 371 (3d ed. 1923) (the canon law imposed liability for
all acts, unless the act itself clearly demonstrated absence of moral responsibility).
140. Henerici de Bracton excused children from punishment because they lacked the intent
to commit a crime, but excused madmen from punishment because of the misfortune of their
fate. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (P. Thorne trans. 1968).
Bracton's views are premised on two different theories of justice: that justice exists in each
individual as his moral conscience; and that God, as the source of all justice, will grant each
person his just deserts. See id at 23 (justice is disposition by God to each person according to
merit and by will of just man to do right). Alth6ugh arguably inconsistent with moral notions of
responsibility and intent, the rise in England of the expiatory justification for mitigation based on
mental disorder coincided with the development of the morally based requirement of intent
for criminal liability. See 1 N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 27. Moreover, the expiatory
view for a time became dominant and replaced earlier moralistic justifications for mitigation. See
id (mentioning the reappearance of expiatory view in writings of Fleta, Coke, and Hume); note
138 supra; notes 227-37 infra and accompanying text.
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punishment for madmen had become commonplace.
1 41
As England's criminal justice system formalized, the defendant's
abnormal mental condition eventually became an absolute defense to
criminal punishment-first in pardon proceedings and later in the
initial determination of guilt.142 Although the procedural form of
applying differential treatment changed, and its theoretical justifica-
tion shifted from the expiatory notion that the madman was punished
by his madness to the moral and utilitarian views that the madman
cannot be blamed or deterred, 143 the proposition of special treatment
retained vitality through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in
the writings of Coke,144 Sir Matthew Hale, 145 and Blackstone. 1"
Unrestricted by the narrow application of the insanity defense in
English courts,1 47 the Scots, led by Sir George Mackenzie, sought a
more rational procedure for according differential treatment.
Mackenzie proposed that lesser forms of mental disorder that
impaired the defendant's reason but did not warrant the absolute
defense of insanity should moderate punishment proportionately.
148
141. N. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307 159, 161 (1969).
Insanity was not viewed as an excuse for crime, but deranged criminals were protected from
punishment for felonious actions. Id at 170; see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 372 (by
the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), infancy, lunacy, misadventure, and self-defense merited
mitigation of punishment). By 1300, pardons were so common that pretrial release of accused
madmen was a regular feature of the criminal justice system. N. HURNARD, supra at 161.
142. Holdsworth places the advent of the insanity defense during the reign of Edward III
(1327-77). 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 372 & h.9; cf. KENNY'S OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL
LAW 75 n.5 (17th ed. 1958) (citing a 1313 case in which the acts of deranged offender found not
to constitute a felony). Walker places the first clear acquittal on grounds of insanity at 1505. 1 N.
WALKER, supra note 136, at 25-26.
143. See 1 N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 247. Adherents of the utilitarian and moral views
differed on the justification for special treatment of the mad offender. The former felt that
deterrence was inapposite; the latter believed that the madman was guiltless. Compare 3 E. COKE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (E. Brooke & R. Brooke ed. 1797) (execution of mad
offenders cannot deter others) with 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24 (madmen suffer
defective or vitiated understanding, which excuses them from guilt).
144. See 3 E. COKE, supra note 143, at 6.
145. See 1 M. HALE. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE *30 (total alienation of the mind, or
perfect madness, excuses the offender from guilt).
146. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 143, at *24. Although Blackstone stated the principle
of law as furiosus furore solum punitur (a madman is punished by his madness alone), his
explanation indicates that he did not adhere solely to an expiatory view. He also believed that
the madman's impaired or defective understanding excused him from guilt. Id.
147. See KENNY'S OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 142, at 76 (as late as 1724, English
courts refused to apply formal insanity defense unless offender's understanding and reason
equivalent to that of brute or wild beast); 1 N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 38 (same).
148. 2 G. IACKENZIE. WORKS 58 (Edinburgh 1722) ("[Slince the law grants a total immunity
to such as are absolutely furious therefore it should by the rule of proportions lessen and
moderate the punishment of such, as though they are not absolutely mad yet are Hypochondrick
and Melancholy to such a degree, that it clouds their reason.. .. "). Mackenzie's proposal was
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In Scotland, Mackenzie's view developed into the practice of
requiring the judge or jury to determine the defendant's state of mind
after conviction so that the appropriate punishment would be
imposed. 149 This practice gradually evolved into the more formal
doctrine of "diminished capacity," which was incorporated into the
jury charge on determination of guilt. 5 0 Although the English law did
not incorporate Scotland's expeditious mitigatory procedure of
diminished responsibility until 1957,11 Mackenzie's proposal was
avidly discussed.152 And even so ardent a supporter of capital
punishment as Sir James Stephen admitted that "the ends of justice"
often required judicial discretion to reduce sentences on the basis of
mental disorder. 
15
Similarly, in American law strong sentiment existed for mitigated
punishment when defendants suffered from mental disorders that did
not constitute legal insanity. In the colonial period, the criminal law in
practice accepted milder forms of derangement as mitigatory fac-
tors. 54 By the turn of the twentieth century, moreover, several state
premised on the Roman expiatory view that the madman was punished by his madness. See I N.
WALKER, supra note 136, at 139-40. Thus, Mackenzie reasoned that offenders suffering from less
severe derangements should be excused from punishment in proportion to the suffering that
resulted from their mental condition. I&
149. See A. ALISON, PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 652 (Edinburgh 1832) (a
defendant completely deprived of reason will be excused from all punishment; defendant
suffering from a mixture of guilt and madness should receive recommendation for royal mercy); 1
B. HUME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING THE DESCRIPTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES ch. 1 (Edinburgh 1797) (by eighteenth century, courts mitigated
punishment sua sponte without requiring application for royal pardon); 1 N. WALKER, supra note
136, at 140-42 (sentencing for crimes for which courts could control severity of punishment
could be reduced without resort to pardon process).
150. See H.M. Advocate v. Dingwall, 5 Irvine 466, 479 (1867) (jury could return verdict on
murder charge or could find culpable homicide only if defendant's mental state warranted it); 1
N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 144-45 (diminished capacity defense first applied in 1844;
unclear whether doctrine applied to mitigation of punishment, to reduction of offense, or to
both). See generally notes 244-46 infra and accompanying text.
151. See The Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 2 (person suffering from abnormality
of mind that impairs mental responsibility for acts shall not be convicted of murder).
152. See 1 N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 147 (early twentieth century commissions studying
reform of English criminal law discussed diminished responsibility as alternative to defense of
insanity); cf 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 441 (advances in medical science by 1923
require more merciful treatment of insane persons by the law).
153. 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 89 (1883) (citing case of
woman who suffered epileptic fits that permanently impaired her powers though not constituting
legal insanity).
154. See E. POWERS, supra note 137, at 529 (mentally disturbed offenders were allowed
special allowances and dispensations in Massachusetts Bay Colony); H. RANKIN, CRLMINAL TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 113 n.60 (1965) (Virginia Council
recommended pardon when madman was convicted).
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supreme courts allowed introduction of evidence concerning the
defendant's mental state in determining the grade of offense.'
Contemporary Anglo-American Positive Law of Mitigation. These
historical antecedents help to explain why the contemporary positive
law of the United States and many other countries recognizes mental
disorder as a circumstance in mitigation of the death penalty.
Several statutory reform commissions, most notably the American
Law Institute in its Model Penal Code, suggest not only that a
defendant's mental disorder should qualify as one item on statutory
lists of mitigating factors, but that mental disorder should be
considered in death penalty decisions even if other factors are
ignored.156 The position of these law reform commissions has received
increasing acceptance among drafters of capital sentencing systems.
Of the thirty-one American jurisdictions that have retained or
redrafted death penalty statutes since the July 2 Cases,11 7 twenty-four
have explicitly listed mitigatory factors that must be considered by
the sentencing authority, including some form of mental disorder. 5 '
155. See Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 526 (1876) (failure in murder trial to admit
evidence of defendant's maniacal behavior for determining degree of crime held erroneous);
Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 135,85 N.W. 596, 598 (1901) (same). Ajury charge in an 1873
Connecticut case permitted the jury to acquit a mentally disordered defendant if it found him
incapable of fully controlling his actions. State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591, 595 (1873).
156. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (including mental
disease or defect impairing capacity to appreciate criminality of act in list of mitigatory
circumstances); id. § 4.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (special section specifying only
evidence of mental disease or defect admissible to support reduction of death sentence); ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REPORT 121-22 (1953) (special treatment of mentally
defective offenders should be extended to capital cases; question whether to make such
extension discretionary reserved).
157. See notes 158-59 infra and accompanying text (listing statutes currently in effect). In late
1977 the statutes of two jurisdictions were ruled unconstitutional by state supreme courts. See
State v. Duren, 547 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Mo. 1977) (death sentence provision of Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 5509.05, 550.009 (Supp. 1975) held unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Moody, 22 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2249, 2249 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1977) (18 PA. CONS. STAT, ANN, § 1311(d)(2)
(Purdon Supp. 1977) held unconstitutional). Recently, the Maryland legislature enacted a new
death penalty statute. 1978 Md. Laws ch. 3 (to be codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412).
158. 49 U.S.C. § 1473(c)(6) (Supp. V 1975); ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 11-7 (1975); ARiz REV.
STAT. § 13-454 (1956 & Supp. 1977), transferred and renumbered as § 13-902 by 1977 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch. 142, § 58; ARKc STAT. ANN. § 41-1304 (1977); 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 316
(West), (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1976)); COLO, REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 532-462(o (West Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 1976); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1977); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 532.025(2)(b) (Interim Supp. 1977); LA. CODE CRIL PRO. ANN. art. 905.5 (West Supp. 1977);
1978 Md. Laws ch.3 (to be codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(G)); 1977 Mo. Laws Act 11,
§ 5.3 (amending Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 559 (Vernon Supp. 1975)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2525(2)
(1975); 1977 N.H. Laws ch. 440.2; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIO REV.
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The remaining seven death penalty statutes all contain general
provisions that permit the defendant to present evidence on any
mitigating factor. 15 9 Moreover, the case law relevant to four of these
seven statutes strongly suggests an amenability to consideration of
mental disorder.16 Thus, it seems apparent that modern American
legislators invariably include this factor when they set out to identify
mitigatory circumstances.
The law of England is also indicative of relevant public attitudes
toward mitigation of the death penalty. 6 English statutory law
identifies mental disorder as a medical rather than a legal problem
and has substituted treatment for punishment in noncapital cases
involving such offenders. 162 Moreover, even before the death penalty
CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page, 1975); 1977 S.C. Acts, Act 177, § 1(c)(6), amending S.C.
CODE § 16-52(c) (Supp. 1977); 1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 51; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(d)
(Supp. 1977); 1977 Va. Acts ch. 492; 1977 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 206, § 4(2) (West) (amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.045 (1974)); Wyo. STAT. § 6.54.20) (Interim Supp. 1977). Most of
these statutes adopt the Model Penal Code's approach, focusing on an impaired capacity to
appreciate wrongfulness. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft
1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 1976); LA. CODE CRim. PRO. ANN. art. 905.5
(West Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 6.54.20) (Interim Supp. 1977). Ohio has adopted a different
test. See 01o REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Page, 1975) (death penalty precluded when
offense results primarily from offender's psychosis or mental deficiency); note 103 supra.
159. DEL. CODE tit. 2, §4209(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp.
1977); 1977 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 154, § 4; Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21(2) (Supp. 1977); 1977
Nev. Stats., ch. 585, § 4(7); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (Supp. 1976); TEx CODE CRIM PRO.
ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
160. In Texas, evidence that a defendant is "of a low order of mentality" has been admitted in
mitigation of the death penalty. See Thomas v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 432, 434, 262 S.W. 84, 85
(1924) (evidence of defendant's low mentality admitted in mitigation). Furthermore, a recent
Texas case has held that temporary insanity caused by intoxication qualifies as a mitigating fact.
Whitmore v. State, No. 52,325 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1976) (unpublished opinion)
(interpreting TEyx CODE CRm- PRO. ANN. art 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77)). Similarly, Idaho
and Oklahoma courts have considered a defendant's mental state and development in mitigation
of the death sentence. See State v. Behler, 65 Idaho 464, 476, 146 P.2d 338, 343 (1921)
(defendant's low intelligence requires reduction of death penalty to life imprisonment); Williams
v. State, 205 P.2d 524, 547-48 (Okla. 1947) (life sentence imposed instead of death penalty due
to defendant's intoxication and lack of education).
The law in Georgia is less clear. Georgia's statute permits consideration of "any mitigating
circumstances... otherwise authorized by law." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1977). It
seems likely that the provision will be construed to allow trial courts to consider mental disorder.
In the only relevant case, Woods v. State, 214 Ga. 546, 105 S.E.2d 896 (1958), the Georgia
Supreme Court found that consideration of weakmindedness was permissible, although the trial
court was not bound by law to so instruct the jury. Id. at 546-47, 105 S.E.2d at 897.
161. The relevance of English materials to public attitudes is underscored by their use by the
Gregg plurality. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that
death penalty has longhistory of acceptance both in United States and in England). Cf. id. at 184
n.30 (citing 1950 report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment to support discussion
of penological justifications).
162. See The Mental Health Act, 1957, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72, § 60 (court may authorize
defendant's admission to mental hospital if offender has mental disorder). See generally 1 N.
WALKER, CmtE AND Pu isHmNr IN BTrrAjN 268-94 (2d rev. ed. 1968) (discussing judicial
discretion to commit offenders).
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was abolished 16' English statutes afforded a wide range of mental
disorder defenses, virtually assuring that mental defectives and
the mentally ill would not receive death sentences. 164 Most impor-
tantly, diminished responsibility, which under The Homicide Act of
1957165 prevented conviction for capital murder if the defendant
was "suffering from such abnormality of mind.., as substantially
impaired his mental responsibility for his acts . .. ,,6 provided
a mitigatory theory similar to those recognized in mitigation by
American death penalty statutes. Even if convicted of a capital
crime, an English prisoner had two more chances to use mental
disorder as a basis for avoiding execution. First, English commutation
practices provided for regularized postsentence administrative
consideration of mitigating circumstances, including mental disorder,
as a basis for downgrading punishment to life imprisonment.
1 67
Second, under the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1884,168 any prisoner who
appeared mentally abnormal received a psychiatric examination prior
to execution; if the psychiatrists found that the offender was then
insane or was insane at the time of the crime, the sentence was
commuted by the Home Secretary to imprisonment for life.
169
The law of several other foreign countries also is instructive
because it affords a picture of the "evolving standards of decency"
that mark the progress of societies arguably at least as mature as our
163. The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, 13 & 14 Ellz. 2, c. 71, § 1 (made
permanent by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament, Dec. 10 and 18, 1969).
164. See, e.g., The Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 2(1) (defendant cannot be
convicted if suffering from mental abnormality that impairs mental responsibility); Trial of
Lunatics Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c. 38, §§ 1-2 (providing for verdict of guilty but insane, and
for special custody); Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, § 2 (indicted person
found insane on arraignment cannot be tried), repealed by Criminal Procedure Act, 1964, 12 &
13 Eliz. 2, c. 84, § 1.
165. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11.
166. Id. c. 11, § 2(1). See generally Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading
Criminal Liability: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 J. CRiM. L.C.
&P.S. 313, 323 n.58 (1971); Wooten, Diminished Responsibility: A Layman's View, 76 L.Q. REv.
224 (1960).
167. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 4 (1949-51)
(Memorandum of the Home Office) (sometimes necessary in commutation cases to consider
whether prisoner is unusually weakminded or emotionally unstable); see 1 N. WALKER, supra
note 136, at 284-85 (prisoner's mental condition often is reason for invoking royal prerogative of
interference with the law).
168. 47 & 48 Vict., c. 64.
169. ROYAL COIISSION ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT. supra note 167, at 3. The standards of the
Home Office appear to have made commutation.mandatory if the pre-execution investigation
revealed mental disorder as a cause of the criminal act, but they made commutation
discretionary if the same condition was present immediately after sentencing.
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own. 170 Indeed, many European countries, as well as Japan, have
matured to the extent that they have abolished the death penalty.171
Their attitudes toward mitigation are nonetheless visible in their
penal codes, each having general provisions reciting mitigating
circumstances, including mental disorder, for use in all sentencing
decisions. 72 Similarly, nations that continue to apply the death
penalty are also under statutory mandate to consider mental
disorder. 173
Contemporary Responses to Mitigation by Other Institutions.
Legislative bodies are not the only institutions making sentencing
decisions that reflect public attitudes; once the criminal justice
system focuses on a particular individual, mitigating factors might be
considered at several critical points. Therefore, the factors considered
relevant by prosecutors, trial judges, juries, appellate courts, and
executive clemency administrators when they exercise their discretion
over capital sentencing should also be examined closely to determine
whether the importance of mental disorder as a mitigating factor is
reflected in contemporary public attitudes.
174
170. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2867 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion) (qlimate of
international opinion is relevant in assessing public attitudes toward death penalty). But cf.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 404 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (European abolition
trend noted, not followed). See generally H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 175-76 (1954) (citing foreign statutes); Mueller & Le Poole, Appellate Review of Legal
but Excessive Sentences: A Comparative Study, 21 VAND. L. REV. 411, 424-29 (1968) (reprinting
foreign statutes)..
171. See generally Patrick, The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective, 56 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 397, 398-404 (1965) (table of world data on capital punishment statutes).
172. See, e.g., Austrian Penal Acts of 1852 & 1945, ch. 4, § 46(a) (N. West & S. Shuman
trans. 1963) (low intelligence and neglected upbringing considered mitigating factors); GERMAN
DRAFT PENAL CODE § 60(2) (N. Ross trans. 1965) (excuse of reduced volition considered);
CRIMINAL CODE OF JAPAN art. 39 (T. Blakemore trans. 1954) (as amended 1954) (mental
derangement and weakmindedness considered); NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE OF 1902, § 56(1)(b)
(H. Schjoldager trans. 1961) (court may reduce punishment below minimum or commute to
milder form when act was committed during temporary reduction of consciousness not due to
voluntary intoxication); PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN ch. 33, § 2 (T. Sellin trans. 1972) (ment~ily ill
cannot be punished; in certain circumstances offender must surrender to special confinement).
173. See, e.g., GREEK PENAL CODE art. 79 (N. Colis trans. 1973) (character and level of
development must be considered); PENAL CODE OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC art. 25
(1969) (W. Kenney & T. Sodowski trans. 1973) (person incapable of recognizing significance of
act or controlling conduct because of mental deficiency, mental illness, or other mental
disturbance may not be convicted).
174. In rejecting the argument that the opportunity for discretion existing at each critical
stage in the criminal justice process was a fatal flaw inherent in any capital sentencing statute,
the July 2 Cases plurality emphasized that the interjection of mercy at each critical stage was
essential to a constitutional statute. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976)
(plurality opinion). Thus, the plurality recognized the importance of discretion at each stage to
ensure that public attitudes play a role in the sentencing decision.
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The prosecutors decision to charge is one of the offender's initial
contacts with the formal court system and is vitally important as a
threshold of the decision whether the death penalty is appropriate in a
particular case. 175 Although few studies focus on the factors actually
considered in making this decision, 176 those available indicate that
mental disorder is an accepted, though not the most frequent,
ameliorative influence on the prosecutor's charging decision.
177
Moreover, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice concluded that a prosecutor should
consider noncriminal disposition when criminal acts involve offenders
who have emotional disorders short of legal insanity.1 78 Similarly, the
American Bar Association has endorsed the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion with regard to the proportionality of the authorized
punishment to the specific offender.
1 79
Juries also apparently consider the defendant's mental condition in
making the sentencing decision. 180 Unfortunately, as in the case of
175. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE
DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO
CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1970).
176. See K. DAVIS, supra note 175, at 198 (inquiry into prosecutorial discretion long overdue).
See generally Kaplan, Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1965).
177. See, e.g., F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL & G. STARKMAN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 487 (1974) (noting tendency of prosecuting authority to be more lenient when illness
or mental problems not amounting to insanity involved); Note, Discretion Exercised by Montana
County Attorneys in Criminal Prosecutions, 28 MONT. L. REV. 41, 49 (1966) (prosecutors
attributed 31% of their decisions not to prosecute to consideration of best interests of the
defendant; insanity or low mentality was third most frequently mentioned component in that
category, accounting for four out of nineteen decisions not to prosecute); Comment,
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S. CAL L. REV. 519, 529
(1969) (survey of prosecutors indicates that intelligence of defendant is fourth most important
consideration in the charging decision, behind prior records, occupation, and age). See also A.
WILCOX. THE DECISIONTO PROSECUTE 87-88 (1972) (discussing two studies analyzing practice of
English police and prosecutors to commit mentally disordered persons as alternative to
prosecution).
178. See PRESIDENTS COMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. The use
of the term "emotional disorders" does not appear to reflect an intent to limit the types of
mental disorders that a prosecutor should consider. See id. at 8. (factors relevant to determining
whether to seek noncriminal disposition include offender's medical, psychiatric, family, or
vocational difficulties). The Task Force recommended that when such difficulties are apparent a
prosecutor should evaluate the viability of alternatives to criminal prosecution such as referral to
an agency, alcoholic treatment program, or mental institution. Id.
179. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.9(b)
(Approved Draft 1971) (factors that prosecutor may consider in exercising discretion include
disproportion of authorized punishment to specific offense or offender).
180. The jury is an extremely important link in the chain leading to execution. Moreover, as
the plurality in the July 2 Cases emphasized, it is uniquely well suited to serve as a reflection of
public attitudes. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (plurality opinion); see notes 44 &
99 supra and accompanying text.
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prosecutorial discretion, little documentation of juror attitudes
exists. 181 Available studies do indicate, however, that if given free
reign to determine punishment, modern juries, like those of old
England and Scotland,1 8 2 are inclined to mitigate the verdict upon
finding facts indicating reduced or diminished responsibility insuffi-
cient to constitute insanity.1
83
In many instances the determination of the sentence is left to the
discretion of the trial judge.184 Commentary and empirical evidence
suggest that judges, like juries, should and do inquire into a
defendant's mental condition, with a variety of results. For example,
the judge may impose an extended term of imprisonment because the
defendant's mental abnormality makes him dangerous, 1 5 use an
181. This lack of data is undoubtedly due to the limitations of any attempt to study attitudes
in the jury room: judges have not been congenial to direct observation of juries at work, and
experimental juries are inherently suspect. See Morris, Bozzetti, Rusk & Read, Whither thou
Goest?An Inquiry Into Jurors 'Perceptions of the Consequences of a Successful Insanity Defense, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1058, 1060-61 (1977) (definitive answers concerning attitudes and behavior
of juries not possible from use of hypothetical juries); Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An
Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 444-45 (1977) (because
mystery essential to jury's function, entire legal system hostile to either direct observation or
experimentation).
182. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
183. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 331-34 (discussion of actual cases in which
jury swayed by evidence of diminished responsibility reached verdict of manslaughter despite
strong evidence of first degree murder); R. SIMON, TIE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 95-
96 (1967) (scientific survey showed one-half of jurors who found defendant guilty favored
commitment over imprisonment, indicating treatment preferred for legally responsible persons);
Dix, supra note 166, at 323 n.58 (English study of operation of doctrine of diminished
responsibility indicated jury impressed by-previous history of mental disorder and relied on it in
reducing grade of offense).
184. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 178, at 26 (summarizing relative roles of judge and
jury in sentencing process in United States); Levin, Sentencing the Criminal Offender, FED.
PROBATION, March, 1949, at 3. The constitutionality of leaving death sentencing entirely in the
trial judge's hands is still in doubt. See- note 99 supra.
185. See COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL
SENTENCING ACT § 5 (2d ed. 1972) (severe personality disorder indicating propensity toward
criminal activity justifies long term commitment to protect public) [hereinafter cited as COUNCIL
OF JUDGES]; MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03 (Proposed Final Draft 1962) (judge may justify
imposing extended term of imprisonment if he finds defendant to be dangerous, mentally
abnormal person whose incarceration necessary to protect public). The effect of the
dangerousness of the mentally disordered person on the decision whether to impose death is
uncertain. Compare Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Texas statute
treats likelihood that defendant will be dangerous as aggravating factor justifying death) with
Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148, 168, 115 N.W. 850, 857 (1908) (death sentence reduced to life
imprisonment because evidence of defendant's diminished responsibility demonstrates he
suffered enough; society protected by lifetime incarceration) and The Supreme Court, 1975
Term, supra note 25, at 72 (specific deterrence equally well served by life imprisonment without
any possibility of parole).
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indeterminate sentence to provide a sufficient period for treatment, 6
or even dismiss the criminal prosecution and commit the mentally
disordered individual to a civil institution.1 87 Provisions in the Model
Penal Code suggest other possibilities. Thus, the Code not only
makes specific provision for mitigation in death penalty cases, s18  but
also permits-as a reason for withholding imprisonment-recognition
of substantial mental grounds that excuse or justify a defendant's
criminal conduct but are insufficient to establish a defense.18 9 Other
sources indicate that judges sometimes place mentally disordered
offenders on probation in cases in which others would be incarcer-
ated,' 90 and often consider the disorder as mitigatory when some type
of punishment is nonetheless deemed appropriate.1 9'
186. Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465,
480-83 (1961) (mental disorder used as aggravating factor to provide time for treatment and to
decide readiness to return to society); see Robert Murray Woolland, 51 Crim. App. 65, 67 (1966)
(indeterminate life sentence imposed in England out of mercy to permit defendant to be
released early if mental condition improves). Although extended sentences may at first seem to
contradict the concept of mitigation of the death penalty, on further reflection it is clear that they
do not. Such sentences are justified by an isolation and treatment rationale which, if applied
in capital situations, in fact would warrant mitigation and perhaps commitment to a special
treatment facility.
187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.13 (Proposed Final Draft 1962). In so providing, the drafters of
the Code codified a practice that is widespread among judges in the Anglo-American legal
system. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF JUDGES, supra note 185, at 18-19 (American judges may order in-
patient or out-patient care based on clinical reports or on judge's own observation); K. DEVLIN,
SENTENCING OFFENDERS IN MAGISTRATE'S COURTS 50-51, 197-200 (1970) (English judges may
impose detention in hospital as viable alternative); J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN
PROCESS 84-85 (1971) (Canadian judges who perceive defendants as mentally ill are affected in
making sentencing decision by belief in reformation).
188. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(e) (Proposed Final Draft 1962) (death penalty may
be excluded if defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency); id. at §§ 210.6(4)(b),
(g), (h) (mitigating circumstances in death penalty provision include presence of mental or
emotional disturbance, diminished responsibility, and age).
189. Id. § 701 (Proposed Final Draft 1962).
190. See R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITION OF
SENTENCE 93 (1969) (discussing judicial reluctance to incarcerate mentally disordered persons,
especially the feeble-minded, whose conditions are insufficiently acute to warrant civil
commitment).
191. See K. DEVLIN, supra note 187, at 50-53 (responsibility of defendant relevant in plea for
mitigation of sentence because it offers explanation for conduct); E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATrrrUDES
IN SENTENCING 5-6 (1961) (criteria for sentencing include defendant's mental characteristics and
whether sentence likely to have corrective effect); Levin, supra note 184, at 3-4 (full appreciation
of the nature and significance of behavior constituting offense relevant to severity of sentence).
Mental disorder is also frequently included in the presentence report to help the judge evaluate
the crime. See COUNCIL OF JUDGES, supra note 185, at 18.
The determinate sentencing system recently adopted in California dramatically illustrates the
importance of a mental disorder as a mitigating factor relevant to the trial judge's sentencing
deliberation. Under the new system, each crime carries the possibility of three sentences. The
judge must impose the middle of the three in severity, unless aggravating circumstances warrant
the more severe alternative, or mitigating circumstances call for the less severe alternative. CAL.
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The exercise of discretion tempered by mercy does not end with the
imposition of sentence by the jury or trial judge; even before Furman
some states provided for appellate review of capital sentencing
decisions, 192 and mental disorder was frequently held to be a valid
ground for mitigation. 193 Appellate decisions in Nebraska, a state that
traditionally has afforded appellate judges unusually liberal review of
death sentencing decisions, 194 illustrate the manner in which some
PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1977); see Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1977, § C, at 1, col. 5
(similar proposal for overhauling sentencing procedures in the District of Columbia). The
California statute authorizes judicial rulemaking to identify aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Pursuant to that authority, Rule 423(b)(2) has been promulgated, making
physical or mental disorder a mitigating circumstance. CAL. RULES COURT tit. 2, div. 1, Rule
423(b)(2).
192. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 178, at 25 (trend is for states to open sentencing
determination to appellate scrutiny); Burr, Appellate Review As a Means of Controlling Criminal
Sentencing Discretion-A Workable Alternative? 3 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1971) (although
appellate review not often provided over sentences within statutory limits, eight states grant
specific powers to reduce excessive sentences and six others have power to modify); 108
U. PA. L. REV. 434, 436-38 (1960) (discussing states that grant appellate review and scope of
review provided). The constitutional requirement of appellate review found by the plurality in the
July 2 Cases will lead to an even more dramatic increase in appellate review of sentencing when
the death sentence is imposed. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (mandatory death sentence law grants standardless sentencing power to jury in form of
verdict determination; inability of appellate courts to review arbitrariness of jury determinations
contributes to unconstitutionality); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (same); Jurek v. Texas, 262,276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (automatic judicial
review guarantees that similar results follow from similar circumstances, minimizing risk of
arbitrariness); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-53 (plurality opinion) (same); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 204 (1976) (plurality opinion) (automatic appeal prevents arbitrary
imposition of death penalty by determining whether arbitrary factors figured in sentence, whether
sentence is disproportionate to similar cases, and whether evidence supports the determination
of aggravating factors); note 127 supra. Since the July 2 Cases, the Court has emphasized the
importance of appellate review. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (appellate court must be able to review presentence report if used by trial judge in
imposing death sentence or if sentencing procedure fails to satisfy Furman).
193. H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 170, at 210-11; see, e.g., State v. Behler, 65 Idaho 464, 474-76,
146 P.2d 338, 343-44 (1944) (defendant with pronounced subnormal mind should not be held
fully accountable; sentence reduced); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 310, 125 N.W.2d 918, 927
(1964) (youthful, feebleminded defendant easily led into homicide; sentence reduced from death
to life imprisonment); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 150, 151 A.2d 241, 248 (1959)
(sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment because sentencing court failed to look for
mitigating circumstances in background of dull-normal defendant).
194. Since 1887, Nebraska statutes have imposed on the state supreme court the duty to
reduce a sentence that is excessive in light of the evidence presented. 1887 Neb. Laws ch. 110,
§ 1 (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (1975)); cf. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2524 to
2525 (1975) (expedited supreme court review in capital cases). Because these statutes are
remedial, they are liberally construed. See Anderson v. State, 26 Neb. 387, 392, 4 N.W. 951,953
(1889) (defendant convicted of first degree murder without strong showing of premeditation;
sentence reduced to life imprisonment without requiring new trial).
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:757
appellate tribunals have treated evidence of mental disorder.195 As
early as 1895, the Nebraska Supreme Court identified the mental
condition of the person convicted as one of several mitigating factors
to be considered by trial courts in fixing punishments. 19 In 1908, that
court became the first appellate tribunal in this country to substitute
life imprisonment for a death sentence solely because the defendant's
physical and mental condition, while not constituting legal insanity,
195. Other states have followed similar pre-Furman patterns. In Idaho, until the enactment of
a mandatory death penalty in 1972, the sentencing authority was authorized by statute to
consider evidence of mitigating circumstances. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1947) (amended 1972).
Mental disorder has justified the state supreme court's reduction of capital sentences. See State
v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 404, 253 P.2d 203, 207 (1953) (testimony regarding defendant's
background and environment erroneously excluded); State v. Behler, 65 Idaho 464, 476, 146
P.2d 338, 343 (1921) (defendant's low order of intelligence requires reduction to life
imprisonment).
The supreme courts of Illinois and Oklahoma have also recognized the mitigatory potential of
mental impairment in judicially imposed capital sentencing situations. See People v. Walcher, 42
lll.2d 159, 166, 246 N.E.2d 256, 261 (1969) (defendant's demonstrated chronic alcoholism
renders death sentence inappropriate); People v. Hetherington, 379 IIl. 71, 74, 39 N.E.2d 361,
362 (1942) (sentencing court may consider defendant's moral character, mentality, and
motives); Williams v. State, 89 Okla. Crim. 95, 141, 205 P.2d 524, 547-48 (1949) (defendants'
very limited education and intoxication may be considered in reducing death sentence); cf.
People v. Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 452, 308 N.E.2d 580, 601 (1974) (armed robbery conviction;
sentencing court may consider defendant's moral character, mentality, social environment, and
subnormal tendencies).
The appellate courts of Iowa and Kentucky have indicated concern that the sentencing
authority fully consider evidence of mental impairment. Nonetheless, the deferential level of
review exercised in those courts has allowed death sentences to be sustained in cases in which
such evidence has been presented. See State v. Junkins, 147 Iowa 588,593, 126 N.W. 689, 690
(1910) (jury-imposed death sentence affirmed despite evidence of defendant's defective mental
capacity); Miller v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 435, 440, 255 S.W. 96, 98 (1923) (jury-imposed
death sentence affirmed despite evidence of defendant's history of mental illness).
Similarly, in Pennsylvania prior to Furman, the trial judge was required to consider proffered
evidence of mental disorder, but if the evidence was admitted and the trial judge did aot find it
adequate to justify mitigation, the supreme court was reluctant to overturn a sentence of death.
Compare Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 148, 151 A.2d 241, 247 (1959) (vacating death
sentence of 15-year-old with low I.Q. because record did not indicate that sentencing judges
adequately considered age, intelligence, or other facts bearing on the understanding and
judgment of the defendant) and Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 47, 17 A.2d 897, 899
(1941) (imposition of death sentence for murder of infant an abuse of discretion in light of
defendant mother's minimal intelligence) and Commonwealth v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 237,
169 A. 439, 441 (1933) (dictum) (defendant entitled to have psychiatric evidence go to
sentencing jury) with Commonwealth v. Smith, 405 Pa. 456, 459, 176 A.2d 619, 620 (1962)
(dictum) (supreme court will sustain death penalty despite evidence that defendant moronic,
psychopathic, unstable, or feebleminded). See also Commonwealth v. Howard, 426 Pa. 305, 311,
231 A.2d 860, 868 (1967) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (abuse of discretion to impose death penalty
despite serious mental disorder).
196. See Tracey v. State, 46 Neb. 361, 367, 64 N.W. 1069, 1070 (1895) (robbery conviction
affirmed; trial judge may consider defendant's previous jail terms because defendant has right to
introduce other mitigating evidence such as mental disorder).
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evidenced reduced culpability at the time of the crime.' 9 Although
the Nebraska court has resisted holding that evidence of mental
disorder is per se mitigatory, especially if the inference of abnormality
must be drawn from the heinousness of the crime, 19 it has reduced
death sentences to life imprisonment with some regularity since
1908.199 The degree to which this line of cases mirrored public
attitudes is demonstrated by the fact that in 1973 the Nebraska
legislature expressly made mental disorder a mitigating factor to be
considered by the sentencing authority.
200
Unlike Nebraska, most states in the pre-Furman era did not permit
substantive review of sentences on appeal. 20' Trial-level sentence
determinations were generally overturned only when statutory limits
were exceeded or when prescribed procedures were not followed.20 2
Nevertheless, the appellate courts of several of those states have
made consideration of mental disorder an essential aspect of the
sentencing process by construing their statutes to require admission
of such evidence because it is relevant to mitigation. For example, the
New York and California statutes require consideration of mitigating
circumstances, 20 3  and the highest courts of both states have
197. Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148, 168, 115 N.W. 850, 857 (1908) (jury found defendant
guilty and sane at trial in which psychiatric experts for both sides testified concerning history of
epileptic seizures; supreme court found no justification for death sentence in evidence
presented).
198. See McAvoy v. State, 144 Neb. 827, 835-36, 15 N.W.2d 45, 49 (1944) (no reduction of
sentence for brutal rape and murder of 16-year-old girl; legislature intended death to be imposed
on abnormal persons when the crime is sufficiently heinous to warrant it).
199. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 310, 125 N.W.2d 918, 927 (1964) (feebleminded
defendant categorized as low-grade moron or high-grade imbecile disposed to follow lead of
others; death sentence reduced to life imprisonment); Cyderman v. State, 101 Neb. 85, 91, 161
N.W. 1045, 1048 (1917) (18-year-old defendant previously committed by parents could not
reliably regulate his conduct; death sentence reduced to life imprisonment); Muzik v. State, 99
Neb. 496, 501, 156 N.W. 1056, 1058 (1916) (defendant's total withdrawal from outside world
caused grave doubts about his responsibility for murder of wife; death penalty reduced to life
imprisonment).
200. 1973 Neb. Laws ch. 268, § 8 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(c) (1975)).
201. See Burr, supra note 192, at 5 (few exceptions to general rule that appellate courts have
little control over sentence).
202. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 178, at 25 (in majority of jurisdictions sentencing
solely within discretion of trial judge if statute complied with); Knowlton, Problems of Jury
Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1125-29 (1953) (summary of state court
decisions regarding degree of jury input in sentencing decision, effect of jury silence on
punishment issue, requirement of unanimity for death sentence, and right of appeal); 108
U. PA. L. REv. 434, 435-36 (1960) (generally appellate review limited to enforcing compliance
with statute).
203. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045(3) (McKinney
1967).
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interpreted those provisions to require the admission of evidence of a
mental condition offered to show mitigation.
20 4
Even without similar statutes, some higher courts in states where
jury sentencing was immunized from substantive appellate review
205
insisted that trial judges permit the presentation of all relevant
information in mitigation, including evidence of mental disorder.20 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, reached this conclusion
after agonizing over the question for several years. Initially, the court
interpreted the sentencing statute so that defendants were able to
influence jury deliberation on the death penalty only if the evidence
offered was relevant to the crime or to the attendant circumstances.
20 7
This interpretation was criticized, 208 and the court eventually reversed
its position, recommending that proffered evidence of a defendant's
204. See Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 38 (9th Cir. 1962) (under California law evidence
of defendant's mental condition relevant to question of penalty as well as guilt); People v.
Bickley, 57 Cal. 2d 788, 792-93, 372 P.2d 100, 102-03, 22 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342-43 (1962)
(psychiatric testimony regarding defendant's sanity and susceptibility to rehabilitation relevant
and admissible at sentencing); People v. Mosely, 20 N.Y.2d 64, 67, 228 N.E. 2d 765, 767,
281 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (1967) (refusal to admit evidence of defendant's mental condition at
sentencing amounts to substantial error; death sentence imposed on convicted murderer of Kitty
Genovese reduced to life imprisonment).
205. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 15.409 (West 1967) (current version at LA. CODE CRmI. PRO.
ANN. art. 814(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977)), invalidated in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336
(1976) (plurality opinion); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-4 (West 1953), invalidated in State v.
Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 67, 286 A.2d 55, 59, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); TEx. STAT. ANN.
ch. 16 art. 1257 (Vernon 1948) (repealed 1973).
206. See Coleman v. United States, 357 F.2d 563, 571, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en banc) ("sole
discretion" construed as requiring judge to consider evidence offered in aggravation and
mitigation and to base sentence upon it; death sentence overturned because trial judge failed to
find defendant's retardation sufficient to justify mitigation), State v. Henry, 196 La. 218, 246,
198 So. 910, 919 (1940) (alternative holding) (proferred testimony of defendant's deprived
childhood erroneously excluded); Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 550 & n.6, 226
N.E.2d 556, 560 & n.6 (psychiatric testimony should be allowed beyond confines of legal
insanity because juries may recommend against death sentence on grounds of impaired
capacity); Thomas v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 432, 434, 262 S.W. 84,85 (1924) (proferred evidence
of defendant's low mentality and lack of schooling admitted in mitigation); State v. Brown, 60
Wyo. 379, 397, 151 P.2d 950, 955-56 (1944) (knowledge of defendant's mental condition and
age necessary for intelligent jury verdict).
207. See State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 106-07, 115 A.2d 62, 87 (1955) (evidence of defendant's
addiction to narcotics properly excluded from jury consideration because it did not bear on guilt
or innocence); State v. Favorito, 115 N.J.L. 197, 203, 178 A. 765, 768 (1935) (exclusion of
testimony concerning defendant's early life not erroneous).
208. See State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 187, 142 A.2d 65, 81 (1958) (Francis, J., concurring)
(evidence of defendant's mental disorders should be considered in determining punishment);
State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 107-08, 115 A.2d 62, 87-88 (1955) (Heher, J., dissenting) (jury should
consider all evidence to determine whether capital punishment in these circumstances serves
the interests of justice).
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deprived childhood 20 9 and mental disorder 210  be admitted for
sentencing purposes. The supreme courts of only two other states
have explicitly refused to admit evidence of mental disorder in
mitigation,2 1 and no court has done so since 1944. Thus, even before
Furman, appellate tribunals in a substantial number of states would
have endorsed the conclusion of one eminent jurist that evidence of an
offender's mental condition is so inseparable from a sentencing
disposition and so important to justice for both the defendant and
society that the legislature could not have intended to bar it. 21
2
The factors weighed by an executive deciding whether to grant
clemency are another strong indication of those considerations
contemporary society as a whole believes relevant to sentencing. The
endorsement of particular mitigating circumstances by a chief
executive is especially forceful because it comes from an elected
individual who is responsive to public opinion and whose decision
to grant mercy is vital to the fair functioning of the criminal justice
system.213 Available sources indicate that mental disorder is a
common and easily identified reason for invoking executive
clemency.21 4 Grounded in the English tradition that madmen are given
209. See State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195, 219, 152 A.2d 343, 355 (1959) (alternative holding)
(exclusion of evidence regarding defendant's deprived childhood improper).
210. See State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 472, 210 A.2d 193, 203 (1965) (evidence of personality
defect regarding ability to premeditate murder admissible for sentencing purposes).
211. See Foster v. State, 222 Ind. 133, 136-37, 52 N.E.2d 358, 359 (1944) (refusing
testimony regarding possible irresistible impulse caused by hormonal imbalance not error when
insanity not plea); Warner v. State, 114 Ind. 137, 143, 16 N.E. 189, 192 (1888) (when insanity
question properly before jury, mental capacity cannot be a mitigating factor in preventing
punishment); Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 547, 51 S.W.2d 843, 848 (1932) (slightly
subnormal intelligence is not a mitigating factor in intentional murder).
212. State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 87, 152 A.2d 50, 77 (1959) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
213. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (last opportunity
for mercy provided by executive clemency critical to American criminal justice system and
constitutionally mandated in federal system).
The scope of executive discretion in selecting reasons for granting clemency is unbounded. It
is, therefore, quite significant when that decision is based on the mitigatory impact of a mental
disorder. The executive decision carries a significance very different from, but no less important
than, that accorded the decision of an appellate judge whose discretion to recognize mitigating
factors is much more limited.
214. The exercise of executive clemency is usually a controversial intrusion into normal
criminal process and frequently exposes the executive to bitter criticism. See W. HUMBERT, THE
PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 124 (1941) (reasons must be unassailable to avoid
criticism); C. JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 11 (1922) (criticism of
administration of clemency power has led some states to establish advisory boards to guide it
exercise). Hence, even if not required by statute, executives usually feel compelled to explain
their announcement of clemency. W. HUMBERT, supra at 124. Because the pardon power is used
so infrequently, the facts of each instance can be studied by commentators, and more complete
analysis exists of the reasons for the grant of clemency than for the exercise of discretion at other
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clemency by the King, 2"5 the recognition of mental disorder as a basis
for clemency was firmly embedded in Anglo-American criminal justice
by the eighteenth century.21 6 In more recent times mental disorder has
continued to form the basis of a significant number of clemency
grants.217 The depth of commitment to clemency on grounds of mental
abnormality is revealed by its application to infamous defendants 21 8
and by the initiation in at least one state of regularized clemency
investigation procedures that inquire into the mental accountability of
the defendant.2 9
Historically and internationally, Anglo-American legal institutions
and scholars have recognized that the penalty of death raises
questions not asked about other punishments. Those same sources
have also concluded that the mentally disordered wrongdoer presents
problems not typical of the normal offender. Based on the former
insight, institutional participants in many Anglo-American criminal
justice systems tradiionally have considered mitigating factors before
undertaking procedures aimed at the ultimate sanction. And, drawing
on the latter insight, those same people, in exercising discretion
concerning whom to charge with what crime and how to punish those
convicted, regularly have considered death an inappropriate penalty
for many mentally afflicted offenders. Thus, these participants in the
creation of "public attitudes" on capital punishment, while never
anxious to put mentally disordered offenders "back on the streets,"
seem little more anxious to put them to death.
stages in the criminal justice system. See id. at 124-33 (study of reasons underlying presidential
grants of clemency); Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted
Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CRIi. L.C. & P.S. 301 (1962) (analysis of factors affecting
commutation); Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 191-92 (1964)
(summary of executions and commutations in each state during early 1960's).
215. See 1 N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 41 (prior to sixteenth century, mad felons left to
mercy of King).
216. See H. RANKIN, CRMIINAL TRIAL PROSECUTIONS IN THE GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 113 n.60 (1965) (governing Council of colonial Virginia recommended pardons for
murderers on insanity ground); 1 N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 196-200 (discussing English
and Scottish practice of granting clemency when accused almost proved legal insanity).
217. See W. HUMBERT, supra note 214, at 124-33 (recommendations for clemency in federal
system based on ill health of prisoner); Acer, Executive Clemency, 15 TEx. B.J. 603, 603-04
(1952) ("weak mind" of prisoner listed as reason to allow clemency); Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde,
supra note 214, at 310 (frequency of reasons offered by state authorities for commuting death
sentences included 14.7% based on mental deficiency or disease, 4.9% based on poor family
background, and 24.2% based on analogous factors such as intoxication and youth).
218. See Ehrmann, supra note 113, at 20-21 (describing specific situations in which sentences
commuted upon evidence of mental disorders despite heinous nature of crimes); Note, supra
note 214, at 166-68 & n.128 (evidence of mental instability short of insanity justifies
commutation of sentence of brutal slayer).
219. See Note, supra note 214, at 169 (description of California procedure).
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PENOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
A constitutionally valid execution must not only be acceptable by
contemporary values evidenced by the acts of legislators, prosecutors,
jurors, judges, and executives; it also must serve a useful social
purpose. 220 In Gregg the plurality concluded that the death penalty is
imposed to serve two principal functions: retribution and deter'
rence. 221 The opinion referred to a wide array of social science
literature and legal scholarship that analyzes these asserted peno-
logical justifications. 222 These sources should be examined to
determine whether a particular aspect of the sentencing determina-
tion is penologically justified; however, the inquiry does not end with
an assertion that many penologists, mental health professionals, and
legal scholars have advocated the mitigation of punishment for
mentally deranged offenders.223 Iii contrast to the public attitudes
analysis, a mere head count of those who advocate that mental
disorder should be considered a mitigating factor, while persuasive, is
not constitutionally conclusive in terms of the utility of the death
penalty. Nevertheless, to the extent the advocates' conclusions are
based on one of the two penological justifications for capital
punishment identified by the Supreme Court, they will be relevant in
determining whether imposing capital punishment on an individual
with a mental disorder constitutes gratuitous infliction of pain in
violation of the eighth amendment.
Retribution. The plurality in the July 2 Cases did not
wholeheartedly embrace retribution as a critical justification for
punishment; nevertheless, it conceded that retribution is a viable
justification.224 Although the plurality did not elaborate how
punishment based on retribution should be administered, the Gregg
opinion does refer to the work of Herbert Packer,225 whose framework
of retributive explanations for punishment provides a useful vehicle
220. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (plurality opinion).
221. Id.
222. Id at 182-87 & nn.29-32; see note 49 supra and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., S. GLuEcK MENTAL DISORDER AND THE LAW, 382-83, 412-17 (1925)
(advocating reduction of punishment in response to evidence of mental disorder so that
punishment serves needs of society without unduly penalizing the offender); W. SULLIVAN,
CRMIE AND INSANITY 251 (1974) (advocating special treatment of offender with diminished
responsibility short of insanity); H. WEINHOFEN, supra note 170, at 175-77 (mental disorders
considered mitigating circumstances); Dix, supra note 166, at 332-34,strict insanity test should
be supplemented by more flexible test of abnormality).
224. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183-84 (retribution not dominant but also not
prohibited justification for punishment).
225. Id. at 183 n.29.
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for analyzing whether mental disorder should be a mitigating factor
when capital punishment may be imposed.
Packer identifies two explanations for society's need for retribution:
expiation and vengeance. 226 Under the expiatory view, punishment is
justified as the means by which the criminal atones for his sin; 227 thus,
the degree of suffering is critical to the punishment imposed.228
Retribution based on revenge 229 emphasizes the infliction of visible
suffering on the wrongdoer to avenge society for his misdeeds.23 °
The expiation justification for punishment traditionally was a
theological one that rarely emerges in modem writing as a major goal
of capital sentencing.23' To the degree that it is viable, however, it
mandates mitigation for mental disorders. This conclusion is
grounded in the early conviction that mentally disordered offenders
226. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 31, 37-44 (1968).
227. Id. at 38. Because sin has no meaning if persons' actions are not a product of free will,
some notion of personal responsibility must underlie the expiation theory of retribution.
Nevertheless, responsibility under the expiation theory runs ultimately to some higher authority
than society. See id. at 37. This article focuses on the type of responsibility that runs to society
and is thus relevant to the revenge theory of retribution. See note 239 infra and accompanying
text.
228. Id. at 38. Packer criticizes the expiation theory as a dogmatic belief lacking any verifiable
basis. Id. at 38-39.
229. Packer discusses three justifications for punishment based on revenge. First,
punishment may be motivated by pure revenge. Id. at 37. This explanation is generally used to
justify the death penalty when the crime is particularly heinous, and was the one primarily relied
on in the July 2 Cases. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (plurality opinion) (death
may be only adequate response to crimes so grievous that they are affront to humanity). Second,
the death penalty may curb the community's "blood lust" for revenge and reduce the anarchy of
mob justice. H. PACKER, supra note 226, at 37; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (when people think that organized society will not impose deserved
punishment, they resort to vigilante justice). Third, the death penalty serves a deterrent function
that flows from the need for revenge: the spectacle of merited suffering increases the general
identification with law-abiding behavior by stigmatizing criminality. H. PACKER, supra note 226,
at 43-44, cited in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183.
Packer criticizes the first two justifications as totally without any verifiable basis in reality. H.
PACKER, supra note 226, at 38-39. Only the third adequately justifies revenge as a purpose for
punishment. See id. at 44.
230. H. PACKER, supra note 226, at 37. The revenge basis for punishment assumes free will;
thus, the man who is responsible for his actions should suffer the consequences. Id.; see Bazelon,
The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 388 (1976). The public desire to inflict
suffering reflects the societal need for vengeance. The public spectacle satisfies the blood lust
drive and reinforces a feeling of public willingness to abide by the law. H. PACKER, supra note
226, at 44; see note 229 supra.
231. See E. EvANs. THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 9 (1906) (among
ancients, punishment based in part on belief that unless murder properly expiated, divine being
would punish society at large; view began to recede by end of nineteenth century); 1 N. WALKER,
supra note 136, at 27, 247 (expiatory theory that focuses on degree of suffering still discussed
but not entirely logical); Letter from Judge Learned Hand to the editors of the University of
Chicago Law Review (undated), reprinted in 22 U. CI. L. REV. 319 (1955) (sense that justice
requires law breaker to suffer just as sinner should suffer is vestige of primitive belief that still
exists in most people); note 228 supra.
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deserve differential treatment because the "madman" is punished
enough by his madness.23 2 Under an expiatory theory of retributive
justice the degree of suffering from whatever source must be
commensurate with the gravity of the crime, 233 and the sentencing
authority should credit against the offender's sentence the degree of
suffering that mental disorder has already visited upon him.
234
A humanistic rather than theological approach to expiation mandates
that persons suffering from infirmities that lead them instinctively
but unwillingly into crime deserve pity and perhaps institutionaliza-
tion, but not punishment. 235 This view, which has more support among
modem commentators, suggests that a compassionate society should
mitigate the retributive punishment of the mentally afflicted whose
suffering in some measure atones for their wrongdoing. 23 6 Only those
offenders who truly suffer because of their mental condition or who
are tormented consciously by their calamity deserve the benefit of an
expiation-justified reduction in punishment commensurate with the
degree of such suffering.
237
Unlike expiation theories of retributive justice, the vengeance-
based theories have solid contemporary support as valid justifications
for punishment. 238 Because mental abnormality tends to undermine
232. See 1 N. WALKER, supra note 136, at 27, 247 (originally Roman view; appears in writings
of Coke, Hume, and others).
233. See 2 G. MACKENZIE, supra ndte 148, at 59 (against Christian charity to add more
affliction to those afflicted with insanity by imposing punishment).
234. Id. (extending Roman maxim that absolute madness substitute for all punishment,
partial madness should be regarded as partial substitute); see Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148,
168, 115 N.W. 850, 857 (1908) (death sentence reduced to life imprisonment in part because
mentally disordered offender suffered greatly during life); Letter from Judge Hand, supra note
231 (belief that wrongdoers should suffer as a purpose for punishment will affect impact of
mental disorder on punishment).
235. J. PRICHARD, ON THE DIFFERENT Fonis OF INsANITY IN RELATION TO JURISPRUDENCE 178
(London 1842) (human compassion forbids adding to plight of mentally disordered sufferer).
236. See State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659, 680, 133 A. 274, 288 (1926) (Minturn, J., concurring)
(living death of insanity sufficient punishment); A. GOLDSTEIN. THE INSANITY DEFENSE 12 (1967)
(compassionate response to mentally abnormal defendants developed as corollary to other
retributive theories); Barnett, The Grounds of Pardon, 6 ORE. L. REv. 205, 210 (1927) (pity
reflected in pardon is increased when offender's condition unusually poor); cf Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (death sentencing system unconstitutional
if ignores "compassionate ... factors" derived from human frailties).
237. J. PRICHARD, supra note 235, at 178.
238. See, e.g., ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNiSHMENT, supra note 167, at 206
(sometimes capital punishment is imposed because society insists on adequate punishment for
outrageous acts and because wrongdoer deserves it regardless of deterrent impact); Gardner,
The Renaisance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 781, 798
(retribution, which imposes punishment to the extent of blameworthiness, is substantial
justification for present penal system); Greenwalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth
Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 938 (1969) (retribution
justifies punishment of those who are morally blameworthy); Wasserstron, H.L.A. Hart and the
Doctrines ofMens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, 35 U. CIE L. REV. 92, 93 (1967) (punishment
based on retribution requires proof of mens rea).
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responsibility, a predicate for punishment based on vengeance, 239 it
supports mitigating the death sentence whenever the validity of
execution depends on this aspect of the retributive justification for
punishment.240 This conclusion is supported by the evolution of legal
defenses dealing with mental disorder at the guilt or innocence stage
of the trial and by the inability of these defenses to solve completely
the problem arising when responsibility is affected but not destroyed.
The insanity defense and the more recently developed diminished
capacity defenses grew out of the perception that abnormal mentality
tempers the justification for criminal punishment because the
individual's responsibility for the crime is diminished or removed. 241
Traditionally, the insanity defense arose when a mentally disordered
defendant was unable to know society's rule of conduct or to know
how his own conduct comports with these rules. 242 Many jurisdictions
today apply a much broader insanity defense that exonerates not only
cognitively disordered wrongdoers but also offenders who lack the
volitional capacity to control their wrongful actions. 243
In recent years, more and more states have recognized the related
concept of a diminished capacity defense, which permits a defendant
to prove that because he suffered from a mental disorder he could not
have had the mental state required for conviction. 244 In its most
239. See H. PACKER, supra note 226, at 37.
240. To retain the respect of society, punishment must be scaled to the degree of societal
condemnation, which in turn depends on the "moral turpitude" of the defendant. As such, it is
difficult to imagine a crime worthy of the death penalty that does not include a high degree of
culpability as an element. Thus, mental abnormality must be considered in virtually every
capital case in which it affects culpability. See Dix, supra note 166, at 332.
241. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 15, 89, 91 (insanity defense); Bazelon,
Responsibility and Mental Competence, 46 F.R.D. 497, 507-10 (1968) (insanity defense); Dix,
supra note 166, at 332-33 (diminished capacity and partial responsibility defenses).
242. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23, H.L. (1843); see Moore, M'Naghten is
Dead-Or Is It? 3 Hous. L. REV. 58, 58-59 (1965) (criticizing narrowness of M'Naghten test of
insanity). Many jurisdictions interpret the "knowledge" formulation broadly enodgh to go
beyond strictly intellectual knowledge to include understanding of the nature and consequences
of one's acts. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 49-50, 236 n.13.
243. This version of the insanity defense was included in the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see A. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 236, at 86-96 (discussing modernized defense). Identical or similar formulations have
been adopted in many jurisdictions. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (listing federal jurisdictions that have adopted Model Penal Code); A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 236, at 67-74 (M'Naghten supplemented by irresistible impulse test used in many
jurisdictions); Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 956,
976-85 (1952) (discussing states that have adopted insanity defense and form in which adopted).
244. 30 VAND. L. REV. 213, 213-14 (1977); see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 194-95
(discussing spread of doctrine of diminished responsibility); ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMEINT, supra note 156, at 413-14 (discussing trend in United States to accept some form
of diminished responsibility defense). For a recent, critical view of these defenses, see Arenella,
The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses-Two Children of a Doomed
Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1977).
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extreme expression, this defense results in total exoneration either
from any crime, because the mental disorder established negates the
element of voluntariness essential to make the actor a criminal, or at
least from any crime requiring proof of a specific mental state that is
negated by the defendant's volitional or cognitive impairments.245
More frequently a defendant raising the diminished capacity defense
is only permitted to introduce evidence of a mental disorder that
rendered him incapable of performing the volitional or cognitive
functions necessary to form the intent required under a higher degree
of the crime. 6
Many legal scholars and mental health professionals have argued
that because of the difficulties that disordered defendants encounter
in establishing these defenses to conviction, many such offenders
should have the additional opportunity to receive less severe
retributive punishment.247 They note that, even if insufficient to
establish a defense at the guilt or innocence stage of the trial,
245. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (testimony on
abnormal mental condition admissible if it relates to existence of specific mental element
necessary for crime; second degree murder conviction remanded with instructions); People v.
Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 733, 336 P.2d 492, 496, 503 (1959) (court may hear evidence of
mental condition of accused to show lack of criminal intent, malice, premeditation, or
voluntariness); A. GOLDSTEIN. supra note 236, at 199-202 (discussion of extreme extension of
partial responsibility defense).
This "total" diminished capacity defense is very similar to the liberal insanity defense
accepted in other jurisdictions. It need not, however, be deferred to the insanity stage of the
trial. See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 350, 202 P.2d 53, 66 (1949) (prosecution may not
delay voluntariness issue to insanity stage of trial). Moreover, a mental condition might not
establish an insanity defense but still might be sufficient to require acquittal because of the lack
of volition. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1005 (dictum) (question whether jury that
convicted under insanity defense will acquit under new standard left open); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.01 (Proposed Final Draft 1962) (liability for offense requires voluntary act).
The diminished capacity defense may also be utilized when the mental abnormality supports
only a lack of the special types of intent necessary to support murder, as opposed to other forms
of homicide; in that instance it evinces a more cognitive, less volitional, approach. See People v.
Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911, 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1966) (defendant who
cannot comprehend duty to govern his actions in accord with law lacks malice aforethought). See
generally Dix, supra note 166, at 328-32; Note, Keeping Wolff from the Door: California's
Diminished Capacity Concept, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1641 (1972).
246. See 30 VAND. L. REV. 213, 214-15, 217-19 (1977) (diminished capacity defense in at
least twelve states can reduce degree of crime when gradation into degrees based on changes in
required mens rea). This defense is also used in England to reduce murder to manslaughter if the
defendant's mental responsibility is impaired. The Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11,
§ 2(1); see Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 624, 636-42 (1957).
247. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 110-15 (discussing difficulties in proving
insanity defense to jury); Bazelon, supra note 230, at 390-98 (difficulty in establishing insanity
defense results in culpability imposed on blameless acts); Dix, supra note 166, at 333-34
(traditional state of mind requirements not suitable vehicle for integrating criminal liability and
mental disorder); Szasz, Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatry, in LEGAL AND CRIMINAL
PSYCHOLOGY 152-56 (H. Toch ed. 1961) (unrealistic emphasis on reason in insanity defense
results in mentally ill person treated as criminal).
812 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:757
evidence of a mental abnormality should be considered at sentencing
as a basis for mitigating punishment because of the defendant's
attenuated responsibility. 248 Thus, to the extent that cognitive or
volitional impairment reduces responsibility, the societal need for
vengeance is correspondingly diminished, and mitigation of punish-
ment is warranted.249
248. See, e.g., S. GLUECK, supra note 223, at 383-84, 413-17 (provision should be made for
procedure in which defendant found guilty because mental disorder too mild for acquittal might
argue for reduced sentence because of limited responsibility); H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 170, at
176 (many authorities argue that borderline cases of mental unsoundness should mitigate
punishment); Arenella, supra note 244, at 850-51 (mental abnormality as circumstance
mitigating sentence useful when category of crime does not accurately reflect defendant's lower
degree of culpability); Dix, supra note 166, at 332-33 (after guilt established trier of fact should
be permitted to find that defendant's mental disorder diminished responsibility and to impose
lesser sentence on that basis); cf. Handler, Background Evidence in Homicide Cases, 51 J. CIAM.
L.C. & P.S. 317, 322, 327 (1960) (background evidence of mental disorder short of insanity
should be considered at separate sentencing in mitigation or aggravation of punishment). This
view was endorsed by the drafters of the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 402(2)
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (impaired mental capacity included as factor ip mitigation of
death penalty because it reduces responsibility and is especially critical in jurisdiction with strict
insanity defense); ROYAL CONWfSSION ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 167, at 121 (in
Scotland, although strict insanity defense makes acquittal unlikely, plea of diminished
responsibility generally results in mitigation of punishment).
249. See Coleman v. United States, 357 F.2d 563, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (statute authorizes
judge to consider factors in mitigation of sentence and to reduce sentence from death to life
imprisonment; death sentence ordered reduced in light of strong evidence of retardation and
potential for rehabilitation); Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148, 168, 115 N.W. 850, 857 (1908)
(mitigation proper because of grave doubts as to defendant's responsibility for actions even
though he was not idiot, imbecile, or maniac); State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 184, 142 A.2d 65, 79-
80 (1958) (Francis, J., concurring) (eloquent statement of need to consider defendant's mental
condition as it bears on his degree of responsibility for purposes of punishment); Dix, supra note
166, at 333-34; cf. The Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 2(1) (punishment reduced
if defendant shows abnormality of mind substantially impairing mental responsibility for act).
One obvious source for guidance in determining the degree to which responsibility is impaired
and thus the degree of mitigatory treatment due might be found in a jurisdiction's own rules for
dealing with mental disorder at the guilt or innocence stage of the trial. For example, a
cognitively impaired but not insane defendant in a jurisdiction adhering to the M'Naghten rule
might deserve mitigatory treatment if his ability to know right from wrong is significantly
impaired. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 4.01(1), 210.6(4) (Proposed Final Draft 1962) (insanity
defense turns on proof that defendant lacks capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform to law, while mitigation permitted if same capacity impaired due to mental defect);
note 242 supra and accompanying text. A more lenient standard of proof for mitigation than that
required for acquittal might be appropriate, however. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 110-
15 (insanity defense often requires preponderance of evidence and, in some jurisdictions, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt). Nevertheless, the jurisdiction's particular law cannot restrict the
inquiry into mitigation of the death penalty due to impairment of responsibility. The eighth
amendment's measuring stick incorporates more than one jurisdiction's views on penological
justifications; the perceptions of the institutional participants in other jurisdictions' criminal
justice systems as well as those of legal scholars, psychologists, psychiatrists, and philosophers
must be considered, and arguably a national standard must be applied. See note 39 supra. Under
such a standard, both volitional and cognitive impairments deserve mitigatory consideration.
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Deterrence. In discussing deterrence the plurality in the July
2 Cases again accepted a view popularized by the late Professor
Packer when it opined that the deterrent effect of punishment, while
not a factor in the mental calculus of every potential offender,
nonetheless may play a significant role in some cases. 250 Indeed, the
plurality characterized many post-Furman statutes as reflecting
legislative attempts "to define those crimes and those criminals for
which capital punishment is most probably an effective deterrent."
251
The reference to "crimes and . . . criminals" is particularly
instructive for it suggests an awareness that the deterrent function
operates on several levels. Traditionally, commentators have divided
deterrence into two categories: specific and general.25 2 Specific
deterrence provides after-the-fact inhibition of the individual offender
to prevent recurrence of the criminal action, 253 and is clearly
meaningless in the capital punishment context. General deterrence,
on the other hand, creates an inhibition in advance by threat or
example, 254 and is traditionally the category of deterrence referred to
in discussions of the death penalty's penological value. A careful
reading of the plurality's discussion of deterrence reveals that the
three justices apparently subdivided general deterrence into two
types of penological justification. Taking a subjective view of general
deterrence, they asked whether the threat of capital punishment
might have some impact on a particular criminal's decision to commit
an offense:
We may nevertheless assume safely that there are
murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the
threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many
others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant
deterrent.255
Taking an objective perspective, the plurality then asked whether the
250. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 185-86 n.33; see H. PACKER, supra note 226, at 45
(deterrent role of criminal law effective mainly with respect to individuals subject to socializing
influences; deterrent role does not affect individuals whose value systems are closed to
modification). See generally W. CHAMBLISS, CRIME AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 368-72 (1969); F.
Zmrnn'G & G. HAWIKS. DETERRENCE 96-128 (1973); Chappell, Geis & Hardt, Explorations in
Deterrence and Criminal Justice, 8 CRni. L. BULL. 514, 519-24 (1972).
251. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186.
252. E.g., H. PACKER, supra note 226, at 39; F. ZMIRING& G. HAWKINS, supra note 250, at 224-
25; Andenaes, Does PAnishment Deter Crime?, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 76, 78 (1968).
253. H. PACKER, supra note 226, at 39; accord, Andenaes, supra note 252, at 78.
254. H. PACKER, supra note 226, at 39; Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punish-
ment, 114 U. PA., L. REV. 949, 951 (1969).
255. 428 U.S. at 185-86 (emphasis added).
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threat of capital punishment will restrain reasonable persons from
committing that crime in the future:
There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder
for hire, where the penalty of death may well enter into the
cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. [A footnote
here catalogues "other types of calculated murders."] And
there are some categories of murder such as murder by a life
prisoner, where other sanctions may not be adequate. 25 6
If the pointed emphasis on the deterrability of different types of
criminals was removed from the first quoted passage, the entire
discussion would become a statement of objective deterrence and
make the relatively simple point that punishment will have the desired
deterrent effect only when it is meted out in response to deterrable
crimes. By focusing on types of criminals, however, the first passage
suggests that the plurality would find the death penalty more justified
if the offender was capable of being deterred at the time he committed
an offense. Hence, the comparative deterrability of different classes
of criminals appears to have at least as much significance in eighth
amendment adjudication as the comparative deterrent impact on the
general population of imposing punishment for different classes of
crimes.257
Current proponents of the concept of deterrence have attempted,
256. Id. at 186 & n.33 (emphasis added).
257. This subjective deterrence doctrine is analytically puzzling: Although included in the
plurality's discussion of general deterrence, the subjective approach actually embodies
characteristics of both general and specific deterrence. Like the traditional concept of general
deterrence, it focuses on before-the-fact impacts of punishment; like specific deterrence,
however, it depends on the impact of punishment on a particular individual. Moreover, by
differentiating deterrable from nondeterrable classes of individuals, the plurality seemed to
iniect its discussion of deterrence with retributive considerations; that is, a person who commits
a capital crime despite an understanding of society's abhorrence of his actions, and despite a
capacity for acting otherwise, is especially deserving of societal revenge. Note that under this
rationale it is the failure of the ultimate sanction as a deterrent that justifies capital punishment
of the offender. Conversely, individuals who cannot be deterred because they cannot control or
understand their actions evoke a more sympathetic response; their diminished responsibility
undercuts the basis for feelings of vengeance. Because they and others like them will not be
deterred by the threat of capital punishment, to inflict that sanction makes little sense.
In fact, although well grounded in retributive theory, the plurality's belief that a deterrable
criminal is more justifiably punished with death than his nondeterrable counterpart does not rely
on the traditional educative explanations for the deterrence justification. Commentators
typically view deterrence as the use of punishment to socialize potential offenders. See H.
PACKER, supra note 236, at 39. General deterrence educates the general populace by making an
example of the wrongdoer, while specific deterrence educates the particular criminal by
punishing him for his antisocial act. Neither of these rationales, however, explains why it is
better to execute a deterrable than a nondeterrable criminal.
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much more than their utilitarian predecessors, to identify the
particular individuals most likely to be deterred by the threat of
punishment. 28 These writers have recognized that the insane and the
mentally disordered are unresponsive as objects of deterrence
because they lack the intellectual capacity to understand the threat of
punishment, or the control mechanisms necessary to conform to that
understanding. 25 9 Thus, to the extent the function of punishment is to
deter the potential offender, mentally abnormal persons not
susceptible to deterrence ought not to be punished.260
Efforts to distinguish offenders on the basis of the likelihood that
the threat of punishment will deter them have resulted in the
identification of several aberrant personality types that are especially
immune to such deterrence. 261 Nonetheless, the wide range of
258. Compare Chappell, Geis & Hardt, supra note 250, at 520-24 (reviewing theorists'
attempts to identify individuals who will be deterred by threats of punishment) and Geerking &
Gove, Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations, 9 LAW & Soc. REv. 497, 509-12 (1975)
(discussing potential offenders' perception of risk as a deterrent mechanism) with J. BENTHAM.
Principles of Penal Law, in 1 WORKS 396 (1843) (making an example of offender should be chief
end of punishment).
259. Andenaes, supra note 254, at 958; accord, Van Den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death
Penalty, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 141, 143 (1969). This insight does not belong solely to modem
generations. See 3 E. CoKE. supra note 143, at 4 ("principle end of punishment is, that others by
his example may fear to offend... but such punishment can be no example to madmen ... ").
By focusing on specific individuals, these authorities are discussing specific deterrence.
Nonetheless, their analyses are also relevant to the plurality's concept of subjective deterrence.
See note 257 supra. Furthermore, the explanations for nondeterrability given by these
authorities are precisely the same as the explanations for deeming mentally disordered
defendants less responsible. See id.
260. See Silving, Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law, 2 CURRENT L. & Soc. PROB. 3, 25 (1961);
cf. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 12-13 (deterrence can be effective only with men who can
understand signals directed at them, respond to warnings, and feel significance of sanctions
imposed upon violators).
261. The most dramatic example of such a personality type involves offenders with suicidal
desires that manifest themselves in capital offenses undertaken to evoke the ultimate sanction.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 351 & n.113 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (capital
punishment may encourage suicidal or notoreity-seeking individuals to commit crimes); G.
ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PuNISHmENT 24-26 (1954) (discussing
Burton's Case, in which defendant testifies at trial that he committed homicide in order to be
hanged); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS. supra note 250, at 110 (disputing numbers but not existence
of offenders who feel they deserve punishment or actually seek out punishment), Goldstein,
Opponents of Death Penalty Fear Psychological Effect of Execution, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1977, at
21, col. 1 (discussing execution of Gary Gilmore, arguably a member of this class of mentally
disordered offenders). Occasionally authorities have reduced the death sentence of a defendant
who exhibits this condition. See Ehrmann,supra note 113, at 19-20 (citing cases); cf. Silving, The
Criminal Law of Mental Incapacity, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 129, 160 (1962) (criminal law need
not embody special rules for lessened punishment in such case because offenders will qualify for
psychiatric treatment).
Other recognizable groups of relatively nondeterrable potential offenders identified by legal
scholars and social scientists are the mentally retarded and psychopaths. See generally notes
278-332 infra and accompanying text.
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psychological infirmities that may affect an individual's deterrability,
and thus the penological justification for punishing him under the
subjective perspective of deterrence, argue for a general eighth
amendment principle of mitigation that is functionally related to
deterrence. Accordingly, a mentally disordered offender should
receive mitigatory consideration to the extent that his susceptibility to
the deterrent effect of the threat of punishment was impaired because
of his inability to understand society's moral outrage at capital crimes
or to conform his actions to that understanding.
26 2
That an offender is mentally disordered might initially appear to
bear little correlation to the objective deterrent effect that his capital
punishment may have on reasonable members of society. Certainly
the general population will be put on notice that a person who has
committed a particular crime has been executed for his proscribed
actions. Nonetheless, writers of the caliber of Glanville Williams,
Jerome Michael, and Herbert Wechsler have carried the assumptions
underlying objective deterrence to the logical conclusion that
abnormal offenders are so distinguishable from other members of the
population that failure to punish them does not impair the deterrent
effect of threatened punishment on normal members of the
population. 263 It follows that an abnormal offender whose punishment
would not significantly deter others deserves to have that fact
considered in mitigation of the death penalty.
264
For at least two reasons, this objective perspective of deterrence
should carry little weight in mitigation decisions. First, any
consideration of how a particular defendant's punishment will appear
to the average citizen may place an insurmountable burden of proof
on both the defense and the prosecution.265 Second, many commen-
262. Cf. DANISH CRIMINAL CODE OF 1930, § 17 (E. Giersing & M. Grunhut trans. 1958) (court
may decide, on basis of medical report and other evidence, whether defendant susceptible to
punishment), discussed in Silving, supra note 261, at 158.
263. G. WILLiS, CPiNNAL LAW 467 (1961); Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide, 37 COLUm. L. REv. 701, 752-57 (1937); see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 13
(threats and examples likely to deter only if person not involved in the criminal process identifies
with offender; identification improbable if offender so different from most men that crime can be
attributed to difference); cf. 3 E. COKE, supra note 143, at 6 (execution of a madman is miserable
spectacle that can be no example to others).
264. See Silving, supra note 261, at 25 (mentally incapacitated persons whose punishment
would not deter others ought not to be punished); cf. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 14
(insanity defense appropriate for defendant who is sufficiently different that he cannot be used
as an effective example).
265. See C. BLACK, supra note 56, at 26 (concluding that deterrent effect of capital
punishment impossible to assess), cited in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185, 187 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (concluding value of capital punishment as deterrent to crime is complex
factual issue that should be resolved by legislatures). Compare Ehrlich & Gibbons, On the
Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 J.
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tators argue that deterrence objectively perceived cannot by itself
justify punishment, for otherwise the state could justifiably convict.a
man known by the authorities to be innocent but supposed by
everyone else to be guilty.266
A FOUR-FACTOR ANALYSIS
Although this article has discussed the mitigatory potential of
mental disorder by focusing separately on public attitudes and
penological justifications, it suggests that these two avenues of
analysis merge for purposes of identifying mitigating circumstances.
Thus, the historical and institutional authorities that were examined
with a view to discerning public attitudes toward mental disorder as a
factor mitigating the death penalty typically premised their conclu-
sions on beliefs about the penological justifications for that
punishment; MackenzieHale, and Blackstone, for example, as well as
American appellate judges, have clearly spoken in terms of expiation,
responsibility, and deterrence in justifying mitigatory treatment of the
mentally afflicted.267 Moreover, although examination of contempo-
rary death penalty statutes does not reveal their supporting
rationales, the plurality in the July 2 Cases assumed that they too
should and do reflect the substantive justifications of retribution and
deterrence.268 In fact, because the "objective" public attitudes relied
on by the plurality are comprised of opinions tempered by
LEGAL STUD. 35 (1977) (econometric regression analysis showing inverse relation between
homicide rate and number of executions) with Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960', 61 U. MINN. L. REv. 743 (1977) (econometric analysis
reaching opposite conclusion). See generally Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
A Question of Life and Death, 65 Aml. EcoN. REV. 397 (1975); Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: Facts v. Faith, 1976 Sup. Or. REv. 317.
266. Greenwalt, supra note 238, at 939 & n.64, 940 (appropriateness of punishment not
reducible to utilitarian considerations); see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 13-14 (it would be
regarded as cruel and unjust to incarcerate men who are not responsible in order to serve social
functions).
267. See notes 135-55 supra and accompanying text (early history of the law of mitigation
based on mental disorder); notes 192-212 supra and accompanying text (appellate court
treatment of mitigation based on mental disorders).
268. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186 (many post-Furman statutes reflect legislative
efforts to identify crimes and criminals for which death penalty is deterrent). See generally
Thomas, supra note 35, at 1005. This assertion is consistent with the empirical study of
Professor Thomas. Relying on data obtained from a randomly selected sample of more than
three thousand heads of household in a metropolitan area, Professor Thomas positively
correlated public support for capital punishment with two persuasive beliefs. The first belief is
retributive: some trends of behavior are sufficiently offensive to fundamental moral standards
that death is an appropriate punishment. The second is that the death penalty serves the
utilitarian purpose of deterring potential offenders. Accordingly, to the extent that death penalty
legislation responds to such public views, it should be expected to rely on these justifications.
19781 817
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
institutional deliberation and debate and often expressed publicly,269
they are especially likely to be based on reasoned justification.
The result of this merger of public attitudes and penological
justifications with respect to the mitigatory potential of mental
disorder is a clear conviction among all of the sources studied that the
death penalty is sometimes an inappropriate punishment for the
mentally impaired. On the other hand, those sources also evince a
striking uniformity of view, given their heterogeneity in time and
discipline, that mental disorder should not always mitigate punish-
ment, but should do so only when it reduces one or both of the
penological justifications for the death penalty identified in the July 2
Cases. As discussed previously,2 0 those justifications reflect retribu-
tive and deterrent values which in turn can be further differentiated:
retributive values reflect both expiation and vengeance, or responsi-
bility concepts, while deterrent values have both objective and sub-
jective components. Taken together, these subcategories form the
basis of a four-factor analysis of mitigatory potential. With respect to
each mentally disordered offender-the following four lines of inquiry
should be pursued to determine whether and to what degree
mitigation is appropriate:
0 whether the offender's suffering evidences expiation or
inspires compassion;
* whether the offender's cognitive and/or volitional im-
pairment at the time he committed the crime affected
his responsibility for his actions, and thereby diminished
society's need for revenge;
* whether the offender, subjectively analyzed, was less
affected than the mentally normal offender by the
deterrent threat of capital punishment at the time he
committed the crime; and
0 whether the exemplary value of capitally punishing the
offender, as objectively perceived by reasonable
persons, would be attenuated by the 'difficulty those
persons would have identifying with the executed
offender.
Application of the four-factor analysis need not be restricted to any
particular phase of the criminal justice process. Rather, because
269. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173.
270. See notes 224-49 supra and accompanying text (expiation and vengeance theories of
retribution); notes 250-66 supra and accompanying text (subjective and objective theories of
general deterrence).
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prosecutors, trial judges, juries, appellate courts, and executives
considering clemency all have the opportunity to consider mitigation
based on an offender's mental disorder,2 71 each of these institutional
participants in the criminal justice system might apply the analysis to
determine whether mitigation is justified with respect to every
defendant who manifests mental disorder. Notwithstanding its broad
potential utility, the most important function of the four-factor scheme
is to guide the sentencing authority. Thus, if the judge presiding at the
penalty phase of a capital case determines that the defendant's
condition is relevant to any justifiable theory of mitigation, under the
eighth amendment she not only must permit presentation of
supporting evidence, 272 but also must charge the jury273 on the
defendant's mitigatory theory. This latter requirement, while also
mandated by normal trial practice rules, has reached the level of a
constitutional imperative in capital sentencing cases in order to
satisfy the "guidance" requirement of the July 2 Cases.2 74 Accord-
ingly, whenever the defendant has presented evidence of mental
disorder in support of mitigation, the judge should instruct the jury to
consider the evidence in light of each of the four factors. To assure
that juries receive standardized and sufficient guidance in making
their decisions, she probably should give all four instructions whether
or not the defendant has explicitly attempted to tie his evidence and
arguments to all of them.275
271. See generally notes 174-219 supra and accompanying text.
272. See notes 105-06 & 110-27 supra and accompanying text.
273. The jury is not always the sentencing authority. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Supp.
1976-77) (providing that the trial judge shall be the actual sentencing authority, although also
providing for an advisory jury verdict). The argument that a jury is the appropriate, if not
constitutionally mandated, sentencing authority is set forth in notes 44 & 49 supra.
274. See notes 123 & 124 supra and accompanying text.
275. Even on the question of mental disorder as a mitigatory factor, the four proposed
instructions may not completely satisfy the guidance requirement under the eighth amendment.
As noted earlier, trial participants typically have a conditional right to prophylactic instructions
on specific pieces of confusing or prejudicial evidence. See note 123 supra. The right is
conditioned on the trial judge's broad discretion to decide whether the evidence is sufficiently
prejudicial to require an instruction. In the context of confusing evidence in mitigation of the
death penalty, however, the trial court's discretion to deny requested instructions on potentially
confusing evidence may diminish under the same constitutional imperative that requires
instructions on all mitigatory theories. Accordingly, in addition to the instructions required on
the defendant's mitigatory theories, additional instructions may be required whenever the
mitigatory evidence is potentially confusing and could prejudice the defendant if misunderstood.
See id.
This rule is particularly important when mental disorder is at issue because of the fear and
distrust that most people feel toward the mentally ill. See, e.g., J. NUNNALLY, POPULAR
CONCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 46 (1961) (mentally ill
perceived by others as dirty, worthless, and dangerous); Aschaffenburg, Psychiatry and Criminal
Law, 32 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 3-4 (1940) (traditional religious view that soul of insane person
possessed by Devil; utilitarian recognition that caring for mentally ill entails enormous expense);
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Although this four-factor scheme provides the sentencing authority
with some guidance in making mitigatory decisions regarding mentally
abnormal offenders, it is far from a complete program for death
sentencing in such cases. In particular, problems may arise from
ambiguities inherent in the four proposed standards. Moreover, the
relative and absolute weight to be afforded the four factors remains
problematical.276 By tracking criteria whose long use in analogous
Mechanic, Mental Health and Social Policy, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY. AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 68 (B. Brooks ed. 1974) (moralistic perception that mental patients, unlike physically ill,
bear responsibility for condition). Although attitudes toward mentally disordered persons are
becoming more enlightened, in the context of a criminal trial many of the prejudices may be
exacerbated. Compare G. CROCETrI, H. SPIRE & I. SCASSI, CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES TOWARD
MENTAL ILLNESS 9, 12 (1974) (reviewing literature showing increased awareness that mental
illness is treatable disease) and Meyer, Attitudes Toward Mental Illness in a Maryland
Community, 79 PUBLIc HEALTH REPORT 769, 771-72 (1964) (community survey study showing
trend toward greater acceptance of mentally ill) with Star, Ideas About Mental Illness, in R.
DONNELLY, J. GOLDSTEIN & R. SCHwARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 818 (1962) (mentally ill stereotyped as
threatening and unpredictable) and H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 381-85 (1966)
(empirical studies showing reaction of jurors against unattrative defendants). Moreover, even if
these elements of prejudice are not present, jurors often have misconceptions about how
mentally disordered persons look and act, and those misconceptions may impair the jurors'
ability to deliberate fairly on the mitigatory potential of the particular defendant's condition. See
Note, Psychopathic Personality: Treatment and Punishment Alternatives Under Current and
Proposed Responsibility Criteria, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 425, 435 (1955) (sociopath's appearance
does not fit expectations for mentally ill; presents picture of nearly average individual). A further
difficulty is that, for a variety of reasons, jurors may find it difficult to accept the validity of
authentic explanations and manifestations of mental disorder. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 236, at 114-37 (jurors reluctant to concede that persons somewhat like themselves are
mentally ill); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 404 (jurors disbelieve testimony of
mentally ill defendants); J. NUNNALLY, supra at 114, 123-38 (experiments indicate that
discussion of mental illness in stressful situations, as during a trial, creates anxiety and
unwillingness to accept communication). See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 378
(extensive empirical study of juror attitudes toward insane defendants; attitudes found confused
and not consistently biased for or against insane).
276. This article thus far has discussed ranking the four mitigating circumstances associated
with mental disorder by simply stating that personal expiation deserves somewhat less considera-
tion than vengeance, and that deterrence objectively perceived deserves less consideration
than deterrence subjectively perceived. See notes 231-38 & 265-66 supra and accompanying
text. Further examination reveals that eighth amendment doctrine may also rank the larger
categories of retribution and deterrence. The plurality in the July 2 Cases acknowledged one
possible ranking when it stated that" '[rietribution is no longer the dominant objective of the
criminal law,' but neither is it a forbidden objective ... ." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183
(1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)). None-
theless, an alternative analysis suggests the opposite conclusion. If, as suggested in notes
257 and 259 supra and accompanying text, subjective deterrence is premised on components of
both expiatory and responsibility analyses, three of the four factors-expiation, reduced
responsibility, and subjective deterrence-will have retributive underpinnings. Moreover, two of
those factors-diminished responsibility and subjective deterrence-seem deserving of far more
mitigatory weight than the remaining two factors. Thus, it seems likely that much of future
discourse about the death penalty under the eighth amendment will focus on the retributive, as
opposed to deterrent, aspect of punishment.
Exposition of the four factor analysis also does not indicate whether mitigatory evidence could
19781 CAPITAL SENTENCING 821
areas of the criminal law suggests a fair degree of administrability,
however, the standards serve to reduce the impact of these difficulties
and probably offer the best hope that sentencing standards can
transcend "meaningless 'boiler-plate' or ... statement[s] of the
obvious.' '277
be so substantial that the Constitution would prohibit a state from imposing capital punishment.
Insofar as mental disorder holds out the possibility of all four separate mitigatory considerations
applying, a rather compelling case for mitigatory treatment could be presented. Nonetheless,
because a rule requiring mitigation would be tantamount to a constitutional partial responsibility
defense, the Supreme Court might be loath to take this step given its past resistance to
constitutionalizing any particular insanity defense. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37
(1968) (plurality opinion) (formulating constitutional rule would reduce fruitful experimentation
and freeze developing dialogue between law and psychiatry); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
800-01 (1952) (progress of science has not reached point at which it would compel court to
require states to eliminate right and wrong test from criminal law). But cf. Roberts v. Louisiana,
431 U.S. 633, 646 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state may consider an aggravating
circumstance so grave that no permutation of mitigating factors could prevent imposition of
capital punishment).
A final problem related to the weight and impact of the four mitigating circumstances
identified in this article involves their relationship to aggravating circumstances that also grow
out of abnormal mental condition. In general, the states have considerable latitude in relating
mitigating and aggravating factors. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195 (Court will not insist on
one scheme of relating individualizing factors). Nonetheless, when a potentially aggravating
factor, such as the heinousness of a criminal act, is the result of a diseased mentality, it arguably
should not count so heavily against the defendant. See Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla.
1977) (because atrocious manner of committing crime was direct consequence of mental illness,
factor not given much aggravating weight; mitigating factors overcame aggravating ones, making
death penalty inappropriate).
277. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971); see note 21 supra and accompanying
text.
The preceding analysis has avoided discussion of the proper allocation of the burden of proof
regarding the existence of the mitigating factors that make the death sentence inappropriate.
This burden was placed on the defendant in an Ohio case that is now before the Supreme Court.
See State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 67, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1075 (1976) (no constitutional bar
to imposing burden of proving mitigation of punishment on defendant previously adjudged
guilty of committing capital offense), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977) (No. 76-6997). The
Supreme Court has considered the proposition that the self-incrimination and due process
clauses of the Constitution require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only every
statutorily defined element of a crime but also any fact affecting the degree of culpability. See
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 n.15 (1977) (discussing and narrowing Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975), which had suggested that due process requires prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting degree of criminal culpability); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process clause requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute crime). Although the Court in Patterson declined to
extend Mulaney to require the state to rebut the defendant's affirmative defenses with proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the uniqueness of the death penalty may persuade the Court to
expand traditional notions of procedural fairness in death penalty cases. Cf. Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (plurality opinion) (in death penalty cases, unlike normal sentencing
situations, due process requires disclosure to defendant of all confidential presentence reports
prior to sentencing hearing). Expanding on this approach to the burden of proof question might
lead to the following analysis. Winship and Mullaney, as interpreted in Patterson, establish the
rule that the state must prove beyond reasonable doubt any fact that spells the difference
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III. THE FOUR-FACTOR MITIGATORY SCHEME APPLIED:
THE MENTAL RETARDATE AND THE SOCIOPATH
Thus far, this article has employed the generic terms, "mental
disorder" and "mental abnormality," to refer to all mental states that
may deserve mitigatory treatment. This lack of psychiatric specificity
may be explained as an attempt to identify general criteria for use in
assessing the mitigatory potential of any abnormal mental condition
suffered by a capital defendant. Nevertheless, an undifferentiated
approach to mental disorder masks the fact that modern psychiatry
recognizes the existence of a variety of distinct mental conditions,
each with its own etiology and symptoms. 2 8 Thus, although no two
mentally disordered defendants will present the same mitigating
circumstances, psychiatric research makes possible meaningful
generalizations about how the symptoms of various recognized mental
disorders are likely to relate to the four-factor scheme. Therefore,
partially in an effort to acknowledge the value of psychiatry for
mitigatory decisionmaking in death penalty cases, 279 and more im-
portantly to illustrate the mitigatory potential of two broad cate-
gories of mental disorder that may afflict capital offenders, the
following two sections apply the four part scheme to two general
categories of mental disorder: mental retardation and sociopathy.
between guilt and innocence, but not those facts affecting the degree of guilt or punishment.
There are two bases for this rule. First, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally
required before conviction because an incorrect finding of guilt would deprive a defendant of
liberty, stigmatize him, and destroy public confidence in the criminal process, In re Winship, 397
U.S. at 363-64. Second, once the defendant's commission of a statutorily defined crime is
accurately established, the scope of the evils engendered by an incorrect assessment of the
appropriate degree of punishment does not rise to constitutional significance. See Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. at 208-10 (discussing limits of due process requirements). Because death is
so qualitatively different from other sanctions, however, the effect on liberty interests and public
confidence of a wrong choice between imprisonment and execution is arguably at least as
significant as that created by a mistaken determination of guilt. See Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("because of that qualitative difference [between a
death sentence and life imprisonment], there is a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"); ef.
Speiser v. Randall, 358 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (reliability of guilt determination increased by
placing burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt on government).
278. See generally F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. DiX & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS,
27-49 (1971); A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (A. Freedman & H. Kaplan eds.
1967) [hereinafter cited as TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY]; cf. R. WOODY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL
RETARDATION 17-18 (1974) (criticizing legal rules that confuse mental illness and mental
retardation).
279. See Crump, supra note 102, at 571 (psychiatrists have ability to aid sentencing jury on
issues, including defendant's capacity to deliberate and commit future acts of violence). But cf.
Diamond, From Durham to Brawner, A Futile Journey, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 109, 114-15
(uncertainty in psychiatric discipline reduces value of psychiatric testimony).
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THE MITIGATORY POTENTIAL OF MENTAL RETARDATION
Psychiatrists have defined mental retardation with increasing
sophistication during this century.280 Some authorities have focused
on symptoms and others on causes of the mental defect. From a
symptomatic perspective, subnormal intelligence is the most common
definitional characteristic of mental retardation. 281 Recent com-
mentary, however, usually adds or substitutes a behaviorial definition
that focuses on the inability of retardates to conform their actions to
social norms.282 Writers who take the etiological perspective contend
intellectual or behaviorial maturity. 283 Proponents of this definition,
280. See generally R. WOODY, supra note 278, at 10-19; Cytryn & Lourie, Mental Retardation,
in TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 278, at 819. The condition originally was called
"feeblemindedness" and was subdivided into "idiocy", "imbecility" and "moronity." See S.
GLUECK, supra note 223, at 333-34; Address by W. Fernald before the Massachusetts Medical
Society (June 12, 1912), quoted in J. WALLIN, MENTAL DEFICIENCY 78 (1956). More recently
authorities have employed the terms "mental defectiveness", "mental deficiency", "subnormal-
ity", and "mental retardation." R. TREDGOLD & K. SODDY, TEXTBOOK OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY
(10th ed. 1963); J. WALLIN, supra.
281. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 341-42 (rev. ed. 1971); S.
GLUECK, supra note 223, at 333. The importance of intelligence is reflected in the various
intelligence-quotient (I.Q.) scales that measure intelligence to categorize all persons, including
retardates. See R. WOODY, supra note 278, at 30-31. But cf B. SARASON. PSYCHOLOGICAL
PROBLEMS IN MENTAL DEFICIENCY 42-48 (3d ed. 1959) (criticizing overuse of I.Q. test in
definition and identification of mental retardation).
282. See E. A. Doll, The Essentials of an Inclusive Concept of Mental Deficiency, 46 AM. J.
MENTAL DEFICIENCY 214, 215 (1942) (suggesting that social competence be considered);
Sternlicht, A Theoretical Model for Psychological Treatment of Mental Retardation, 68 AM. J.
MENTAL DEFICIENCY 620 (1964) (identifying emotional response to low intelligence as a
secondary indicator of retardation).
The classical model discerns a functional relationship between mental retardation and the
proclivity to commit crimes. See R. TREDGOLD & K. SODDY, supra note 280, at 260 (modern
reiteration of this view); Address by W. Fernald, quoted in J. WALLIN, supra note 280, at 78
(every feebleminded person is a potential criminal given the proper environment and
opportunity). See generally Beier, Behavioral Disturbances in the Mentally Retarded, in MENTAL
RETARDATION 453, 466-68 (H. Stephens & R. Heber, eds. 1964). However, during the 1940's the
view that mental retardation bore no abnormal statistical relation to criminality began to prevail.
R. WOODY, supra note 278, at 43; Levy, The Role of Mental Deficiency in the Causation of Crime,
58 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 455, 458-59 (1954). More recently, the dominant view has been
that retardates are somewhat more likely to commit crimes or be apprehended than members of
the general population. Allen, The Retarded Offenders, Unrecognized in Court and Untreated in
Prison, FED. PROBATION, September, 1968, at 22-24; Smith, Criminality and Mental Retardation,
59 TRAINING ScH. BULL. 74, 78 (1962). It is clearly recognized, however, that retardates who do
break the law tend to commit crimes of violence. Thus, even if the percentage of retardates in
prison accurately reflects their proportion to the general population, they are overrepresented in
the class of capital offenders. E.g., W. BROMBERG, THE MOLD OF MURDER 202 (1961); J. WALLIN,
supra note 280, at 99; Brown, Courtless & Silber, Fantasy and Force: A Study of the Dynamics of
the Mentally Retarded Offender, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 71 (1971) (most frequent crime
committed by retardates is homicide).
283. See A. BiNET& T. SIoMON, MENTALLY DEFECTIVE CHILDREN 18-23 (1914) (pioneering work
claiming that retarded children are the victims of disease, constitutional debility, or
malnutrition); Heber, Modifications in the Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental
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however, disagree over nomenclature applicable to persons who
exhibit the same arrested-development symptoms as the organically
impaired, but whose mental disorder is apparently caused by such
environmental factors as cultural deprivation. Although some
commentators exclude this syndrome from the category of mental
retardation, the majority categorizes sociocultural defects as a
subclass of mental retardation.284
Various legal definitions of mental retardation also have surfaced.
In many cases courts and legislatures have concluded that retardation
encompasses a multitude of symptomatic and etiological afflictions,
the severity of which may bear on mitigatory decisionmaking in death
sentencing. 285 Therefore, for purposes of the following four-factor
Retardation, 65 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 499, 499 (1961).
These organic impairments emanate from a multitude of causes: metabolic or chromosonal
disorders, severe prematurity, brain damage during labor, and postnatal infections, poisoning,
and blows to the head. See generally Cytryn & Lourie, supra note 280, at 820-34.
284. Compare M. STERNLICHT & M. DEUTSCH, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE MENTALLY RETARDED 7, 9-10, 41-42 (1972) (separate subcategory of mental
retardation caused by cultural deprivation) and Cytryn & Lourie, supra note 280, at 820-21,834-
36 (same) and E.E. Doll, Historical Survey of Research and Management of Mental Retardation in
the United States, in READINGS ON THE EXCEPTIONAL CHILD 47, 48 (E. Trapp ed. 1962)
(environment may cause subclass of retardation) with E.A. Doll, supra note 282, at 217 (limiting
categories of mental retardation to those of hereditary or pathological origin).
285. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 310, 125 N.W.2d 918,927 (1964) (on basis of low
intelligence and suggestability of defendant, death sentence reduced to life imprisonment); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2947.24(A), 5125.011 (Page, 1975) (defective delinquent and civil com-
mitment statutes; retardation defined as low intelligence and inadequate social adjustment);
VA. CODE § 37-1-1(13) (1976) (defective delinquent statute; retardation comprises subaverage
intellect, impaired adaptive behavior). Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court, interpreting that
state's mitigating factor based on mental deficiency, offered a purportedly broad definition that
nevertheless excludes behavioral symptoms:
Mental deficiency is consistently defined to mean a low or defective intelligence.
Construing the term broadly, a deficiency may be severe or mild, and may be
hereditary or caused by a brain defect, disease, or injury, or whatever other
condition might cause subnormal intelligence. But it does not include the
emotional and behavioral abnormalities claimed to exist by the defense.
State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 96, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1050-51 (1976). The United States
Supreme Court soon may have occasion to scrutinize this definition and its application in two
cases. See State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 66-67, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1074 (1976) (rejecting
defendant's claim of mental deficiency based on dull-normal I.Q., susceptibility to undue
influence, and participation in methadone treatment), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977) (No. 76-
6997); State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 280, 358 N.E.2d 556, 565 (1976) (though minor is not
per se "mentally deficient" within meaning of statute, defendant's age may be relevant to mental
deficiency), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977) (No. 76-6513); note 103 supra. The Lockelt and
Bell cases also illustrate the difficulty courts have experienced in assessing the mitigatory
potential of individuals with dull-normal or borderline intelligence. Compare State v. Lockett, 49
Ohio St. 2d at 66-67, 358 N.E.2d at 1074 (no mental deficiency despite dull-normal I.Q. and
suggestability) and State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d at 277-80, 358 N.E.2d at 563-65 (no mental
deficiency despite tender age and behavioral adaptability difficulties) with Meeks v. State, 336
So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. 1976) (dull-normal intelligence and youth comprise mitigating factor)
and Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 148, 151 A.2d 241, 247 (1959) (same).
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analysis of the mitigatory potential of retardation, a broad-based
approach to mental retardation is utilized, reflecting the prevailing
views of both psychiatric and legal communities.
28 6
Expiation. Many of the antisocial actions of the mental
retardate stem from an impulsive reaction against the painful
awareness, hammered home by frustration, failure, and humiliation,
of the "cruel trick that biology has played on him. ' 287 Indeed, opinions
in some death penalty cases have displayed a strong sense of
compassion that reflects an awareness of the mental retardate's
internal suffering.288 To the extent that such suffering can be proved,
it undercuts the expiation justification for capital punishment and
should function as a mitigating circumstance.28 9
Vengeance. Mental retardation raises questions concerning
potential impairment of all the psychological predicates to responsi-
bility.290 Although some support exists for the proposition that mental
retardation is per se proof of a lack of criminal responsibility, 91 the
286. In essence, this approach adopts the official definition of the American Association of
Mental Deficiency (AAMD), which states that "[miental retardation refers to sub-average
general intellectual functioning which originated during the developmental period and is
associated with impairment in adaptive behavior." See Heber, supra note 283, at 499.
287. W. BROMBERG, supra note 282, at 202; see Address by C. H. Martin at the National
Institute on Crime and Delinquency (July 24, 1962), quoted in B. BROWN & T. COURTLESS, THE
MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDER 22-24 (report submitted to President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967) (consciousness of being different in some
way may be responsible for feelings of inferiority, frustration, and resentment in the mildly
retarded).
The instinctive, aggressive, and hostile impulses of the retardate are the expression of an
attempt to deal with certain life situations. This attempt does not represent any special or
pathological characteristic peculiar to the retarded individual, but rather the normal and healthy
tendency in every individual to maintain his worth as a human being. M. STERNLICHT & M.
DEUTSCH, supra note 284, at 62.
288. See Woods v. State, 214 Ga. 546, 546, 105 S.E.2d 896,897 (1958) (jury instructed that
weakmindedness, though no defense to the crime, may be grounds for a recommendation of
mercy); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70, 78-84, 89 A.2d 782, 786-89 (1954) (Musmanno,
J., dissenting) (reciting circumstances affecting defendant that should "soften the blow of the
iron hammer of retribution").
289. See notes 231-37 supra and accompanying text.
290. See notes 238-49 supra and accompanying text.
291. Legal rules for determining responsibility developed primarily in cases involving
"mental disease." See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23 (1843) (person asserting
insanity defense must prove at time of crime he was laboring under such defect of reason or
disease of mind as not to know nature and quality of act, or that what he did was was wrong). See
generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 223-26. Today, mental health professionals
distinguish "mental disease" from the "mental defects" underlying retardation and have
suggested separate rules for defendants suffering from the latter affliction. R. WOODY. supra
note 278, at 17; Hinkle, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Retarded, 65 AM. J. OF MENTAL
DEFICIENCY 434, 435-36 (1960). In England, the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913, provided a
special defense comparable to the insanity defense for the feebleminded. 3 & 4 Geo. V, c. 28, § 8,
discussed in S. GLUECK, supra note 223, at 332 & n.1, 335 n.4. Until recently Virginia also had a
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:757
consensus among the courts that have considered the argument is to
apply to mental retardates the cognitive and volitional standards
discussed earlier for the insanity and diminished capacity defenses." 2
Moreover, despite their intellectual impairment, mental retardates
rarely satisfy even the cognition-based insanity test 293 because, at
least in some very rudimentary sense, they do understand the
difference between right and wrong. 294 Nonetheless, even in cases in
which the retardate is too cognitively aware to meet the legal test of
insanity, it is recognized that the retardate's level of cognition and
volition is often so far below average that the death penalty is
inappropriate.2 95
There are three ways in which the retardate's impaired intelligence
puts him at a disadvantage in appreciating the significance of his acts
and in conforming those acts to societal norms. First, the retard-
ate's intellectual defect may manifest itself as an inability fully to
understand legal rules,296 or the rationale underlying them. Thus,
statute providing that the feebleminded could assert the same defenses as insane persons. VA.
CODE ch. 46, § 1094 (1942) (recodified in part, VA. CODE § 37.1-127 (1970) (repealed 1976);
see Jessup v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 610, 617-19, 39 S.E.2d 638, 641-42 (1946) (reversing
conviction of defendant with I.Q. of 58 because statute not applied). Other American
jurisdictions have refused to view mental retardation, except in its most severe forms, as per so
proof of lack of responsibility. See Hinkle, supra at 436 (insanity defense not applied absent gross
idiocy). Moreover, American systems consistently have rejected the argument that an adult
defendant's severely stunted mental growth should qualify him for the common law rule that
children between the ages of 7 and 14 are presumed criminally irresponsible. In State v.
Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145, 112 A. 400 (1920), the court dismissed the mental age argument of a
28-year-old defendant with a mental age of only 11, noting that the presumption of irre-
sponsibility of adolescents stemmed solely from their "tender years." Id. at 148, 112 A. at 402;
see Edgerson v. State, 302 So. 2d 556, 558 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974) (actual age, not mental age,
controls application of common law presumptions as to capacity to commit crime); People v.
Perry, 195 Col. 623, 638-39, 234 P. 890, 896-97 (1925) (same); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255
Mass. 9, 13, 151 N.E. 74, 74-75 (1926) (same); cf. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 143, at *23 (as
to children over age 14 "the capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much measured by
years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent's understanding and judgment.").
292. See generally notes 238-49 supra and accompanying text.
293. See notes 242 & 291 supra and accompanying text.
294. See State v. Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145, 148, 112 A. 400, 402 (1920) (28 year-old adult
presumed to have capacity to distinguish right from wrong); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 310,
125 N.W.2d 918, 925 (1964) (mentally defective offender with mental age of five- to seven-year
old who understood the difference between right and wrong presumed legally sane).
295. See, e.g., State v. Behler, 65 Idaho 464, 475-76 146 P.2d 338, 343 (1944) (sentence
reduced to life imprisonment because person with pronounced subnormal mind not held to
normal standard of accountability); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295,310, 125 N.W.2d 918,925 (1964)
(sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment because defendant low-grade moron
disposed to follow others); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 148, 151 A.2d 241, 247 (1959)
(death penalty vacated because defendant's youth and dull-normal intelligence not considered
by sentencing judge).
296. See R. TREDGOLD & K. SODDY, supra note 280, at 251.
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the retardate not only may be less affected by the knowledge that the
police and his peers will disapprove of a criminal act, but also may be
less aware of the harm that might follow from that act.2 97 Second, the
retardate is more prone to commit a crime than a normal person
because he misperceives surrounding circumstances and conse-
quently tends to react immediately and violently to the urges of the
moment.298 For example, a situation that may appear harmless to a
person of normal intellect to the retardate will justify a swift and sure
reaction in "self-defense. ' 299 Third, retardates' native suggestibility
may lead them to participate in illegal activity out of a desire to please
their cohorts, and so may reflect adversely on the existence of criminal
intent.300
Subjective Deterrence. Retardates' behavioral disorders and
297. In this context, Tredgold and Soddy offer the example of an imbecile who cut off a sleeping
man's head because he thought it would be fun to see what his victim would say when he woke
up and found that his head was missing. Using the M'Naghten terms, the authors note that
the retardate may evince an understanding of the "nature" of the act-that it is forbidden-
without fully understanding its "quality. " R. TREDGOLD & F. SODDY, supra note 280, at 252. See
also M. STERNLICHT & M. DEUTSCH, supra note 284, at 80 (although individual of normal
intelligence might feel some pangs of conscience before he decides to act in an antisocial
manner, retarded individual has only dim awareness that act might not be desirable because of
inability to foresee future consequences).
298. See, e.g., W. BROMBERG, supra note 282, at 202 (noting retardates' tendency to "react in
a blinding flash of vengeance" against frustration and humiliation); S. GLUECK, supra note 223,
at 334-35 (feeblemindedness, especially when accompanied by psychosis, may lead to serious
crimes of violence due to actor's defective control of instinctive behavior); M. STERNLICHT & M.
DEUTSCH, supra note 284, at 58 (defect in organization of ego results in failure of defense
mechanisms of repression and inhibition, with result that retardate has difficulty developing
control of instinctive aggressive and hostile impulses emanating from the Id).
299. Put most simply, poor judgment usually accompanies a weak intellect:
[A] retarded individual is especially prone to committing deviant acts because he
will be subject to weak and ineffective functioning not only in the realm of
conscience and values but in the realm of judgment and common sense as well. It is
the latter deficit, in fact, which creates perhaps the more immediate and pervasive
of the retardate's problems in the area of deviant and antisocial conduct.
M. STErNLICHT & M. DEUTSCH, supra note 284, at 81.
300. See State v. Hall, 126 Neb. 295, 310, 125 N.W.2d 918, 927 (1964) (reducing death
sentence to life imprisonment because defendant was low-grade moron disposed to follow
others); W. BROMBERG, supra note 282, at 202; S. GLUECK, supra note 223, at 334-35; R.
TREDGOLD & K. SODDY. supra note 280, at 257; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.6(4)(e)-
6(4)(0 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (mitigating circumstance present if defendant was
accomplice and participation in homicidal act was relatively minor or if defendant acted under
domination of another person). But see State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 66-67, 358 N.E.2d
1062, 1074 (1976) (dull-normal defendant, although subject to undue influence by others, did
not show sufficient mental deficiency to preclude imposition of capital punishment), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 261 (No. 76-6997); State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 280, 358 N.E.2d 556,
564-65 (1976) (same), cerL granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977) (No. 76-6513).
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intellectual deficiencies suggest that they are largely immune from the
threat of punishment. Their susceptibility to impulsive conduct
makes it unlikely that they will commit the fully contemplated and
coolly calculated crime that the plurality in the July 2 Cases postulated
is indicative of deterrability.3 °' Further, although capable of under-
standing that the law forbids a certain act, retardates may not fully
understand the rationale underlying the law and thus may be
unaffected by the moral and legal opprobrium that normally
accompanies the criminal sanction. 02 This latter problem is exacer-
bated by the deficient's reduced ability to "project into the future,"
which in turn reduces the likelihood that he will appreciate and be
tempered by the prospect of punishment, 03 or that he will respond
differently based on variations in the degree of punishment.
Objective Deterrence. Although the behavior of retardates
may in some respects be distinguished from that of mentally normal
individuals, the distinction usually is based on incomplete human
development rather than on aberrant or "inhuman" characteristics.
Qualitatively, therefore, retardates generally will not appear so
different from other members of the population that their capital
punishment could not serve an educational function. 0 4 Combined
with the difficulty of assessing the objective impact of mitigatory
decisions, this moderate degree of behavioral distinctness attending
the retardate personality holds out little mitigatory value. 0 5
Three of the four factors, expiation, vengeance, and subjective
deterrence, offer substantial mitigatory potential to the retardate.
Moreover, the retardate personality may also evidence other
potentially mitigating characteristics, including mental illness3 °6 and
alcoholism. 0 7 Taken together, these mitigating circumstances present
301. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186; see note 298 supra and accompanying text.
302. See note 297 supra and accompanying text.
303. See M. STERNLICHT & M. DEUTSCH, supra note 284, at 80; Grigg, Criminal Behavior of
Mentally Retarded Adults, 52 AM. J. OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY 370, 371, 374 (1948).
304. Indeed, judges, juries, and even defense counsel often do not realize that a defendant is
retarded. For example, when a retardate is testifying truthfully, the jury may erroneously
attribute his confusion under the pressure of effective cross-examination to lack of truthfulness.
See Allen, supra note 282, at 25. This problem makes it especially imperative that juries be
instructed on the mitigatory theories of mental retardation. See note 275 supra.
305. See notes 265-66 supra and accompanying text.
306. See M. STERNLICHT & M. DEUTSCH, supra note 284, at 87.
307. See Grigg, supra note 303, at 374. Due to their suggestibility retardates are also more
likely to confess than normal defendants. See Dover v. State, 207 So. 2d 296, 300 (Miss. 1968)
(moderate mental defective with I.Q. of 60 did not knowingly and intelligently waive privilege
against self-incrimination); Harvey v. State, 207 So. 2d 108, 117 (Miss. 1968) (confession of
mental retardate deemed involuntary). Moreover, due to their intellectual deficiencies, they may
be less able to assist counsel and less likely to appear credible to juries. See Inkes & Perretta,
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a compelling case for reduction of a death sentence that should be
overcome only by substantial aggravating conditions. It is important
to note, however, that some of these conditions are not likely to
cumulate in any individual and may even be mutually exclusive, 308 so
that the mitigatory potential of mental retardation alone remains a
question for which the final answer rests on an examination of the
circumstances of each case.
THE MITIGATORY POTENTIAL OF SOCIOPATHY
Although the subject of considerable literary, historical, and
medical speculation, the sociopathic or psychopathic personality has
defied precise definition among mental health professionals. 309 During
the long and often confusing evolution of these medical concepts,
legislators and legal commentators have attempted with varying
degrees of success to keep legal standards of sociopathy consistent
with the changing understandings of mental health professionals.
3 1 0
Apparently relying at least in part on past understandings of mental
health professionals, state legislators in attempting to delineate the
condition of sociopathy for special sentencing statutes typically have
defined the condition in a general and simplistic manner. Washing-
ton's statute, for example, defines the psychopathic condition as
follows:
[Psychopathy is] the existence in any person of such
hereditary, congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional rather than the intellectual field and
manifested by anomalies of such character as to render
Legal Dilemmas of Mental Retardation, in DIMINISHED PEOPLE 107, 115-16 (N. Bernstein ed.
1971) (retardates' deficiency impairs ability to exercise legal rights after arrest; retardate likely
to waive right to remain silent); note 304 supra. These consistent disadvantages in presenting a
defense suggest a further mitigating factor in the case of retardates.
308. For example, a slightly retarded offender might be particularly subject to frustration,
failure, and aggression that bear on expiation, subjective deterrence, and volitional
responsibility, yet be relatively responsible in a cognitive sense. Address of C. H. Martin, quoted
in B. BROWN & T. COURTLESS, supra note 287, at 22-24.
309. The term "psychopath" was traditionally used to describe sociopaths. In 1952 the
American Psychiatric Association manual replaced "psychopath" with "sociopath" to
emphasize the social maladjustments of its victims. Rabin, Psychopathic (Sociopathic)
Personalities, in LEGAL AND CRmIN'AL PSYCHOLOGY 274 (H. Toch ed. 1961). See W. BROMBERG,
supra note 282, at 58-59 (history of experiments on sociopaths); H. CLECKLY, THE MASK OF
SANrTY 360 (4th ed. 1964) (identifies Dostoevsky's senior Karamazov as sociopath).
310. See COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1287 (A. Freedman, H. Kaplan & P.
Sadlock eds. 1975). See generally Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative
Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 550-55 (1966); Note, supra note 275.
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satisfactory social adjustment by such person difficult or
impossible.
31
Faced with the inadequacy in practice of such amorphous and
potentially overinclusive definitions, legal commentators have
shunned comprehensive definitions and instead have described socio-
paths only by means of a series of characteristics. 2 Thus, sociopaths
evidence four personality traits that together might be summarized as
a lack of conscience or super ego. The most notable sociopathic
characteristic is a severe disturbance or virtual absence of moral
judgment tied to the sociopath's inability to adhere to rules or to
experience guilt; linked to this absence of judgment are egocentric
concerns for personal needs, general inability to plan for the future,
and inability to maintain affectional ties.313 These four characteristics
have traditionally been employed as the legal indicia of sociopathy.
314
311. WASF! REV. CODE ANN. § 71.06.010 (1975); see MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1976)
(defective delinquent defined as individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated
antisocial or criminal behavior, evidences propensity toward criminal activity, and who is found
to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly
demonstrate an actual danger to society); Note, supra note 310, at 555 (citing some statutes in
effect in 1966).
312. See Rabin, supra note 309, at 276 (calling definition a "wastebasket" classification). In
addition to covering too many offenders, these open-ended definitions mask disagreement
among mental health professionals and fall to provide any guidance in the borderline situations
in which such guidance is particularly needed. See REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY COMSMSSION ON
THE HABrruAL SEX OFFENDER 37 (1950) (psychiatrists widely disagree over definition of
psychopaths); Bowman & Rose, A Criticism of the Current Usage of the Term Sexual Psychopath,
109 ANL J. PSYCHIATRY 177, 179 (1952) (term sexual psychopath used too loosely to be
meaningful); Panel Discussion, The Sociopathic Criminal Offender: What to Do With Him, 34
U. CiN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1965) (term sociopath applied to all individuals who are unable to make
acceptable and satisfactory adjustment to the prevailing social and moral milieu); Note, supra
note 275, at 431-32 (reviewing literature that attempts to define sociopathy by use of
characteristics).
313. See A. CHAPMAN, TEXTBOOK OF CLINICALPSYCHIATRY: AN INTERPERSONAL APPROACH 221-
24 (2d ed. 1976); H. CLECKLY, supra note 309, at 370-72 (inability to feel guilt manifested by
frequent denials of wrongdoing); W. MCCORD & J. MCCORD, THE PSYCHOPATH, AN ESSAY ON THE
CRIMINAL MIND 8, 53 (1964) (sociopaths unstoppable by any abstract rule; impulsive); Rabin,
supra note 309, at 278-80 (sociopaths do not internalize "thou shalts" and "thou shalt nots");
Robins, Antisocial and Dyssocial Personality Disorders, in TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note
278, at 279, 955. These traits of the sociopathic personality, particularly the inability to follow
plans, are an ultimate irony of the sociopaths' existence: Despite their intelligence and their
willingness to violate moral codes, they organize their behavior so that they rarely win any of the
successes recognized by society. H. CLECKLY, supra note 309, at 400.
314. See Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 34-37, 221 A.2d 397, 408-09 (1966) (reliance on
psychiatric text to give content to term "psychopath"); Palmer v. State, 215 Md. 142, 146-48,
137 A.2d 119, 122-23 (1957) (reliance on psychiatric definition of sociopathy to illustrate
emotional imbalance as a mitigating factor), cited with approval in Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp.
389, 396-97 (D.Md. 1969); cf State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 197-98, 560 P.2d 41, 52-53
(1976) (citing psychiatric texts to define sociopathy), cert denied, 97 S. Ct. 2988,
830
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While the legal definition seems to have remained unchanged, the
mental health profession's concept of the psychopathic personality
has evolved radically over the past twenty-six years. The most
important development has been the isolation of a new category of
psychopathy, denominated "antisocial personality. ' 315 Researchers
studying the antisocial personality have uncovered evidence of certain
identifiable childhood characteristics and biological abnormalities,
making possible the development of a more objective set of
symptomatic characteristics that distinguish these sociopaths not
only by their antisocial behavior but also by their shared develop-
mental and biological traits.3 16 Because in the death penalty context
modem legal definitions should recognize theoretical advances, 317 the
following subsection will apply the four factor analysis to individuals
who fall within either the traditional legal definition of sociopathy or
the modern concept of antisocial personality.
Expiation. Because sociopaths generally do not exhibit
behavioral patterns normally associated with insane or mentally
unbalanced individuals, they are unlikely to evoke pity or com-
passion.3 18 As a result, sentencing authorities may be reluctant to
315. See L. ULLMAN & L. KRASNER, A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 544
(2d ed. 1975). In 1952 the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
dispensed with the term psychopath and referred to a category of personality disorders called
sociopathic personality disturbance that included individuals who were "ill primarily in terms of
society and of conformity with the prevailing cultural milieu." The subcategories of this
disturbance were sexual deviation, addiction, antisocial reaction, and dyssocial reaction. Id. In
1968, antisocial reaction was relabeled antisocial personality and included within a category of
personality disorders separate from the sociopathic personality disturbance. AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM 1I, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL Dis-
ORDERS q 301.7 (1968). Because many defendants commonly referred to as sociopaths may fit
the more precise definition of antisocial personality, this article will address both conditions. See
note 324 infra.
316. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM I1, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS q 301.7 (1968) (mere history of repeated legal or social offenses not
sufficient to justify diagnosis); COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 310, at
1287-97 (stressing importance of objective symptomatology and referring to genetic factors,
electroencephalograph abnormalities, and the presence of childhood disorders). See generally L.
ROBINS, DEVIANT CHILDREN GROWN UP: A SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC STUDY OF SOCIOPATHIC
PERSONALITY (1966).
317. See Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572, 572-73 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam)
(granting new trial because government's psychiatric expert who testified at trial and defined
mental disease not to include sociopathy redefined mental disease to include sociopathy in
subsequent, unrelated trial). The Supreme Court, however, recently denied review of a case in
which a capital defendant was denied mitigatory treatment despite his sociopathic condition.
State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 199, 560 P.2d 41, 52 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2988
(1977).
318. See S. GLUECK, supra note 223, at 382 (noting the usual absence of symptoms that juries
accept as evidence of insanity); Note, supra note 275, at 435 (sociopath does not appear pathetic,
mentally unbalanced, helpless to avoid or combat his affliction, or incapable of making his way into
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believe that sociopaths suffer from the torment of their calamity that
is necessary to fit a mentally disordered offender within the expiation
qualification to retributive punishment. 19
Vengeance. Most psychologists and legal commentators
agree that sociopaths possess the cognitive ability to distinguish
between right and wrong and probably have a full understanding of
the nature of their actions.3 20 The more persuasive argument for
mitigation in the case of the sociopath is based largely on modern
formulations of the volitional element of the responsibility factor-
impaired ability to conform actions to societal rules.3 2 The extreme
impulsiveness recognized as central to the character of the
sociopath3 22 arguably brings these persons within the American Law
Institute's standard of a defendant who "lacks substantial capacity
... to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law" and thus is
less responsible for criminal conduct.3 23 However, in 1962 the ALI
specifically excluded sociopaths from that standard because they
differ from normal persons only quantitatively rather than qualita-
tively, and because a symptomatic diagnosis of sociopathy does not
society). If, however, it is shown that sociopathy has biological origins, the potential for pity,
and for expiatory mitigation, would be enhanced. See note 316 supra and accompanying text.
319. See Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (remorseless
attitude of sociopathic offender constituted continuing threat to society and qualified as
aggravating factor).
320. See H. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 31-32 (2d ed. 1965) (psychopaths' attempts to
explain, neutralize, or escape from offenses by evasive explanations or flight indicate knowledge
of distinction between right and wrong); S. GLUECK, supra note 223, at 382; Note, supra note 275,
at 432. A few psychiatrists have reached a contrary conclusion, contending that the sociopath
cannot be said to know the difference between right and wrong because sociopaths never
actually feel wrong through experience. See E. KAHN, PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITIES 348 (1931);
Seeman, Behavioral Science, M'Naghten, and the Sociopathic Offender, 34 U. CIN. L. REv. 58,
61-62 (1965).
321. See notes 242-49 supra and accompanying text.
322. See W. BROMBERG, supra note 282, at 75-76; W. MCCoRD & J. MCCORD, supra note 313,
at 16-17, 27. William Cook, probably the most thoroughly studied sociopath, has been described
as "so impulsive [andl so warped that every frustration resulted in explosive, murderous
aggression." Id. at 5. Impulsiveness has also been introduced into statutory definitions of
sociopathy. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 526.09 (West 1975) (impulsiveness of behavior); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 8501(a) (Supp. 1977) (lack of power to control impulses).
323. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The "product of a mental
disease or defect" standard articulated in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), also seems to favor the inclusion of sociopaths. Arguably Durham himself was a
sociopath. W. MCCORD & J. MCCORD, supra note 313, at 179. The District of Columbia Circuit
subsequently ruled that the sociopathic condition was sufficient to require the submission of the
issue of responsibility to the jury. See Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572, 572-73 (D.C. Cir.
1959) (per curiam) (jury should determine criminal responsibility of alleged psychopath); In re
Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957) (same).
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explain the causes of the abnormality.3 24 Even if courts choose to
follow this rule, 325 the vitality of the exclusion as applied to those
sociopaths who suffer from antisocial personality is at best dubious in
light of evidence that they may be biologically and developmentally
distinguishable from other defendants. 326 Hence, courts that are
willing to accept the results of current psychiatric research may be
expected to accord significant mitigatory potential to reduced
culpability.
Subjective Deterrence. Sociopathy has greater mitigatory
potential under the important factor of subjective deterrence. Apart
from the widely recognized view, not relevant to death penalty cases,
that sociopaths do not learn from punishment,327 an analysis of
sociopathic characteristics indicates that the threat of sanction does
not alter their conduct. Sociopaths' inability either to suppress
immediate gratification in favor of longterm needs or to conform to
the basic moral codes of the society 28 is inconsistent with the notion
that the fear of penalty can alter their conduct. Commentators,
therefore, have recognized the impropriety of justifying the socio-
path's punishment on grounds of deterrence. 29 A few even have
suggested that the threat of punishment might be counterproductive
because it encourages some sociopaths to engage in criminal
activity.
330
324. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This provision has been criticized as an inadvisable
effort to bar sociopaths from the insanity defense, and praised as a necessary compromise to the
broadening of the insanity defense. Compare A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 88 (psychopaths
should be included in definition) with Welchsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U.
CHI. L. REv. 367, 376 & n.23 (1955) (sociopaths should be excluded). The psychiatric profession
responded to the ALI's concerns in 1968 by removing from its "sociopathic personality"
classification all disorders related solely to the inability to be socialized and including them in a
category of conditions "without manifest psychiatric disorder." See L. ULLMAN & L. KRASNER,
supra note 315, at 544 (persons normal in terms of subculture but abnormal in terms of
dominant social group reclassified as without psychiatric disorder).
325. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, at 88 (noting jurisdictions that follow the ALI rule); cf.
Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 608, 626 (1963)
(contending that most psychopaths would not be excluded under the Model Penal Code because
they evidence characteristics other than repeated criminal behavior).
326. See note 316 supra and accompanying text.
327. See H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 170, at 123-24 (under traditional tests psychopathic
defendants must be held responsible and punishable even when, as usual, it may be medically
certain that punishment can have no therapeutic effect). But see L. ROBINS, supra note 316, at
958 (finding some evidence that conditioning potential of psychopaths increases with age).
328. See notes 313-14 supra and accompanying text.
329. See Note, supra note 275, at 436-37 & n.58 (psychopath will commit criminal acts even if
he knows he may be required to serve a prison term).
330. See W. MCCORD & J. McCoRD, supra note 313, at 31.
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Objective Deterrence. Because sociopathic offenders are not
easily distinguished from normal offenders, and because of the
resulting fear that any offender could attempt to avoid responsibility
by claiming to be a sociopath, it is unlikely that a court will view
sociopaths as so different from members of the general population
that their exemplary punishment will not serve to deter others. 331 New
evidence pointing to objective distinctions between sociopaths
suffering from antisocial personality and other criminal defendants,
however, could generate change because dissemination of this
information should serve to heighten public awareness of differences
between antisocial and normal personalities, thereby diminishing the
need for exemplary punishment of persons with antisocial personali-
ties. Nonetheless, problems of proof will continue to plague efforts to
establish this mitigating factor.
The mitigatory potential of sociopathy may be weaker than the
mitigatory potential of retardation due to the absence of expiation.
Nevertheless, if the theory is accepted that sociopaths who suffer
from antisocial personality are biologically abnormal, at least these
persons should receive mitigatory consideration because of the
reduced vitality of the important vengeance and subjective deterrence
justifications for punishment. Such a conclusion does not indicate,
however, that all sociopaths or even all antisocial personalities would
be exempted from the death penalty; because of the callousness and
destructiveness inherent in the sociopath's behavior, the presence of
aggravating factors is often a real possibility.
332
CONCLUSION
In the July 2 Cases, the Supreme Court for the first time firmly
concluded that the death penalty could coexist with the eighth
amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. By the
result reached in two of the cases, however, the Court also affirmed
that in many modes of administration the ultimate sanction does not
satisfy that constitutional requirement. 333 Both of these holdings were
the product of a consistent view of the doctrinal framework of the
331. See Note, supra note 275, at 435 (psychopaths appear to be nearly average persons, of
varying degrees of intelligence, as well able to manage their own affairs and conduct themselves
in society; their anti-social actions appear "bad" to others who do not recognize that behavior
results from mental illness).
332. See Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (remorseless
attitude of sociopathic offender constituted continuing threat to society and qualified as an
aggravating factor).
333. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 336 (mandatory death statute violates eighth and
fourteenth amendments); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305 (same).
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eighth amendment advanced by the plurality of. Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens. At base, that framework insists upon death
sentencing systems that are consistent with "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 33 4 From that
base rise two requirements: that the death penalty be consistent with
"public attitudes" toward punishment, and that the system accord
with "human dignity." This latter requirement also has two parts-one
substantive, requiring that the punishment be penologically justified
and proportionate to the offense committed, and one procedural,
requiring nonarbitrary administration of punishment through the
guided and individually oriented discretion of the sentencing
authority.
This article has focused primarily on this latter, guided individuali-
zation requirement. It has concluded that satisfaction of that
requirement mandates first that no offender be executed until the
sentencing authority considers the full range of factors mitigating the
propriety of that penalty; second, in cases of jury sentencing, the court
must take special precautions to instruct the jury on the theory of the
defendant's mitigatory case. More specifically, this article has
analyzed the dictates of guided individualization in the case of the
mentally disordered defendant. It has concluded that the public
attitudes and penological justifications necessary to support a
constitutional death penalty system support the mitigatory considera-
tion of mental abnormality, at least if it inspires compassion for the
defendant, dilutes his responsibility, impedes his ability to react to
the threat of punishment, or impairs the educative impact of his
execution on the public.
In these conclusions lies the apparent lesson that the standards of
decency marking the progress of a maturing society evolve and
become ensconced in legal procedures with varying degrees of
dispatch. Thus, it took almost a century for the occasionally expressed
view that the law's "external standards [should] not take account of
incapacities, unless the weakness is so marked as to [establish]
madness," '335 to evolve into today's unequivocal view that such
incapacities should at least moderate punishment. By contrast, it took
only five years for Justice Harlan's statement that death sentencing
guidelines could embody only "meaningless 'boiler-plate' " to evolve
into the view of the plurality in the July 2 Cases that such guidelines
are the most basic prerequisite to constitutional death sentencing.
334. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
335. 0. W. HOLMES, THE CONION LAW 48 (1881).
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Moreover, this uncertain durability of the announced standards of
contemporary decency to any stage of a society's development
suggests a more important lesson: If death sentencing authorities are
unwilling or unable to apply the mitigation standards that have
evolved into constitutional edicts-and, in the context of disordered
offenders, the intractability of jurors suggests that they may be
336 -
must not the standard that now permits the death penalty give way to
a standard that forbids it?
For now, the Supreme Court has declined to recognize this
possibility, although not without acknowledging the underlying
problems. Instead, it has developed its own approach based on two
premises: that eventually the rule of law can be made to prevail in
each imposition of the death sentence; and that meanwhile, in those
cases in which it has not at first prevailed, its success can be assured
upon appellate review. Should these premises be undermined by the
difficulty of administering any standards, no matter how unequi-
vocally evolved, we are left where we began-with Professor Kalven's
relentless questions:
What does it mean about the nature of the death penalty
that either it cannot ... be administered through a set of
rules guiding its allocation or that no responsible organ of
government is willing to take on the burden of allocating it?
What, that is, does it mean about the death penalty that its
administration must depend so heavily on the quality of
mercy?
37
336. See note 275 supra
337. Kalven, supra note 2, at 25.
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